Indebted to History

The Hartlepool by-election result- Opinion piece on the root of the Conservative's success and what this means for Labour

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Fri, 07 May 2021 10:55:14 GMT

My hot take that nobody asked for on the results of yesterdays elections- surrounding Conservative successes after 10 years of government, Labour, Hartlepool and its slipping heartlands;

The Context:

Hartlepool has been lost by Labour to the Conservatives for the first time in 62 years (it's not quite as simple as the current Corbynite vs Blairite argument as to why as I'll explain). The Hartlepool result though is an issue for Labour as the way it was won puts on the line 34-odd other Labour seats- an election in 2023 (or even next year according to some rumors if the Conservatives repeal the Fixed Term act asap) could see Labour well and truly devastated and in danger of going the way of so many other European left-wing parties.

It's important to note for Labour that this result is one that comes 11 years into a Conservative government. This is a dire situation for an opposition party. Some commentators are highlighting that on current trend, Hartlepool confirms that the Conservatives 'Blair moment' of 2019 when Labour broke through in 1997 into traditional Conservative areas, is not a Brexit fluke, but indeed the continuation of a long-term sustained trend. For Blair his breakthrough led to 10 further years in power for Labour. For the Conservatives this is very likely too as the shift continues in Labours former Red Wall heartlands.

Voter turnout- no excuse for Labour's left or right:

One defense of Labour's poor turnout being offered is that many pro-Labour voters chose to stay at home rather than come out in support of the party, and so Labour under Starmer or Corbyn (depending on who you talk to/is trying to spin it) isn't the issue. This however isn't really the case. While indeed the turnout this time was 42.3% compared to 57.9% in 2019 and 59.2% in 2017, the missing 15% would not have made any real dent in the figures, even if they all went and voted for Labour. The Conservatives would still gain the seat by a solid 8% swing.

Root of Conservative success: Adaptability combined with an understanding that Britain's electoral meta is currently a public that is left-wing economically and small-c conservative on cultural issues:

The key to understanding this the Conservatives shift pragmatically on policy spectrum as needed and sit astride Britain's current electoral meta with the British public (for FPTP at least) is a majority who are left-wing economically, but small-c conservative on cultural issues.

Labour's issue is thus not the one currently being battled about between the parties right and left (i.e. the party needs to go full-Blairite vs back to Corbyn who held Hartlepool- it's important to note here Hartlepool was held under Corbyn due to the Brexit Party splitting the vote- that Brexit Party vote yesterday all went not to Labour, but to the Conservatives , while this may be due to Keir Starmer's former position on Brexit, and the Labour candidate being a former remain supporter , it's unlikely that such a universal swing away from Labour was made on just that issue alone). Both of these sides are mired in the small detail and not seeing the bigger picture and real problem. The issue for Labour is as noted- that modern Britain has an electorate that generally is left-wing on economic issues, and small-c conservative on cultural ones.

This was something recognized by Theresa May, and you saw some polling shift in Labour heartlands both around Brexit, but also May's concentration on economic policy frameworks for "Just about Managing" voters.

Boris Johnson's leadership took this further, adopting policies that have the Thatcherite wing of the Conservatives very uncomfortable (Large scale state spending on infrastructure, tax hikes, increase in state intervention and spending in the economy, government centered research etc). His concentration on 'leveling up' the north is divisive internally (and among Conservative activists in the South East) but highlights a Conservative party that is doing what its always done- changing to meet the times in sometimes paradoxical and contradictory ways-

Disraeli's conservatives were anti-liberal

Sailsbury's were liberal and anti-socialist

Macmillan's embraced socialist statism

Thatcher revamped classical liberalism to roll back the state

Johnson's One Nation economically left politics is a complete u-turn on Thatcher

The Conservatives were able to shift with the electoral center-ground, and from there shape it once in power.

Because of this the Conservatives are one of the most successful political parties in the world. Of the last 120 years, Labour has only been in power for 30 of them. This is because the Conservatives are ruthless in adapting to a changing electorate and completely flexible in policy platform, often quickly adopting a stance that was completely at odds with their former position (remember when they dubbed Ed Milliband's policies as communist, before promptly adopting them a few years later, and Corbyn's shift towards further left-wing economic platforms has allowed May and now Johnson to follow left in his wake).

Britain's current electoral 'meta' under FPTP of left-wing economic and culturally small-c conservative voters dominating the ability to win seats has been recognized and leapt upon by the Conservatives.

The difficulties for Labour (-primarily the Conservatives currently sit astride the new center ground of British politics):

This will make any Labour gain or path forward incredibly difficult. The Conservatives are occupying their former stomping ground and are quite prepared to spend in a way totally at odds with Cameron's previous austerity framework- a Labour party that goes further left (return to Corbyn) risk being seen and tarred as "too radical", while the Conservatives can "play it safe" following in their wake, as indeed Johnson has done, promising economic policies that satisfy the electorates economic appetite. A Blairite Labour however would be at risk of the Conservatives actually offering more radical left-wing policies than they, while also keeping well away officially from US style "culture wars" that don't go down well, however well intended, with the electoral groups needed to win seats at Westminster- an aspect where Labour under Corbynite or Blairite control would struggle to remain distant from.

Crafting policy for Labour is going to be incredible difficult going forward so long as the Conservatives continue to sit astride this economic-left, culturally-small c meta.

This is exacerbated of course by the fact that historically Labour are held to a far higher standard of scrutiny than the Conservatives- to win Labour have to highlight in detail how policies they offer will work, be paid for and have a far higher degree of professionalism in their conduct (allegations of sleaze for instance, until they build to critical levels tend to not really effect Conservative MP's and their vote shares in the same way as they do to Labour).

But some things that could improve things for Labour-

A ) PR would change things- unlikely to ever happen in the UK

B ) Conservatives fail to deliver upon their left-wing economic platform of "leveling up"- however this doesn't mean voters would go back to Labour and also it means agency is entirely in the government's remit, and results will be judged just as much on perception as on actual reality.

C ) The Conservatives ditch Boris Johnson and shift back to a more Cameron or Thatcherite platform that gives space for Labour to flourish in the economic field. This could happen given there is a lot of disquiet on the backbenches and among the core Conservative vote about the direction of the party (Activists have accused Johnson of being a communist). However, it's very unlikely as long as Johnson keeps winning- the Conservatives are infamous pragmatists above all.

D ) Labour creates a viable and large-scale modernizing policy platform that primarily emphasizes the economic aspects of change. Labour win they build "visions for the future" that envisage the raising of standards of living. Labour should not pitch a platform that is based or emphasizes their stance (and indeed divides) on cultural issues- unlike the US, there is more to be lost electorally than gained in terms of voters. Once in power Labour can address this as it sees fit.

The Profit Drive: The innovative success of the Dutch Vereenigde Oost-Indische (VOC) as an imperial model (1602-1700)

Fri, 09 Apr 2021 19:07:01 GMT

A comparative overview of the rise of the VOC in the eastern hemisphere and success as a model of early imperialism through a geopolitical, economic, social and military lens

Abstract : This article explores through a comparative perspective with its contemporary rivals the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and its success and innovation as an imperial model. The VOC is responsible for trail-blazing many of the modern commercial practices we know today such as public stocks and bonds, but it was also in its time a new and innovative model of imperialism, based on efficiency and commerce rather than older conceptions that mixed gold alongside glory and god. It would inspire a string of larger and more successful imitators, the most famous of which was the British East India Company which overtook the VOC in the later 1640s. Prior to this the VOC dominated Europe-Asiatic trade having displaced Portugal and Spain in the eastern hemisphere as the most successful European imperial actor.

Introduction:

The Dutch indirectly ruled their eastern possessions through the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), a private entity which built, facilitated, and administered Dutch expansion in the eastern hemisphere from its founding in 1602. The VOC shared similarities with contemporary empires like Portugal in methods of administration, but uniquely for the time emphasised long-term profits as its foremost aim, with its directors stating that ‘profitable trade… is the principal reason for and aim of this company’ (Hereen XVII, quoted in Steensgaard, 1982, p.17). This focus was due to the United Provinces uniquely having a large and influential merchant class at home, and its eastern-hemisphere expansion being coordinated and overseen by a business enterprise accountable to its investors aboard, rather than being an entity directly under state control. The VOC thus lacked the broader multi-purpose nature of other contemporary empires with aspects like geopolitical competition subsumed to the pursuit of profit maximization.

Comparisons here will be mainly drawn primarily from Portugal’s Estado da India and Russia with limited references to other contemporary empires. Portugal due to its role as the VOC's most significant early rival in the eastern hemisphere and its similar contexts and challenges as a fellow small maritime state, will show how the VOC uniquely acted with profitability as its sole aim. Russia as a continuous empire will provide a contrast for the elements that the Dutch VOC lacked as they were unnecessary in a profit-driven enterprise.

What the VOC? A unique success story and kick-starter for the 17th Century:

The VOC was a truly unique and pathfinding organization. It was in technical terms a state chartered joint-stock company (Grell, 2008, p.218). In practice it operated as a privately owned sub-imperialist body organized as a sovereign power, but with the functions of a business partnership (Steensgaard, 1982, p.3). It was the first large-scale organization with such a form. Only in 1670 would their British equivalent in the ‘East India Company’ acquire similar powers (Niall Ferguson, 2003 p.20), in imitation of the VOC. Indeed, British expansion in the eastern hemisphere during the 17th century was heavily inspired by the Dutch VOC model. The scale of its economic success made abundantly clear when in 1622 its Governor-general Jan Pietersz Coen reported Dutch capital in Asia amounted to 2.9 million florins, while Portuguese-Spanish capital was only around half a million (Steensgaard, 1982, p.16). This disparity was due to the VOC’s globalist outlook as it uniquely sold directly to the most profitable places, not constraining itself to the exclusive periphery-core trading relationship used among all other contemporary empires (Steensgaard, 1982, p.3). For the VOC this meant it generated a larger reserve of capital than its rivals, which also uniquely in Europe was mostly reinvested, highlighting a ruthless streak of profiteering as the Netherlands did not, as others, directly reap the material benefits of empire, but rather put their returns to good use in expanding their operation.

The VOC as an imperial actor:

The VOC’s powers derived from its state given charter to maintain troops, negotiate with foreign powers, impose governors on its holdings, and wage war (Grell, 2008, p.218), these powers were effectively the Dutch state outsourcing its own role. The VOC could be construed as a state arm in-so-far as it provided aid to the United Provinces during its inter-state competition with rival European powers, much in the same way that Portugal’s Estado da India helped fulfil Portugal’s competitive and crusading ambitions through weakening the revenues of key Islamic powers such as the Mamelukes and Ottomans (Grell, 2008, p.201). However, the VOC was significantly different as a state-arm. Its Governor was not an extension of state as a Portuguese Estado da India viceroy was, but a merchant representing a private business, (Grell, 2008, p.218) held accountable to directors and investors (Hereen XVII). A fact highlighted with the VOC’s investors and director’s reminder to Governor-General Coen that the objective of profits over glory-seeking enterprises was to be strictly ‘obeyed’ (Hereen XVII, quoted in Steensgaard, 1982, p.17).

In contrast Jan Van Linschoten, a Dutch merchant in the late-16th century, states a Portuguese viceroy had ‘absolute power’ bestowed directly from the Portuguese Monarch allowing them to act as they pleased without significant reference to others (Van Linshoten, 1964a, p. 1). While this is perhaps an exaggeration of a viceroys powers lending from Van Linschoten’s heavy critiquing of the Portuguese system (Van Linshoten, 1964a, p.1), possibly in favour of the limited powers given to VOC governors who also needed their council’s approval to act (Grell, 2008, p.218). It does though bear a significant degree of truth showcased by the Portuguese crown’s instructions that the viceroy be obeyed as if ‘[the King] had…commanded it’ (Grell, 2008, p.200). A fact made necessary due to the length of time orders and communications from the central state could take to reach the imperial periphery, typically a message and its response could take a full year (Chaudhuri, p.57-70).

God, Gold or Glory? The VOC’s profit motive

Portugal’s direct control through their viceroy meant that unlike the VOC’s clear profit driven enterprise, multiple ambitions and aims clashed within its apparatus. The Portuguese crown’s religious aim of marginalizing and weakening Islamic power in Europe and the Middle East through undermining their spice revenue monopoly (Grell, 2008, p.201) and the expansion of state income through tribute and maritime trade to off-set Portugal’s resource disadvantage compared to its Christian European rivals (Grell, 2008, p.194), conflicted with the Fidalgos (sons of Portuguese gentry- a lower nobility) who in their capacity as state officials with a culture of feudal militarism saw conflict, and the glory and prestige found within it, as the only path to success (Grell, 2008, p.195). They specifically sought out personal wealth and societal prestige through plunder (Van Linshoten, 1964a, p.2), which conflicted with the stable economic growth needed if Portugal was to grow its economic power in a sustainable way to compete with European rivals.

This is perhaps the reason why a Portuguese merchant in 1626 identified that both king and nobles ‘thought more highly of soldiering than of …trade’ (Solis, quoted in Steensgaard, 1982, p.17) The cost of militarisation for goals other than the pursuit of economic profit detracted from potential crown revenues. Meanwhile while the VOC recognized that military action might be needed in the course of its form of imperial expansion, this was carefully budgeted within its expenses, and only needed to be engaged in if a power was aiming to harm its profitable trade, or prevent the expansion of its trade networks. This is highlighted most succinctly by the VOC dismantling a number of its military assets in Asia as soon as their need had passed (Grell, 2008, p.219).

A sophisticated economic operator

As in Russia, Portuguese merchants had very little influence over state policy. This is most ably shown in the direct crown control of the spice monopoly in Portugal which forced the sale of spice immediately and in bulk to Portuguese ports. The VOC however, with a society in which the merchant classes held political influence within the unique monarchical-republic of the United Provinces were able to operate with a greater degree of market sophistication as they withheld their spice stocks so as to not flood the market and thus consistently manipulated favourable profits far in excess of those Portugal and other contemporaries achieved (Steensgaard, 1982, p.3).

The geopolitical weaponization of the profit drive

The VOC aims in maximizing profits alternatively complimented the government of the United Provinces, particularly in the context of its competition with the Portuguese-Spanish crown-union. The VOC was set up originally indeed to circumvent an embargo on Dutch merchants buying spices in Lisbon due to the ongoing Eighty years War (1568-1648) by controlling eastern commodities at source, whilst stemming declining profits due to Dutch merchants competing against one another, as well as their foreign counterparts (Grell, 2008, p.217-18). This coincided with the United Provinces’ aim of striking back at their Portuguese and Spanish rivals in a way that they may engage on equal terms due to the strength of their maritime forces, and weaken Portugal-Spain’s vastly larger military machine (Steensgaard, 1982, p.5).

As the Dutch Republic was uniquely dominated by merchants at the political level, many of whom held an interest in the Asian trade (Grell, 2008, p.214), the economic was married to the geopolitical. The VOC was tasked to muscle in on Portuguese and Spanish eastern trade networks and disrupting their shipping. It was to ruthlessly pursue profit, and so in the process aid the Dutch state by disrupting and diminishing the income its rivals in lucrative markets, and by boosting the revenue of the Dutch state and political elite, which could then be further spent on defence. This resulted in a specific understanding that the VOC’s market domination and thus profitability was central to both its own affairs, and those of the United Provinces.

Commerce over politics

That the Dutch did not remove the Portuguese entirely from the East Indies, as the Russians had overran their rival Novgorod in 1478, shows that state competition was not a main factor. This is despite the VOC’s ability to make money and disrupt trade being incredibly helpful to the United Provinces in this area.

The VOC had the ability to wipe out Portugal’s Asian presence, holding as it did the largest stock of modern ships in Europe, their type of galleon being far faster, cheaper and more powerful than Portugal’s equivalents. Indeed Portugal continued to rely on old stocks of medieval carracks for much of its trade (Grell, 2008, p.199 and 215). This disparity is highlighted in Francesco Carletti’s 1602 account of the Dutch ‘ruining’ the Portuguese carrack he was on and plundering it with ease (Carletti, 1964d, p.1). There are three Dutch ships noted in the encounter perhaps showing their regional superiority, and the battle is portrayed as one sided in favour of the far more manoeuvrable Dutch galleons. While Carletti might be overly critical of the Portuguese carrack’s ability to cope military due to his resulting financial loss (Carletti, 1964b, p.2), the encounter regardless remains a Dutch victory.

Despite these material military advantages, the VOC did not attempt to eliminate the Portuguese presence in Asia, unless the Portuguese were specifically disrupting trade, or sitting on a particularly lucrative position. It was simply not in the VOC’s interest who answered to its shareholders before any state considerations. This is highlighted in the VOC’s directors’ chastisement of Governor-General Coen that the VOC’s military costs need to be reduced (Grell, 2008, pp.218-19), despite the fact that war is raging at the time. This is unexpected to say the least if state competition and expansion were deemed at all important aims for the VOC, especially as it was actively involved in a global war with Portugal. Indeed, Russia who aimed to compete with rival western and southern states prioritized military budgeting specifically to dominate its vast territory and expanded partly as a means to secure further revenue to pay for this (Chant, 2008, p.246).

Budget warfare

Instead the Dutch used their superior fleet to hit Portuguese return shipping. Forty-five percent of which was sunk in 1600 (Grell, 2008, p.216), probably because like Carletti’s returning ship, they were laden with goods to be seized by their VOC counterparts. That this was the primary strategy employed by the VOC to contribute directly to the war effort- maritime commerce raiding, rather than pushing the Portuguese out of the region, or physically expelling their forts highlights how military action for the VOC is subsumed into simply being another means of making a profit. The Portuguese were thus squeezed out of the market, but not the eastern hemisphere, and the VOC received revenue from encouraging business-minded privateering.

Dutch shipping superiority was also used to uniquely change and secure the eastern intercontinental trade lanes and largely displace the traditional routes (Grell, 2008, p.223) to favour the Dutch at the expense of their rivals. The journey was thus also rendered more efficient, being faster and more secure, indicating that profitability and decreasing risk was the key concern. By comparison Portugal’s Estado da India had relied in Asia on simply partaking in the existing regional trade systems and were satisfied by gaining an income primarily through customs duties and shipping passes enforced by a string of forts and bases built to command these traditional trade systems (Grell, 2008, p.207).

By direct comparison Spain created a new American trade lane with their annual treasure fleet, but the driving force here was not profitability, however. The revenues, as with Russia’s drive for increased economic returns were used to pay for military enterprise in Flanders to prop up Habsburg power against the United Provinces and other rivals and act as collateral on loans to keep the monarchy solvent (Waites, 2008, p.150). The English raided Spanish shipping lanes though unlike the Dutch they did so individually for personal wealth of the privateer captains and as part of state rivalry (Williams, 2008a, p.1). They did not set up for this venture an organized business arm with sophisticated commercial practices as the Dutch had.

Side Note: Shipping Changes:

The VOC’s larger stock of modern ships allowed them to seize commercial and strategic superiority from Portugal. In doing so they came to dominate key regional trade lanes, shifting them through volume to a way that suited the VOC (routing much traffic through Batavia, which became the VOC-owned controller of European trade in South-East Asia). The VOC also discovered and utilized the Brouwer route- founded by VOC explorer Hendrik Brouwer. It was a straight crossing from the Cape and up towards Java, and by 1616 was compulsory for all VOC ships travelling to the region. The winds on the route allowed for greatly increased speed, and thus shipping efficiency, which translated into profits. Though it required a skilled captain to make use of due to the difficulties navigating it without an accurate way to determine longitude at the time. In this way it was far safer for VOC ships, who were less likely to fall victim to disruption or piracy from regional or European rivals, and the expected usage meant VOC captains were experienced enough to utilize it effectively. It would displace the traditional Monsoon route used by the Portuguese. (Parthesius, 2010, pp.1-59)

Endemic economic short-termism vs the VOC’s long-term outlook

All this goes to highlight the short-term economic natures of most empires in comparison with the VOC’s long-term outlook. Portugal relied on local trade from which it skimmed profits (Grell, 2008, p.195). Likewise, English privateers were reliant on continued Spanish economic activity and a state of war. Spain’s wholesale extraction of commodities actually collapsed Spanish commerce (Waites, 2008, p.151) showing the pre-eminence of the state interests in these cases over those of their merchants. Meanwhile the Dutch uniquely sought to create a stable controlled trading monopoly keeping commodities profitable, but not so high that rivals would be tempted to take the risk and try and muscle in on market share, in a serious way (Steensgaard, 1982, p.3) avoiding the circumstances which had made Portugal a target for them, and ensuring that as far as possible they could keep their own military spending and activity commensurately low, ensuring higher returns from their commercial activity and greater focus on economic expansion.

To ensure this the VOC aimed to control trading commodities directly like the Spice Isles, which were seized and made a plantation colony (Szczepankski, 2016) giving them greater control over pricing and scarcity. Portugal in comparison had relied on local merchants and facilitators to sell the commodities to them in the region for re-export to Europe.

The use and role of a physical presence in Asia

The VOC did though borrow the idea of regional enclaves from Portugal as these were pragmatic and efficient bases of operation (and control). They were necessary as economically and militarily powerful and populous states surrounded the India Ocean in this era, such as the Mughals, Indian kingdoms, Khmer and China to name a few who were capable of successfully combatting the smaller European presence and utilized similar technology, or imported it in from Europe (Scammell, 1980, p.3). This was a situation vastly unlike Spain’s American or Russia’s Siberian experience where existing states and entities were far weaker than the new arrivals and lacked comparable technology.

The Portuguese enclaves were placed strategically to control local shipping and extract tribute from the area (Grell, 2008, p.207). The cost of running this system, due to the large-scale military presence needed at each outpost, and the sheer amount of enclaves, led an English ambassador in the east to note in 1616 that it was Portugal’s ‘beggaring’ (Roe, quoted in Steensgaard, 1982, p.16) correlating with Solis’ previous comment that Portugal relegated commerce in favour of short-term state revenues and military presence.

VOC enclaves to facilitate their trading lanes were placed to directly control commodities like at Banda with its spice (Szczepanski, 2016), rather than simply to project power over a nearby territory. As such while the Portuguese expanded their physical presence, the Dutch were more cost-efficient; their directors even suggested removing a number of enclaves to streamline the VOC’s presence due to their existence being unnecessary for profit (Grell, 2008, p.219). Something unheard of in other contemporary empires as state-led expansion was linked to state and personal glory, Portugal for instance held onto unprofitable regions, and fought to do so due to prestige. (Williams, 2008b, p.116) a factor the VOC downplayed in its own calculations.

Social, cultural and settler integration

The Portuguese enclaves also differed from the Dutch as argued by Malyn Newitt by being small-scale settlement colonies with large numbers of Portuguese men settling and creating a mixed ‘Luso-Asian’ colonial population. This is evidenced in Carletti’s account of the Portuguese enclave of Goa, where the most marriageable women are ‘born…of Portuguese fathers’ (Carletti, 1964c, p.2). By this it is clear that there has been wide scale and historic cultural integration between Portuguese and Indians, and also that Portuguese men are commonly during the writers’ time, seeking local women to marry and settle down with in the enclave.

Carletti further notes that baptism is a common practice for all subjects, as is Portuguese fashion indicating the adoption of Portuguese culture and religion by Indians, creating a colonial population with ties to Portugal.

The few Dutch who settled in Asia themselves married Luso-Asian women, thus not creating a similar loyal colonial population. These women and their families tended to keep their Portuguese culture and Catholicism (Grell, 2008, p.223). The ecological footprint of the VOC was thus comparatively small as they did not transpose their culture unlike Portugal. The Portuguese’s more widespread presence as settlers was helped by Portuguese service-men having to pay for their own passage home, an exorbitant prospect that could cost up to a full years wages for many (Van Linshoten, 1964b, p.1), resulting in the poorer sailors and officials settling in ‘miserie’ as Linschoten’s writes at the time (Van Linshoten, 1964b, p.1). Though Linschoten’s accounts negative focus contrasts with Carletti’s idyllic lifestyle for Portuguese settlers (Carletti, 1964c, p.2) perhaps because of bias or the discussion of different social classes. Regardless large numbers of Portuguese settled to create a large mixed colonial population.

By contrast most Dutch officials returned home after service (Grell, 2008, p.223). This when combined with the fact that the VOC applied strict trading restrictions on any company officials who chose to remain in the eastern hemisphere after their contract was up implies a policy of discouragement for settlers. This is likely because of the VOCs business focus. The independent trading of these individuals could disrupt the VOC’s ability to control profits and would affect their market monopoly and share. In contrast to attract settlers Russia gave ‘financial aid’ to prospective colonists of its eastern expansion to help them create a sustainable living for themselves, and eventually contribute to the state (Veradsky, 1972, p.1). The Dutch enclaves are thus one-dimensional in comparison to other states’ multi-functional settlements, being just assets to secure and facilitate trade and profit, rather than as dynamic settlements were integration and sustainability of presence was deemed important goals.

The treatment of indigenous peoples

The VOC was similarly pragmatic with indigenous peoples. They were uninterested in influencing local culture, society, or religion. This ran counter to Portugal’s creation of an informal empire in Japan with the active conversion of ‘300,000’ (Carletti, 1964a, p.2) locals by their state-sponsored Jesuits (Grell, 2008, p.211) and Spain’s conquest-based campaigns to ‘civilize’ non-Christians evidenced by Bernal Diaz justifying his participation in the massacre at Cholula as saving indigenes from ‘a state of idolatry’ in the long-term (Diaz, 1963 [c.1570], p.11). The VOC meanwhile concentrated on trade and economic gain, not souls.

Religion was a fundamental part of contemporary life; it was not merely a cynical legitimisation for exploitation. The Spanish encomienda were meant to facilitate the conversion of Amerindians as well as utilizing their labour for economic gain. They were specifically chartered with having responsibility for their workers religious welfare (Waites, 2008, p.133). This highlights the entwined nature of economics with religion for most empires, excepting the VOC and Russia.

Instead Russia was careful to maintain stable revenues for the crown, even forbidding Russians to baptize indigenous peoples (Dmytryshyn, 1991, p.5) as once baptized, subjects could become enslaved and removed from directly paying tribute. Moreover, Russia incorporated indigene nobles into what M.I. Finley terms an imperial hierarchy regardless of their religion or culture (Chant, 2008, p.240). Spain also did this through the vassalage of indigenous rulers (Waites, 2008, p.141).

The Dutch lacked an imperial hierarchy as its maintenance was costly. The VOC were more interested in allying with indigenous peoples against Portugal rather than adopting them into their own imperial system. This was not altruistic by any means but was meant to further diminish the Portuguese threat to VOC control of profitable commodities by making their presence difficult to maintain (Steensgaard, 1982, p.9). It also meant the VOC could spend less on military enterprise, relying instead on local support. Further, The VOC also participated in the slave trade, indigenous kingdoms and powers would sell them their sells and the VOC would ship these to plantation colonies in the eastern hemisphere or elsewhere, or on to other European traders.

Conclusion

The lack of primary source coverage over-time and in an equal matter handicaps the analysis somewhat in presenting a full range of differences that might be correlated with one another, especially as sources are an individual’s experience and not indicative alone to the larger picture. This makes comprehensive analysis of every aspect difficult. This article is thus not exhaustive, but highlights through key elements the VOC’s importance in shaping the eastern Dutch empire by uniquely subsuming all other typical imperial interests of contemporaries to the pursuit of stable profits due to its nature as a business enterprise, supported by an understanding merchant-led state. This mitigated the competing interests that watered down the aim of profit in other empires. The VOC’s pursuit of permanency of profits acted as a model for future sub-imperialist enterprise as states like Britain and France saw a cost-efficient model for expansion which guaranteed economic returns without directly shouldering the costs of empire.

Bibliography:

Primary Sources:

Carletti, F. (1964a) First Chronicle of the East Indies. In Which is told the voyage from the Philippine Islands to those of Japan, and other notable things of that region, New York, Pantheon Books

Carletti, F. (1964b) Third Chronicle of the East Indies. Which treats of the voyage made from the island of Macao in China to Malacca and thence to Goa, and of what occurred during that voyage, New York, Pantheon Books

Carletti, F. (1964c) Fourth Chronicle of the East Indies, Dealing with the debarking and stay in the city of Goa, up to embarking for Lisbon, with all other particulars of the matters of India, New York, Pantheon Books

Carletti, F. (1964d) Fifth Chronicle of the Second Oriental Account, Which deals with the departure from Goa en route for Lisbon and with what happened that voyage up to arrival in Zeeland, New York, Pantheon Books

Diaz, B. (1963 [c.1570]) The Conquest of New Spain, Harmondsworth, Penguin

Dmytryshyn, B. (1991) A petition on the Siberian fur trade from the merchant Guselnikov to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich protesting excessive regulation of the fur trade in Siberia, 1639, Fort Worth, Texas, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers

Las Casas, B.D. (2004 [1552]) A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies, London, Penguin

Tavernier, J.B. (1925) Travels in India, London, Oxford University Press

Van Linshoten, J.H. (1964a) The Voyage of Jan Huyghen van Linschoten to the East Indies, New York, Thomas Y. Cromwell

Van Linshoten, J.H. (1964b) The Voyage of Jan Huyghen van Linschoten to the East Indies, New York, Thomas Y. Cromwell

Veradsky, G. (1972) VIII:77. Administrative instructions for Western Siberia, 1664–1680, New Haven and London, Yale University Press

Secondary Sources:

Chaudhuri, K. N., (1992), ‘The Portuguese Maritime Empire, Trade and Society in the Indian Ocean During the Sixteenth Century’, Portuguese Studies, 8, p 57-70.

Chant, C. (2008) ‘The Expansion Of Russia 1500-1725’, How do empires begin?, Milton Keynes, The Open University

Ferguson, N. (2003) Empire: How Britain Made The Modern World, London, Allen Lane

Grell, O.P. (2008) ‘Empires of Trade? The Portuguese And The Dutch In East Asia 1580-1670’, How do empires begin?. Milton Keynes, The Open University.

Hack, K. (2008) ‘Tools And Terms For Studying Empires’, What are empires?, Milton Keynes, The Open University.

Parthesius, R., (2010) Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters: The Development of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) Shipping Network in Asia 1595-1660, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Scammell, G.V., (1980) ‘Indigenous assistance in the establishment of Portuguese power in Asia in the sixteenth century’, Modern Asian Studies Vol.14 no.1

Steensgaard, N., (1982) ‘The Dutch East India Company as an institutional innovation’, Dutch Capitalism and World Capitalism, Cambridge University Press

Waites, B. (2008) ‘The Beginning Of Atlantic Empires: Spain In The New World’, How do empires begin?. Milton Keynes, The Open University.

Williams, C.A. (2008a) ‘Pirates, Pilgrims, Plantations and Pigs: The Beginnings Of The British Atlantic Empire 1497-1660’, How do empires begin? Milton Keynes, The Open University.

Williams, C.A. (2008b) ‘Introduction’, How do empires begin?. Milton Keynes, The Open University.

Online Sources:

Szczepanski, K. (2016) ‘The Bandas Massacre’ in Nutmeg: The Unsavoury History Of A Tasty Spice [Online]. Available at: http://asianhistory.about.com/od/colonialisminasia/p/Nutmeg-Unsavory-History.htm (Accessed 19th December 2017)

The South China Sea will continue to be the primary arena of US-China geopolitical competition under the Biden Presidency.

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Wed, 27 Jan 2021 12:32:18 GMT

Tensions over the South China Sea to remain high as Biden reaffirms regional commitments and Beijing ramps-up displays of its airpower.

A US carrier group on Sunday crossed into the disputed South China Sea to carry out ‘Freedom of navigation’ operations and reassure regional partners of the US’ continuing support for their struggle with China over island and maritime claims , the ownership of which would bestow significant influence and control over a region which facilitates 1/3rd of all global shipping .

China has decried the move as “ not conducive to peace and stability in the region ”. However, at the same time in its own provocative move the Chinese air force carried out a large-scale incursion of Taiwanese airspace using fighters and nuclear-capable bombers for the first time . No comment has yet been made by Beijing as to the specific reason for this escalation, though undoubtedly it was linked to the imminent arrival of the US Carrier Group and more broadly is just the latest escalation in a historic dispute over both competing South China Sea claims , and the very nature of Taiwanese sovereignty, with both Beijing and Taipei both claiming to be the legitimate Chinese government after the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949) saw the split of China into the two self-governing entities.

Taiwan as a key US partner, particularly due to its strategic location and area-of-denial capability has received a “ rock-solid ” US commitment to support its dispute, as Biden continues Trumps policy of increasing cooperation with Taipei . An important point since Taiwan is not officially recognized by the US, or indeed most states around the world, due to the success of Beijing's ' One China ' policy making such a feat incredibly difficult without dramatically increasing tensions, and so diplomatic relations and material aid to Taiwan has always been a fraught affair, despite its importance to US regional strategy.

Similarly, the Biden administration has also reaffirmed its commitment to other key regional partners like Japan as it continues to try and create an anti-Beijing alliance, and a military buffer where the South China Sea issue is concerned at least. This is made all the more difficult though as several key and prospective US partners also dispute certain elements of the South China Sea among themselves , as well as Beijing, making stable cooperation fragile and difficult, though China's far more aggressive and widespread moves somewhat alleviate this as Beijing paints itself as the key disruptive element for regional powers.

Biden has also sent a signal of his willingness to continue US confrontation with Beijing by his appointment of several Cabinet members who have made “ aggressive ” public comments against Beijing, both on its South China Strategy, its wider global aims and the perceived hostile economic policies from which China benefits as the expense of domestic industries elsewhere (Janet Yellen's comments on currency manipulation for instance).

These points combined with the longer-term commitment later this year for the US and Royal Navy to carry out further South China Sea operations means that any hoped for ‘ great reset ’ in US-China relations is now highly unlikely as Biden continues the previous administrations policy of confrontation with Beijing over economic and security matters. The South China Sea thus will remain the primary, though not exclusive , arena of this growing great power competition.

Covid-19’s fallout drives a shift in China’s Belt and Road priorities

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Tue, 26 Jan 2021 16:50:52 GMT

Cash for political clout is out, as economic viability takes great prominence among Beijing's considerations.

Above image of states which have signed cooperation agreements related to the Belt and Road Initiative ( Wikimedia Commons )

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is beginning to gather steam once more after its Covid-19 forced slow down , as China’s Foreign Minister visited five key African partners to explore further investment.

However, there can be detected a shift towards a more cautious policy for BRI expansion, informed by the economic fallout of Coronavirus, which hit the global and Chinese economy hard. Though in China’s case the true impact of Covid-19 might be more psychological than material, as while economically it has sprung back quickly and is now growing at a faster rate than prior to the pandemic , Covid-19 also represented the first time the Chinese economy has contracted since the 1970s when Mao-era collectivization was abolished. This psychological shock, for a state whose legitimacy rests on providing ever-increasing economic growth and so raising the living standards for its citizens in return for them accepting its authoritarian model of governance , and combined with the economic weakness of BRI partners has seemingly awakened a more fiscally cautious streak in Beijing as it becomes more concerned about securing a reasonable and stable return on its large-scale investments in partners, to compliment the expected geopolitical gains, rather than the latter dominating the agenda .

The evidence for this switch is most apparent in Pakistan this week, which has long been the most important element of the BRI for Beijing. Dubbed the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), geopolitically it gives Beijing secure and direct access to the Persian Gulf , limits the ‘safe spaces’ for Uighur militants who utilize Northern Pakistan as a safe harbor, and also more broadly surrounds and isolates China’s regional rival, India, and specifically pressures its contestation of the Kashmir region .

These geopolitical and security reasons are why China as of 2020 has invested $60 billion in Pakistan , the largest of any BRI partners , and why China currently is the biggest lender to Pakistan owning 1/5 of Pakistan’s total debt and rising. This has caused some experts to argue that Pakistan is fast becoming a victim of Beijing’s neo-colonial debt-trap diplomacy . With Pakistan potentially soon unable to pay back Beijing and instead being forced to give up assets or political control, as happened in Sri Lanka when China directly seized Hambantota Port for 99 years as Sri Lanka fell behind on its debt repayments.

However, in contradiction to this, it is Pakistan’s debt levels that are causing it a rift with China over CPEC. Pakistan is demanding further Chinese loans at concessionary rates , while China is reluctant due to Pakistan’s uncertain ability to pay these back , and its political instability delaying stable repayment , even going so far as to for the first time ever delay the gathering of the China-Pakistan Joint Cooperation Committee which oversees and makes decisions regarding CPEC until terms more favourable to China can be reached.

This firmer stance is new in an area that is of such vital importance to China geopolitically, and certainly sign-posts a more economically focused BRI that wants a monetary return for its investment beyond political influence (or an arguable pseudo-colony ). Whether this change has an impact on the sheer scope or expected overruns of BRI remains to be seen.

Space Empires (Part 1): NASA's latest announcement highlights how the Outer Space Treaty shapes but cannot prevent the pursuit of Space imperialism, with special reference to the Antarctic Treaty

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Sun, 06 Dec 2020 17:45:52 GMT

NASA's announcement that it intends to pay private enterprise for Moon rock is an attempt to create a workable system of ownership over extracted resources from celestial bodies that aims to circumvent the Outer Space Treaties prohibition on nations claiming sovereignty over territory in Space. Space legal specialists need to be wary of not mistaking a legally based dejure prohibition on ownership as applying in a defacto sense (which can then be later legalistically changed through challenge).

NASA has announced that it is going to pay private companies for Moon rocks between 50g and 500g and other objects of 'scientific value'. This is not however, an economic venture, the amount paid is paltry to the costs of collection, with one company getting as little as $1 as NASA are not paying for the development or transport costs, but simply the rocks themselves .

The creation of a business model for outer-space exploitation:

The fact though that money is exchanging hands at all is significant, as for both NASA and the four private enterprises commissioned; Lunar Outpost (USA), ispace Japan, ispace Europe, and Masten Space Systems (USA) it seeks to create a recognized and viable system of the commercial extraction, sale and use of outer-space resources by implementing a buyers and sellers market for space materials. The payment method for instance is structured so that ' companies will receive 10% of their total proposed price upon award, will receive 10% upon launch, and the remaining 80% upon successful completion '. This is clearly ridiculous for as small a sum as a mere $1, but its an attempt to set a precedent for future, more lucrative, transactions. The private enterprises meanwhile are getting valuable experience and practice at extracting outer-space resources.

This is important, because Space mining would take the economy of the earth onto a radically different footing through how incredibly lucrative, and necessary it is. Lucrative in terms of asteroids existing like '16 Psyche' , situated in the belt between Mars and Jupiter, whose metal content is valued at $10,000 quadrillion, compared to the entire global economy which in 2021 is expected to reach $149 trillion . Incidentally this is an asteroid that NASA is planning to visit in 2016. While its debated that such a shock to the earths global economy at the addition of such an asteroid could be negative , most analysts agree that the profits will actually be vast and the earths economy well able to adapt to make it a lucrative enterprise.

It is necessary in terms of the earths finite resources. For instance, rare earth materials like platinum are integral for 'green technologies', but its questionable if there is enough supply currently to keep up with its growing demand. Space though represents a vastly greater source of platinum that could be exploited to help aid the path towards sustainability on earth. This is not to mention the fact that shifting the mining emphasis to Space will mean far less contamination and pollution on Earth, with mining being a key contributor to environmental degradation .

The mining of resources in space is also big business in how it can help aid further space exploration . Having water, minerals and other resources available in space drastically reduces the cost of space exploration and increases its reach as there will be less reliance on costly supply rockets from Earth .

The creation of a concept of outer-space ownership:

More though than the implementation of a business model, there is the aim to create a recognized system of ownership for Space resources. NASA particular notes that;

' Companies will collect a small amount of lunar regolith from any location on the Moon and provide imagery to NASA of the collection and the collected material, along with data that identifies the collection location. Subsequent to receiving such imagery and data, an “in-place” transfer of ownership of the lunar regolith to NASA will take place. After ownership transfer, the collected material becomes the sole property of NASA for the agency’s use under the Artemis program. '

This has important implications, firstly NASA are at great pains to note that the collected material after transfer will become the 'sole property' of NASA. I.e. space resources once extracted can be owned by an agency, state or private body and thus utilized in any way deemed fit, in this case for use in NASA's project to put a man and woman on the Moon by 2024.

Further though there is an implicit note here that the companies extracting these from the Moon have ownership of whatever they have extracted, at the point of extraction (the mining site), as they may then 'transfer' the ownership of these 'in-place' to NASA once certain conditions are met. This is an attempt to solidify the 2015 US Commercial Space Act formulated and passed by the Obama administration, part of which set out to enable;

' A U.S. citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell it according to applicable law, including U.S. international obligations. '

The Act proved controversial, with European specialists in Space law arguing it contravened the UN Outer Space Treaty 1967 , whose Article II forbade the ' national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means '. The Obama administration was clearly though aware of the potential controversy as they actively noted in the Act that ' it is the sense of Congress that the United States does not, by enactment of this Act, assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or ownership of, any celestial body '. The concept here then is based on the idea that extraction of resources equates to ownership of the extracted resource at point of extraction, but just like economic activities in international waters , this does not mean that the territory occupied to perform the extraction means that someone is making a claim to 'own' that area in a dejure legal sense, it instead remains a 'global commons'.

This is exactly the case the US argues too, as Article I of the Outer Space Treaty essentially makes Space a global commons by stating;

' Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies .'

On top of forbidding the making of claims of sovereignty. Thus, the US concentrates merely on the ownership of extracted resources, as is the precedent on earth for the economic exploitation of global commons. The legal experts who disagree of course, argue that there is an implicit violation by one company or state taking ownership of things they've 'picked up' from Space.

Regardless though, the US system here opens up two routes that Space exploitation can be facilitated by, despite the Outer Space Treaty:

1) Court of law overrules the Outer Space Treaty:

Firstly, the US system of 'ownership of extraction' is tested in a legal court, as a private company seeks to take ownership over an actual territory they are mining so as to prevent rival competitors from simply building a mine nearby and tapping into their vein too, or indeed an off-earth mine being set up near a research station which could have incredibly disruptive consequences for the non-mining party (an issue that happened historically in Britain for instance, where mines attempted to take ownership of local water supplies and disrupted other forms of human activity which could only be settled in court through a judgement for ownership to one party or the other). These are issues resolved by a territorial claim then, which the Outer Space Treaty of course prevents (though there are some critics who argue it does not apply to private enterprise , realistically it does as states who are bound by the treaty are made responsible for the actions of their private enterprises, so there is an implicit expectation, though again this may need testing in a court).

A court ruling for a private company to have ownership of the area it is mining (or indeed a court ruling that those disrupted by the mining have rights, and thus implicit ownership of the area they inhabit), will essentially contradict and likely nullify the Outer Space Treaty. It after all was purposefully vague and loose as space exploration was in its infancy when it was created and so needed to be kept adaptable and changeable.

2) Skirting around the Outer Space Treaty

Secondly though, it might be that Space exploitation is facilitated simply by continuing to skirt the Outer Space Treaty and using its vagueness as a continuing cover with states happy to allow the use of loop holes and so not see the treaty as a set of overriding aims, undermined. This is where the similarities to the exploitation of resources in 'international waters' are maintained and concentration surrounding ownership is given at the point when something is 'picked up' or extracted.

Antarctic imperialism as a laboratory for Space imperialism:

This isn't a new concept by any means, beyond the example of exploitation of 'international waters' it bears a lot of similarities with the current Antarctic Treaty System which facilitates an internationally governed Antarctica, as epitomized by the 1961 Antarctic Treaty ( which the Outer Space Treaty incidentally owes a lot to ). The Antarctic was, and is, probably one of the last frontiers, bar the Arctic Ocean, of territorial grabs and imperialism.

Like Space, the Antarctic has no indigenous population (the exploration of rights of potential alien civilizations is beyond the scope of this article- though a debate does exist ) and so is a platform of 'pure' inter-state competition where claims were made to the continent based on a number of competing conceptions of what constituted a valid claim of ownership in a region that was, like Space, an incredibly hostile environment which prevented the easy facilitating of traditional legal conceptions such as ' Effective Occupation ' (i.e. the provision and enforcement of a largely non-contested administrative regime and legal system to a territory) as a valid claim to ownership. Instead the occupation had to be creatively shown in Britain and Argentina's (two of the key Antarctic rivals) view by

Effective 'use' of a territory scientifically (through the quality and quantity of research produced on an area; The National Archives, London, FO 371/113971, Foreign Office Cabinet Paper on Antarctica 26 January 1955).

Though Britain also recognized it;

Economically (through the control of whaling licenses; The National Archives, London, CAB 129/40/39, Proposal to Re-Establish a Whaling Base on Deception Island, 26 June 1950 )

And through;

Environmental authority (through acceptance of their stewardship and regulation surrounding regional environmental sustainability; ( Adrian Howkins, ‘Frozen Empires: A History of the Antarctic Sovereignty Dispute Between Britain, Argentina and Chile, 1939-1959’ (The University of Texas at Austin, D.Phil Dissertation, 2008), 12-13 ).

These latter two were not categories accepted by Argentina. The United States likewise had a very different conception of 'scientific use', and counted air surveillance as a valid means of claiming territory through discovery, which was not shared by the other claimant powers (Steve Heavens, 'Brian Roberts and the origins of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, 52, Polar Record (2016), 719).

In all cases though 'physical presence' (be it from a scientific research team, summer base, permanent administrative official or whalers operating under a national license) came to be the basis of 'Effective Occupation', instead of a comprehensive administering system, and thus the basis for a claim, to the extent that science was being utilized politically, for instance Britain judged its scientific activity not on its own merits, but increased it to ensure it did not lag behind the activity (and so presence) of Argentina and the USA (The National Archives, London, FCO 7/3248, Memo by Hankey on United Kingdom Policy in the Antarctic area, 8 November 1957 ).

Equality of opportunity equates to solidifying ownership- Antarctic and US administrative models:

The other most obvious way of course that the current US model of Space ownership facilitation shares a big debt to the development of the Antarctic and its geopolitical claims is through the fact that it opened the competition for contracts to both US and non-US companies, with apparently 22 of the private enterprises participating in the bidding process being foreign owned, and of course half of those accepted being based in Japan and Luxembourg. This not only is testament to the USA's market orientated approach, even in the Trump era of 'America First', but also (and perhaps mainly) due to the fact that the co-opting of foreign enterprise into your judicial and administrative framework is a major, and key, way of increasing the legitimacy of any ownership system. It strengthens the claims by having a diverse number of companies invested in maintaining and expanding the model (who may also pressure their own governments to accept it), but also is a key recognition of authority and so ownership of extraction, or indeed defacto territory itself, as this article is arguing.

The Antarctic highlights this succinctly with Britain's drive to regulate economic activity in the region. Antarctic whaling being key, which was primarily done not by British companies, but by Norwegian (British Library, London, IOR/L/PS/12/1292, Copy of a telegram from Foreign Office to Buenos Aires, no.810, 21 December 1947) and indeed enterprises from Britain's rival claimant in the region, Argentina (The National Archives, London, ADM1/25082, Letter to Oliver Lyttalton, 11 February 1953). That companies from these states accepted British administrative authority, bid for British licenses and accepted British regulations of their activities in the region was a key part of Britain's 1955 unilateral International Court of Justice (ICJ) case to have Argentina and Chile recognize their claims. The case of course was unsuccessful not because it was ruled against, but because Argentina and Chile refused to participate citing the Antarctic as a domestic matter, rather than an international one, and thus denying the ICJ's jurisdiction (The National Archives, London, Telegram from British Embassy Santiago to Hankey (American department, FO), Restricted (1521/19/67) memo, 5 February 1957).

Antarctic competition and Space competition- National interests trump hopeful thinking:

The 1961 Antarctic Treaty supposedly put an end to the increasing competition. It was the Cold War's first 'arms control' treaty and it came about after war nearly broke out several times over the Antarctic, particularly between Argentina and Britain who in the period 1943-1954 were involved in a number of operations and heated clashes with one another, including one live-fire incident at Hope Bay in 1952 when a British scientific party were shot at by Argentine soldiers (The National Archives, London, ADM1/ 23580, Telegram from Falkland Islands Governor, 1 February 1952), as well as the coming of Russia to the continent during the International Geophysical Year 1957-8 which threatened to bring significant Cold War tensions to an already delicate region (The National Archives, London, FO 371/126126 , Telegram to Hankey, from Murihead at Washington Embassy, 11 May 1957).

The Antarctic Treaty stipulated that all claims would essentially be 'frozen' (i.e. ignored, though not discarded or resolved) as its Article IV stated;

' Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:

a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;

a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;

prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-recognition of any other State‚s rights of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. '

This combined with the ironically far more stringent demilitarization requirements in the Antarctic Treaty than the Outer Space Treaty stipulates, the former demanding in Article I that the continent is to be used for 'peaceful purposes' only with no military weapons or activity allowed in the region, while the latter's Article IV only prevents military activity on celestial bodies, and weapons of mass destruction from being deployed in Space (but not military activity or normal weapons in Space), means that the Antarctic is effectively a 'global commons' for scientific research and exploration (though the extent it allows the whole world to participate, or is merely gate-keeping for the Antarctic Treaty powers is debatable ), the very thing that the Outer Space Treaty would attempt to mimic for Space.

However, even the Antarctic's far more stringent governance system did not end competition between states over claims. While legally claims were frozen, and it was stipulated that;

' No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force .'

In practice this has done little to change the nature of states perspectives. For instance, in 1984 Britain was still concerned about preserving it's Antarctic presence to sustain it's claims against Argentina and Chile, despite the latter two being fellow signatories to the Antarctic Treaty and the above article being in force, stepped up funding for the British Antarctic Survey so it's physical presence and activity would not be deemed to have diminished (Klaus Dodds, Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire, (London, 2002), 192). Indeed in 2012 one of the arguments utilized successfully to prevent the British Antarctic Survey being merged with the National Oceanography Center was that the Survey had a political dimension to protecting British claims in the Antarctic .

Indeed nearly all claimant nations of Antarctic territory, seem to have rejected the Antarctic Treaty's aim to increasing international cooperation, as epitomized by Article III encouraging a shared scientific enterprise, that would more efficiently pool costs and increase the production of knowledge in a risk-filled and harsh environment, and have instead stuck to national-based activities based in their respectively claimed areas , despite in other areas, such as the International Space Station, being quite willing to pool their resources with one another. The reason of course is that the activity aids their claims, which at some point might be reactivated if the Antarctic treaty is changed or rejected, and that this all still has a significant political emphasis even while supposedly 'frozen', to the extent that states are shunning economizing and making their Antarctic efforts more rationale, and instead favoring the protection of their individual claims, at greater cost and risk to themselves.

Indeed Shirley Scott has gone so far as to single out that the Antarctic Treaty in fact benefited the US from an imperialistic perspective , as it allowed the US unhindered access to the entire continent to be able to build bases wherever it liked and so while in legal terms, the Article about no activities taking place while the Antarctic Treaty is in force may constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty holds, in reality- an increased US presence (Or indeed as of late a rapidly expanding Chinese presence ), means that if the Antarctic Treaty is ever dropped, the US (or China) will have a large-scale presence that would render the basis of other Antarctic powers claims, moot as they would no longer be able to administer their territories effectively, especially if the US presence outnumbers there own. To build on Scott's idea here then, in a defacto sense, the US, China, Britain, Argentina and the other claimants claims over the area still exist as pressing political concerns, despite claims being taken off the table in a legalistic dejure sense. This is to the extent that these powers are no cooperating on the scale hoped for, and instead concentrating their Antarctic resources in a way that will maximize their pre-existing claims (or allow the making of new claims) the minute the Antarctic Treaty ceases to be upheld, or is changed. If that happens, then the defacto can easily become the dejure through a legal, political or diplomatic challenge by the competing states.

Specific lessons regarding claims from the Antarctic Treaty for the Outer Space Treaty- defacto trumps dejure:

The difference then between a legalistic dejure interpretation of claims and ownership, and the defacto situation in terms of physical presence, competing conceptions of what constitutes a claim and that simply national governments continue to pursue, right up until today their own interests in areas they deem appropriate, despite signing international treaties to the contrary (and indeed the very international treaty that inspired the Outer Space Treaty) means that skirting the Outer Space Treaty, creating a defacto ownership of territory on a celestial body through physical occupation or use, that for instance a mining company would entail, would be far far easier than many current space legal experts are highlighting. Indeed it would then from that point be fairly easy at a later date of the state or private companies choosing to then revert back to Route 1, in which they present their physical occupation and usage of a territory in a courtroom, highlight the necessity of protecting their enterprise from competitors (on a political or simply health and safety ground) and use their existing comparatively overwhelming presence in the area they wish to claim as a fait accompli to be rubber stamped and so become legal (and thus override the Outer Space Treaty stipulation).

This is not even though simply a lesson which applies to the US attempts at skirting the Outer Space Treaty in a way which essentially equates to defacto ownership. Russia openly intends to create a Moon base for helium mining , despite committing itself to honoring the Outer Space Treaty and condemning current US actions surrounding its opening up of space to mining claims on a national basis . Likewise, China intends to among other initiatives, 'capture' asteroids and bring them back to earth for its industry to mine. This arguably implies an outright breaking of the Outer Space Treaty, rather than a simple skirting and the US is attempting, as it means laying claim and ownership to an entire celestial body, and then to move it, which certainly breaks Article II and potentially Article IX on not taking actions which may harmfully contaminate the Earth. India is another Space mining actor, who seeks to exploit Luna and asteroid resources, and whose Chairman of the Indian Space Research Organization (India's national space agency) has openly stated that he wants ' the countries which have the capacity to bring that source from the moon to Earth will dictate the process '. This means that it should be up to the countries involved in facilitating the exploitation of space, who should be the ones to make and shape the rules and laws surrounding it, which includes ownership. A clear knock to the legitimacy of the Outer Space Treaty as providing the rules for the process.

The wider Antarctic comparison- avoid the pitfalls of the past, the need for a realist-driven reform to the Outer Space Treaty:

There is then a very similar political situation developing regarding the exploitation of Space, as to Antarctic claims, despite both having a treaty framework which aimed to prevent an imperialistically driven land-grab, where ownership claims were made in a scramble that could result in at best states being left out of the race altogether, and at worst see political tensions develop on earth over the ownership and exploitation of territories, they are both also subject to the major players seeing these treaties, perhaps inevitably as merely a framework to be noted (or ignored) and not wholly applying to them. Just as in the Antarctic claims still loom large in the minds of governments, to the extent that scientific activity is directed with a political eye to maintaining (or increasing) the legitimacy of their claims, in Space defacto ownership is implied in all these mining operations in the way the states plan to initiative them. While this contradicts the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty, much like the Antarctic Treaty, governments are acting in their own interests, under the assumption that treaties do not last forever.

The Antarctic Treaty for instance is up for modification or scrapping in 2048 . Given that climate change has made the commercial exploration and exploitation of the continent increasingly viable as rising temperatures melt the ice, potentially revealing a treasure trove of resources like oil deposits and rare earth materials to exploit, and as states like China are arguably already trying to positioning themselves to take advantage of if not the scrapping of the Antarctic Treaty, at least changes allowing for economic exploitation , which claimant states like Britain historically viewed as being the end of the Antarctic Treaty as a serious and enforceable document due to the increased competition itn would mean (Klaus Dodds, Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire, (London, 2002), 190). In this context its understandable why current Antarctic powers have essentially continued to try and build-up their claims and positions in the region, despite the Antarctic Treaty 'freezing' claims.

The same goes for Space, a purposefully vague and old treaty does not provide sufficient cover and certainty for states to feel they can be 'left behind' by their earthly competitors and miss out on exploiting the stars. There is no reason to let their guard down and not seek ways to under the cover of the treaty, skirting it, or ignoring it, build up a physical case for their defacto ownership of celestial bodies. Even a more comprehensive treaty would struggle to contain their national interests from dominating (as the Antarctic Treaty failed to create truly international cooperation in the region in a way that would see states placing the maintenance of their claims as a secondary objective). The fact that every major power is set on somehow circumventing or ignoring the Outer Space Treaty to pursue the exploitation of Space bodes ill for its future sustainability as a binding document, beyond providing of course an important anchor document for a framework that seeks to ease (though does not prevent) the militarization of Space, in a similar way that the Anglo-Argentine-Chilean Tripartite Naval Declaration prevented Antarctic tensions from going too far by limiting the military assets in the region (The National Archives, London, FO 371/113976, 'Memo by Speaight', 1 November 1955 ), and much like the Outer Space Treaty did not totally prevent military displays of force being used to solidify claims of sovereignty such as during the 1953 Deception Island incident , where British Royal Marines and a Frigate supported the arrest of Argentine military personnel who they deemed had illegally occupied Deception Island (which was claimed by both Britain and Argentina), prior to the ban on military assets that is perhaps the most tangible of the Antarctic Treaty's achievements.

A treaty governing Space must take into account a realistic appraisal of states national interests in exploitation to be effective:

Whatever happens from here, any future Space framework must account for the tangible interests of nation states among the stars and allow their peaceable facilitation rather than blocking them and forcing workarounds. If this can be achieved in it may prevent a 'scramble' that might increase tensions on earth, and cut off Space exploration and exploitation for latecomers. It will avoid the mistakes of the Antarctic Treaty, where an idealistic interpretation of a peaceful continent with 'frozen' claims resulted in little tangible progress regarding the easing of political tensions over claims, and has instead resulted in a slow build-up in presence of all concerned states, and the potential for the complete scrapping of the treaty in 2048. Instead a realistic re-envisioning of Space ownership and the Outer Space Treaty now could avoid a multitude of tensions and complaints and mean that states like the US do not have to currently experiment unilaterally with their own controversial models of ownership, which they justify in part by a refusal of Russia and China to engage with them to ratify a singular system, due to the cover the Outer Space Treaty provides (despite all powers flaunting it).

In Part 2:

Part 2 will continue the Applied History emphasis of this article, by looking at a similar model of historic imperialism to the one the US seems to be implementing from NASA's announcement, and what lessons we can subsequently learn about what to expect in terms of Space power and exploitation.

Arctic Geopolitics: What's happening and why?

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Thu, 19 Nov 2020 22:15:14 GMT

Five key political, geographic and scientific developments from October's Arctic analyzed:

1) Arctic sea ice at record low October levels:

Water temperatures north of Siberia were 2 to 4 degrees warmer than normal.

On October 28 the Danish Meteorological Institute has warned that sea ice in the Arctic was at record lows for October and its rate of regrowth slower than normal. Scientists at the institute highlighted that this followed a consistent downward trend for October ice of 8.2 percent over the last 10 years.

The institute dubbed this trend a ‘vicious spiral’ as with ever less ice reflecting the sunlight, oceans become ever warmer, which results in further ice loss. Because of this the Arctic has been warming twice as fast as the rest of the world in a process dubbed ‘Arctic amplification’. It is feared that the loss of Arctic sea ice may raise temperatures globally by 0.2C according to the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. This is on top of the current 1.5C that human activity has rendered inevitable and that the 2016 Paris agreement desired to keep below.

This of course a speeding of the process which has seen the British Antarctic Survey already bring the date for an 'ice-free' Arctic forward to 2035.

There are significant risks to this, not least of all the impact of rising water levels and changing levels of sea salt, but also opportunities as the scramble for resources and Arctic shipping lanes begins- which of course comes with its own geopolitical consequences as we're beginning to see play out with Russia and China potentially seeking to 'dominate' the high north , met by NATO and specifically Canada, US, Denmark and the UK who are all pursuing their own interests.

The Arctic sea ice as of 19 November is only now just starting to form.

2) U.S. and Greenland close to finalizing economic and security agreement:

The agreement is aimed at curtailing China’s growing Arctic influence

As of October 29, the Trump administration are finalizing a deal aimed at strengthening ties with Greenland and minimizing China’s Arctic ambitions. The talks have produced several agreements on security, diplomatic cooperating and trade. These both ensure US security due to Greenland’s geostrategic importance to it, while also providing as Marc Jacobsen from the Scott Polar Research Institute states ‘tangible benefits’ for Greenlanders, including guaranteed jobs at the US base at Thule, and greater US investment in mining and tourism.

The geopolitical context for this agreement harks back to China’s 2018 interest in taking Greenland up on its offer to build new commercial airports. China proposed it would fund three new airports, but the Pentagon derailed the deal due to U.S. security concerns, primarily Greenland’s proximity to the US as well as its Thule airbase, which houses an element of the USA’s missile early-warning system.

3) Russian development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) gathers apace:

Russia to build a fleet of ice-breaking LNG vessels for NSR shipping

Back in January 2020 the Russia government announced that as part of its effort to make the Arctic commercially viable, it would undertake a major infrastructure development on the Arctic’s Northern Sea Route. The route hugs the coast of Siberia and allows shipping to Asia in only 15 days via the Bering Strait, half the time of the traditional Suez route. Indeed, in May this year Sovcomflot ice-class Arc7 LNG Christophe de Margerie completed an eastbound passage on the NSR to China, in challenging ice conditions, in only 12 days .

A key part of Russia’s NSR development is the report on 30 October that Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed an executive order that among other things requires the Russian backed shipping company Sovcomflot ordered three new Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carriers of ice-class tonnage.

The ships will be integral to the success of several Russian projects seeking to exploit Arctic natural gas, such as Arctic LNG 2, which is estimated to cost $21.3 billion US dollars, by carrying the gas to customers in Asia, particularly China. With this latest order Sovcomflot’s fleet of LNG carriers will grow to 34 vessels in total, 19 of which are under construction.

4) Scientists find large Arctic methane deposits are beginning to release

It is feared evidence of new methane leaks may increase likelihood of abrupt global warming

The International Siberian Shelf Study (ISSS) announced on 27 October that its team aboard the Russian research ship R/V Akademik Keldysh have found evidence that huge frozen methane deposits are starting to be released over a large area off the East Siberian coast. This would be the third such find in the region. Methane is a greenhouse gas 86 times more potent over a 20-year period than carbon dioxide according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

High levels of methane have been detected down to a depth of 350 metres in the Laptev Sea, and on the surface, it was present 4 to 8 times more than would normally be expected and was venting into the atmosphere, despite most of the methane bubbles dissolving in the water. The Laptev Sea has already been in headlines on the 24 October for in the first time in recorded history not freezing by late October.

Swedish scientist Örjan Gustafsson stated that while at this point there is unlikely to be any major impact on global warming from the methane release yet, the process had been triggered for a continual amount to be released into the atmosphere over time. Researchers are worried this has created a climate feedback loop which will accelerate global warming.

The United States Geological Survey has previously listed this process, known as Arctic hydrate destabilization, as one of the four most serious scenarios for abrupt climate change.

5) Eco-friendly autonomous mapping of the Arctic’s depths

Four autonomous vessels head back to California after successfully mapping the Arctic’s seafloor

The Arctic is not yet a hospitable territory for ships, making mapping its seafloor as precisely as other global seas difficult, leading to a lack of accurate knowledge about the topography of the area.

This may be about to start to change, with the announcement on 31 October of the successful completion of a collaborative mission led by Saildrone and the USA’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric survey partner TerraSond to map the Northwest Passage’s seafloor topography with an eye to it’s increasing viability as a shorter alternative shipping route between Asia, North America and Europe. The more precise maps are hoped to protect both future shipping and wildlife and are important to the passage’s commercial viability as currently shipping insurance brokers lack the data required to confidently assure ships they’d be completely covered in case of incident. Meaning while the route is shorter and growing ever more viable due to a warming climate, it may not be favoured by shipping companies until this is rectified.

The ‘saildrones’ are 23 feet long, lacked crews and were powered only by the wind and sun. They launched from San Francisco Bay and sailed successfully all the way through the Aleutian Islands and Bering Strait to the Canadian Border. On the way they used single-beam echo sounder technology to map the seafloor at 65 and 164 feet, and despite concerns about the dwindling sunlight to be found in the Arctic to power them, they successfully completed their 8000-nautical-mile mapping mission and are currently on route back to California, in a triumph for the technologies application in the far north.

USA 2020 election: An analysis of vote share and the state of the Democrat and Republican parties thus far

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Mon, 09 Nov 2020 13:34:05 GMT

Traditional 'Identity politics' slowly gives way to 'politics of place'.

With Democratic fears abound that Trump, or at least Trumpism has not been 'repudiated' by the electorate, and with Trump increasing the Republican vote share among non-white voters, could a very different US political landscape be emerging? Yes, and no.

Presidential Vote:

Well for the winners- President-Elect and Vice President-Elect Joe Biden and Kamala Harris (Democrats). Harris' triumph particularly is a historic moment for US politics, the first female person of colour as a VP (and tipped by pundits to be a future presidential contender).

Trump's legal warfare to try and dispute the result is rather moot at this point. In the best light (and it's not great) he's trying to stretch out the election by contesting it to try and undermine the legacy that Biden won by a landslide of Electoral College votes, by the end expected to be around 300 to Trumps 214.

Trump has a long history of claiming something is 'rigged' against him anytime he loses, even going so far as to claim the Emmy's were rigged against him when his TV show did not receive an award. It appears to be a way of not having to acknowledge a loss and, to his supporters at least, save face. So attempting to make the election seem far closer than it actually was is an ego-saving move.

In the worst light though, Trump is seriously trying to overturn the election result, relying on an unlikely strategy of somehow getting to the Supreme Court based on a cascade of legal challenges ( all of which so far have been thrown out ), where the Republican majority will declare him the winner. Trump even getting to the Supreme Court, let alone Republican leaning judges siding with him to overturn a democratic election is incredible unlikely.

Regardless Trump is reportedly going to carry out a series of rallies over the US starting next week to raise money for the legal battles, and to politically try and keep up the appearance that the election is still somehow contested.

Presidential voting data breakdown: (Taken primarily from the exit polls , note that there will be some nuance from the final result, especially as the kind of person willing to discuss the vote they've just cast with a pollster at the polling booth exit varies wildly, though they are usually a good indication of rough wider trends):

The popular vote: Biden is currently ahead by around 5 million votes . However, it's important to note that both candidates are up compared to 2016 . The issue for Trump of course is that he increased his popular vote in states that he already firmly had a lead in and thus were irrelevant to the electoral college votes.

Not a simple picture:

The breakdown of the Biden win though requires scrutiny to understand current electoral trends that Biden will have to address if he is to fulfill his commitment to reunify the country (and for the Democrats to capitalize politically).

-Of the 47% of men who voted, Trump lead with 53% voting for him, compared to 46% for Biden.

-The 53% of Women who voted were 55% to 44% for Biden.

There is a clear gender divide then here, and women are far more politically active.

Breaking this down by identity- a more complex picture emerges of slight changes that contextually have a loud resonance- lets concentrate on the losing side (Republican) vote shares:

-58% of white men voted for Trump, compared to 52% in previous exit polls, or indeed 62% in 2016

-55% of white women voted for Trump, compared to 52% (at the exit poll in 2016), or 47% ( According to Pew for 2016 )

-79% of White Christian evangelicals voted for Trump, this is down from the 81% in 2016.

-8% of African Americans (and around 18% of black men - a trend that for the last three elections has been growing in the Republicans favour) voted for Trump, which is tiny overall, but is a 4% increase on 2016- so it's a significant uptick. The Republican party have made inroads with a candidate widely decried as racist, and while the vast majority went to the Democratic party, it is something political planners should note.

- Among Hispanics and Latinos 32-35% of voted for Trump . Again an increase on his 2016 performance, and notable for the Democrats, a group who like African Americans have slowly shifted over the last three elections by small, but significant increments towards the Republicans, especially as Trump was the President who put Hispanic and Latino immigrant children into cages.

-Trump had a majority among Native Alaskans and Native Americans, gaining 52% of the vote. Likewise Pacific islanders voted for Trump by 59%.

- 31%of Asians voted Trump

- Reuters have highlighted that essentially Trump lost some support among white voting groups, though he made equivalent gains in some support from non-white groups.

- 28% of the LGBTQ+ community also voted for Trump , a group in which it seems Trump may have actually doubled his vote share compared to 2016.

The decline of Identity politics in favour of 'Place' politics?:

While then Trump has been rejected, 'Trumpism' appears to not have been repudiated as Adam Tooze has correctly identified - "Rather than a rejection of Trump, the election results reshuffle the finely balanced and deeply polarised configuration that has prevailed in American politics since the days of Bill Clinton in the 1990s".

In that historic context though, the Democrats and their supporters should not necessarily be self-flagellating and lamenting the lack of a clear rejection against Trump's politics ( as here ), but instead recognize that US politics has been nuanced for a long time, and this is no different. No Trump was not 'massively repudiated', and yes Democrats need to be wary that we might be seeing a decline in Identity politics in favour of a shift towards 'place politics'- with location trumping ethnicity and race for voting groups (for instance Florida and particularly Miami where Hispanics were integral form retaining the state for Trump). This is a trend not merely from this election, but among certain non-white groups is one seen over successive elections since Obama. Whether it will continue to 'election changing' levels remains to be seen.

Leaving the top race:

While then a Democratic President-Elect has been selected (despite what Trump may say). The Republican party at other levels have proven to be quite resilient (again feeding into this narrative of a change US political scene that Biden must contend with).

Battle for the Senate:

The Democrats have gained 2 seats so far, and lost 1 . However, their hopes for seizing control of the Senate have been dashed, as they needed to win three seats, and that seems unlikely (though there is hope for them in January at a second push). In practice even a small Democrat majority in the Senate does not aid a Biden presidency due to factionalism (though it would make it easier in some respects of partisanship- where Democratic factions at least are usually prepared to compromise)

Battle for Congress:

Here the reverse is true of the Senate for the Democrats, with the Republicans actually have made gains of 8 seats so far (losing 2). It's likely that the Democrats may remain in control of Congress, by a diminished margin, but again the lack of a 'stable' majority will cause problems.

So what's the take away from this?- Place over Identity and no repudiation of Trump and the Republicans electorally- shocking, but also not, and not a reason for Democrats to despair:

Trump put immigrant children in cages, he actively stoked disunity and set class and ethnic groups on one another- spurning perhaps the most important part of the US presidents job- acting as a national unifying figure. He played fast and loose with institutions, severely limiting their ability to act, and destabilized US power abroad. His Covid-19 response has been a disaster by all objective accounts, and the consistent lies and misinformation have deteriorated political public life.

By all rights this should have seen the US public, and particularly non-white groups give Trump and the Republican party a huge kicking. I suspect that's what we in Europe (and particularly Britain with FPTP) would be used to/expecting given what happens in our elections.

But, US politics is a different beast. Polarization is far greater- Presidential elections are decided upon by a mere handful of swing states (though a growing number now due to demographic changes- s ee Georgia ). Since 1992 then, there hasn't really been a 'big' repudiation of a president/party in the popular vote- no matter how bad, and while indeed Trump was far worse than previous recent Presidents in terms of policy and influence, it seems two things are apparent:

-The polarization of US politics is unchanged- indeed the Republican party under Trump have made inroads into non-white voting groups while losing support among white groups. There is thus no possible scope for a 'clear' repudiation of one side or the other while US political polarization remains, and it shows no signs of dwindling.

-However, while polarization shows no signs of dwindling in US politics, it does show signs of changing. The fact the Republican Party with Trump lost some of its white vote, but made gains in non-white communities highlights i suspect that 'Identity politics' is on the out and 'Politics of place' due to the radical changes globalization and the fourth industrial revolution- which affect different regions in very different ways, are coming slowly to the fore. While i don't expect to see in a US context the Republican party dominating vote share among African Americans, it appears that pending change it cannot be assumed that if you are black, you will support a Democratic candidate- particularly again as Trump is recognized as a racist, and yet still saw a fairly significant increase.

This Politics of Place is arguably what politics in the UK has become based around since 2016 - if your area/home region has benefited from globalization and a radically changing world, or if you feel or have been 'left behind' economically as jobs are lost, incomes dwindle and social links severed with no viable replacements on the horizon, you begin to see significant geographic divides with surprising political consequences (Labour losing it's heartland, many parts of which it has held since the 1930s).

It appears that the US may be starting to transition to this in a small way. It means Democrats and Republicans should heed UK political experience and not assume voters, even historically 'heartland' groups will support them due to simply a historic connection or indeed mere words- they need to be courted and convinced by action.

At the same time though, and with the above context in mind that the US rarely shifts (and even small changes are offset by voters from different groups shifting), there is no reason for Democrat supporters to feel anguished or panicked at the lack of a major Trump repudiation- it's something that just cannot happen if US politics is to continue to be as polarized as it has been since the end of the Cold War. So despite Trump winning the second largest popular vote share (With Biden getting the first) of any candidate, instead they should celebrate loudly that in this context, they won the presidency.

But they should also be aware that Trump is a symptom, not the cause of the USA's political, economic and social problems which has driven the increasing polarization. He was able to get in off the back of harnessing the anger from these issues. This thankfully for the Democrats is something that I suspect Biden and Harris have both identified given the focus on their acceptance speeches was on 'reunification' rather than simply accepting their victory and moving on with the mandate as they could have done. It's a huge task, but an absolutely necessary one if US polarization is not to continue (and start to shift towards regional lines).

Starmer's suspension of Corbyn- bad or good politically?

Thu, 29 Oct 2020 20:17:01 GMT

Politically, a Labour civil war ala Clause 4, may in fact suit Starmer to gain traction among the electorate, though it depends wildly on how it's exactly handled.

Kier Starmer's decision today to suspend and remove the whip from former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn has played well with all sections of the British public according to the first polling on the issue by YouGov.

Only 13% of the British public see it as a bad decision, 58% were in favour and 29% had no opinion. More importantly perhaps, most 2019 Labour voters are on board with Starmer, 41% to 26%, with again 'Don't Knows' being the second most popular category. Starmer thus has potentially a stable base from which to wage a civil war against Labour's far-left if needed. Indeed the potential warning for Momentum and other Corbyn supporting groups here should be that the more they attack Starmer, and the more Starmer moves against them- the more electable Starmer will become.

Particularly as the Conservative category should not be ignored here- 80% of whom support Starmer's decision. Among their number are former Red Wall voters who voted Conservative for the first time in 2019, and who Labour need to re-convince if they are to achieve electoral success and begin to break down Boris Johnson's majority of 80, as most of the 43 former Red Wall seats are marginals.

Of course there is an element of chaos in this for Starmer, that being any potential successful legal challenge or appeal by Corbyn- it's currently not crystal clear just how shorne up Starmer's position is in banning Corbyn as there is a case to be made that while he contradicted the leaders stance (though he got his message out on the ECHR findings prior to Starmer- in itself an arguable challenge from a backbench position). he hasn't actually clearly broken any of the party rules. If then it proves Starmer acted in haste, he may end up looking weaker than when he went in, and will have burned significant bridges in any attempt to act as a 'unifier'.

In the larger picture then best laid plans do not survive contact with the enemy. Kier Starmer may start a Labour civil war riding high, but the 'events' during it, could wildly derail things for him. Much depends then on what the Corbyn supports among the parliamentary party decide to do over the next few days. Certainly the previous example of ChangeUK and its destruction in the First Past the Post environment will act as a warning over splitting, it will depend then on who can seize control of the inevitable Labour conference to discuss how to tackle Starmer's promise to implement the ECHR findings in full.

A Moon base race?

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Mon, 26 Oct 2020 22:02:50 GMT

NASA have confirmed there is water on the moon. The scientific implications are amazing, as are those for geopolitics.

Accessible Moon water!

NASA announced today that it's Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) telescope has found accessible water on the Moon on its sunlit surface that astronauts can use.

The announcement here .

This has so many implications from a scientific perspective, which i am ill equipped to comment on beyond saying it's a radical game changer to the previously believed inaccessible ice-cap water that was all the Moon was previously thought to contain in the best case scenario. Luckily for us though this event also has significant geopolitical consequences, which i can muse about.

Space Race 2- The context

There has been a growing 'space race' over the past few years, though unlike the previous Cold War one, this was started not by states, but by private companies, and more accurately billionaires- Elon Musk, Richard Branson, and Jeff Bezo , beginning from 2000 with the latters Blue Origin private space company . They all see the commercial opportunities that space exploration and exploitation presents, both in the short-medium term where we talk about things like Satellite navigation and GPS, communications, orbital tourism, mapping, inter-orbit cargo transport and waste disposal. As well as the longer term opportunities presented by space travel, mining and eventual colonization. The current end-game and aim for this stage of the space race is to be the first to successfully establish a Mars colony, with the billionaires appealing to the higher purpose of human survival rather than commercial concerns.

However, nation states were happy to let the private sector bear the cost and risk, despite looming issues of space and colony governance if nations allowed space to be a private enterprise free for all, particularly as the 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty, that forms the framework for outer-orbit governance never envisaged private actors leading the way , and so it not concretely applicable to private enterprises.

It would take China's ambitious Space program to rekindle the space race among national governments. While the European Space Agency completed its first Lunar Orbit in 2003 , The so-called 'Asian Space Race' between China, Japan and India was key to starting the current scramble. Among other endeavors China launched its first Lunar orbiter in 2007 , as it raced to meet Japan who had achieved this a month earlier , India launched its own in 2008 .

While it seemed the US was 'out of the race' this was not quite the case , but certainly under the Obama administration much of NASA's exploration plans were derailed due to cuts disallowing manned spaced exploration beyond orbit, and an arguable lack of serious overall aim. Leading figures like Neil Armstrong would criticize Obama as having devastated US space ambitions.

While the Trump administration is far more assertive about the need for the US to partake and 'win' the current Space race, with a promise since 2017 for a second human landing on the moon by 2024 , and NASA to perform an eventual human landing on mars at a later date, the arguable lack of interest previously has meant that China, Japan and the European Union are all well placed to also partake in the race and all have plans to do so .

Behind these leading powers though, space exploration is steadily becoming more affordable, and the opportunities (or risks of missing out at least) ever greater. Powers then like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have also made their presence felt, and are planning moon and mars missions. The race to the moon and then mars is truly on.

Alongside the main race, their are opportunities for the likes of Britain and Russia to profit from the action, with the former planning to build its own space port (the first of it's kind in Europe) to take advantage of the UK's Polar orbit launch potential. Likewise Russia is key to keeping the International Space Station running , as well as provides launch capacity to nearly all other space agencies- government and private due to its unique geographic position and old but extensive infrastructure.

So how does accessible Moon water change things?

To understand this, we must first recognize that despite universally decreasing costs due to increased private agency competition in the market from the likes of Blue Origin and Space X, space exploration and specifically rocket launches from earth are still horrendously expensive . A significant cost factor is the amount of fuel that needs to be expended to create enough energy to leave the earths gravitational pull . A moon base however has always offered a potential way to escape this 'tyranny of the rocket equation'. The Moons gravitational pull is radically weaker than the earths, making it far easier for rockets to take off, meaning less fuel is needed. Potentially too Luna launched rockets can take heavier payloads due to requiring less fuel. It significantly cheapens the cost of space exploration and thus also allows more launches to take place in the first place. A more detailed analysis of this can be found here .

So the Moon was always a potential prospect to be used as humanities rocket platform and hub for space exploration. However, there would still be a significant cost in transporting the cargo and resources needed to sustain a moon presence AND keep the Moon's space ports functional. A big part of the cost is water , essential for sustaining life, creating oxygen and indeed in creating rocket fuel . Water truly is the 'oil' (in terms of its incredible value) of space.

Finding accessible water on the Moon though radically alters its desirability. Now the Moon has water deposits which are significant enough to be mined, and so can provide on-site directly water, oxygen and fuel to both increase its self sufficiency (and thus make Moon bases logistical cheaper), and for rocket launches (making them cheaper too). Meanwhile rockets from earth can either be cheaper (due to water no longer taking up so much space and weight, and can indeed carry different and more other items- meaning less supply runs from Earth will be necessary). The Moon becomes almost a 'must have' prospect as a stepping stone for future space exploration, and we can expect every Space Agency, private or public that is serious about exploring Space to want to establish a Moon base in the best position possible position (currently from this find, the Moon's southern hemisphere). Very quickly 'idealized' plans for further Moon exploration will now become a definite reality.

The risks

So that's the opportunity- a far more valuable Moon that can help humanity more easily become space-faring. However the increased activity and interest in a newly confirmed strategic celestial object, which contains pockets of a comparatively precious resource (water) in space may lead to increased competition among those partaking in the space race. Mapping the Moon for water will become a main goal, and a means of dividing up territory and resources on the Moon will no doubt happen, with or without official legal sanction.

It also isn't like the current Space Race powers have much respect for international agreements. Private corporations are not really bound by major legislation yet, and national governments have tacitly ignored the Outer Space Treaties restrictions on militarizing space . So it's stipulations on ownership of celestial bodies may not hold up all that well, especially as the legal framework for space exploration and exploitation is lagging behind the actual act. The ineffectiveness of international treaties and organizations to prevent de facto moves towards ownership and exploitation can be arguably seen in the Antarctic currently , where despite lip service the Antarctic Treaty System is honoured and broken on the whims of larger powers who seek out loop-holes.

Despite though the increasing militarization of space ( China, Russia, US and France have their own dedicated or integrated Space Forces, with more nations scrambling to create an equivalent arm ) making the space race competition far more volatile and potentially dangerous than ever before, it does not stand to reason that humanity is doomed to take its 'Great power competition' and threat of conflict into the stars . Cooperation can and still will be had, space is hostile enough, but water on the moon makes things ever so slightly more complicated politically (just as practically it makes things easier) and increases the need for careful diplomacy, lest a Cold War style race, become a hot war conflict, in space, or on Earth over position and resources.

First USA Presidential Debate- Trump's bullying worked?

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Thu, 01 Oct 2020 21:09:57 GMT

The first presidential debate has been universally condemned... but did Trump 'win' a strategic victory?

The first US presidential debate has caused quite a stir. The kindest that has been said of it is that it was " an ill-tempered and at times incomprehensible squabble between two angry septuagenarians who palpably loathe each other ", and the agreed takeaway from even Republican supporters was that there was 'no winner' , indeed it could be said that it was the American people who are the ones who really lost , so poor was the presentation of both Donald Trump and Joe Biden.

However this seeming disaster alas does have in political terms a winner and a loser, and arguably Trump and his campaign team played a winning gambit (whether they meant to or not...). Trump managed to neuter the debate being a vehicle for Biden to prove himself a statesman and denied him the opportunity to neutralize Trump's 'sleepy Joe' campaign strategy, while Trump being as everyone expected him to be, politically lost nothing at all.

To understand this, we need to remind ourselves of the Trump campaigns broader strategy- the narrative of 'sleepy Joe' , a moniker coined by Trump to mock Biden's perceived absence from the campaign trail , and to reinforce the personal attacks Trump and his team have launched questioning Biden's mental fitness to lead to the USA.

These sorts of personal attacks have so far defined Trumps campaign style both in 2016 and now, and moreover, Biden's team are aware, and admit at how successful they were in 2016 and can be if let unchallenged . They galvanize Trump's base (naturally), and eat away at swing voter confidence- not necessarily so far as getting them to vote for Trump, but to just not turn out. With Biden already having to tackle the issue that around 14% of Sanders supporters will not not back him , and may choose to not vote, this is an election that might be decided on a knife edge, as while polling shows Biden in the lead fairly consistently , so it did too in 2016- the current polls are not comfortably enough ahead for Biden to breathe a real sigh if relief that he might be in the clear, and national polling fails of course to take into account the particular situation in key swing states where things are far from settled.

With this in mind, the first presidential debate was a chance for Biden to directly counter (as he must) the attacks against his mental fitness for the role, by coming across as calm, collected, competent and solid. Giving direct policy answers and painting out clearly his hopes and ambitions for his presidency. His ability to do this is aided by the supposedly very structured format of the debates, with time to answer an array of questions and usually some inkling of what the key issues will be. In this rather 'set piece' affair Biden would have all the advantages to dispel Trump's attack line here by coming across as clear, in control and commanding, and put some clear blue water between them both in the polling by reaching directly to swing voters who while not Trump enthusiasts, might equally have concerns around his ability to be president (and of course to win over potentially 'stay at home' Sanders voters) by showing that he is indeed competent. Indeed it was put around in the media that the debate would be Biden's chance to disprove Trump's claims about him .

Far from though Biden being able to do this in a clear way, Trump was himself... he interrupted, bullied, heckled and personally attacked Biden throughout, frequently cutting across Biden's answers and in some cases being able to bring Biden down to his level of squalid debate. So much so indeed did he do this, and the candidates squabbled that t he next debate is looking at putting in special rules to prevent such rudeness and 'cut across' from either candidate by silencing their mic if they attempt to. Trump of course is a polarizing figure, he's also know broadly by his own supporters and opponents as brash, a bully/strong man, and something of an ass, thus his tactics shocked no one, losing him no support. Meanwhile Biden was rattled, he came across as being unclear, long-winded and winding.

So whether Trump tactically chose to play into this, or was just himself, we can't really know. But regardless as a tactic is was incredibly successful at lowering the tone of the debate, 'shaking' Biden so that he didn't perform as well as he could have done and he certainly wasn't able to be statesman-like and dispel attacks of 'sleepy Joe', instead he came down to Trump's level (willingly or not) and the consequence has been as in the links I posted above- commentators, politicians, the media and public have all come away from the debate thinking the whole thing was pointless and damaging for all parties, and any chance to shift to polls completely lost . Trump effectively has neutered at least the first debate as being a tool for a Democrat leap to happen, Trump lost nothing by being as everyone expected him to be, Biden lost the chance to prove he's not what Trump paints him as.

Whether this works in the second debate with the new rules, we'll have to wait and see. But the first was a tactical victory for Trump.

Britannia Waives the Rules: Undermining international law means undermining post-Brexit Britain's national interest and influence abroad

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Wed, 09 Sep 2020 15:44:13 GMT

Putting aside the current raging arguments of 'Leavers' and 'Remainers', the willingness of the British government to openly break international law risks undermining Britain's post-Brexit prospects and power abroad. (Also- i was so chuffed at the title, but apparently the I-Newspaper already got there first...)

"It was embodied in a Treaty signed in the name of the British people.

Britain does not renounce Treaties.

Indeed, to do so would damage our own integrity as well as international relations."

( Margaret Thatcher, 1979 on the EEC )

It is truly a historic moment when a British minister can stand in Parliament at the dispatch box and openly state that Britain will 'break international law' , even if they try to hide it with the caveat that it's only going to be 'in a very specific and limited way'. That's rather like someone saying they did break the law by stealing £500 from a shops till, but it's fine, because they didn't take the other till too. They specifically limited their rule breaking, so does that make it OK? Of course not.

This was said by Boris Johnson's minister regarding Britain being prepared to alter elements of the EU Withdrawal Agreement, a treaty it already signed up to last year (and thus it would break international law). A treaty indeed that Boris Johnson himself re-negotiated and signed, heralding it as a 'fantastic moment' , but a treaty which his government now argues would leave Britain a ' client state ' of the EU.

I am the law? Defining International law:

Firstly some housekeeping, as I've seen 'International law' being bandied around as if it was a legislated, codified and 'supranational' legal system with defined punishments and practices akin to national sovereign law. It's not. International law is more a system of rules, traditions, customs, and standards generally accepted as a framework for international relations between states to be conducted from, that ensures stability, consistency and provides an element of certainty and security thus improving peace, trust and cooperation between states. For more see here .

So while they'll be no global police force coming to arrest a breaker of this system, there are significant diplomatic repercussions for the violator from both ally, partner and foe alike. Be it a loss of trust and so good standing (integral capital for creating comprehensive and mutually beneficial trade deals), international alienation or cold shouldering or indeed the consequences can be as bad as partners seeking more 'stable' association elsewhere and actual economic and diplomatic consequences (an extreme example is the Russian annexation of Crimea and the resulting sanctions regime).

A repeat felon?:

Britain of course has had its run ins with International law and the web of institutions that embody it. Most recently Britain was ordered on 20 June 2020 by the International Court of Justice to return the Chagos Islands to Mauritius , which would fulfill Britain's own now overdue 1965 commitment to do so when the islands were 'no longer needed for defense' , and pay £40 million in compensation to the islanders Britain forcefully removed from their home (for more on the Chagos Islands, see my essay here ). Britain despite losing this case, alongside several others over the past decade, refuses to do so yet citing 'national security' concerns.

Why does this matter more?:

The key difference here is essentially scale. Firstly the Chagos Islands is a low-flying dispute taking place in the Indian Ocean between Britain and a very small state with little international backing or attention and who is reliant on another larger power taking an interest for any kind of serious pressure to start being applied. Britain also has the tacit backing of the USA to whom it rents out a military base on one of the islands; Diego Garcia, and the silence of many allied partners in Europe over its Chagos Island dispute (it's important to note this silence though is a step-down from previous support).

Likewise in terms of media attention Britain has purposefully attempted to keep its rule breaking on the down-low in an attempt to mitigate itself and all its partner states from being pressured to make any sweeping comments or come down on a side by keeping international attention low. However, it's important to note that since Brexit, Britain's traditionally strong presence on international bodies has started to be squeezed, and our close allies and partners are no longer voting as consistently or closely with us- many on the Chagos Islands matter have begun abstaining . The effects then for breaking international law in a way that partners find indefensible has real-world consequences for a nations wider political presence. It could be the Chagos dispute becomes a slow growing sore for British influence and 'smart power' abroad.

The government's recent statement regarding the EU though is very different and far more public. For a British Minister in the form of Northern Ireland Secretary Brandon Lewis to openly state in Parliament, that the government is willing to break the law , and then for another Minister, Matt Hancock, while doing the media rounds to confirm he is 'comfortable' with the UK breaking international law, and finally for Boris Johnson in PMQs to essentially try and side-step the issue and try and extol the benefits of breaking the treaty is incredulous to the extreme, as well as wholly self-damaging, especially as the threat is breaking international law against Britain's close partners in Europe, in a way that has even seen powers in the US decry it . Britain very much is going out on a limb alone here, riling its historic partners and allies, who are all weighty international actors.

What's the potential fallout?:

To be so open about being willing to break international law, and in such a blase manner, Britain is actively undermining its post-Brexit influence and power structures in two key ways. Firstly Britain is directly damaging its own permanent national interests, and secondly it is potentially damaging its ability to get the most out of post-Brexit relationships. We'll examine this one after the other.

1) Damaging it's national interests:

Britain relies on the perception (note with the Chagos dispute, not the reality) internationally that it is a champion of the 'rules based order' of International law. In 2015 the UK's Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) identified the erosion of the rules-based international order as one of the four main threats facing the country . That Britain is now willing to contribute to this erosion is an extreme form of political self-harm.

Especially as i ndeed it had a huge role in creating the very system of International customs, standards, rules and traditions that make up International law , in a way that specifically benefits itself materially. One of Britain's greatest achievements is arguably co-opting and partnering most of the globe to see the benefit of having a system of rules governing international diplomacy and getting them on board securing, with some large blips, peace and prosperity and an increasingly economically inter-connected globe which Britain has benefited from hugely.

This is a doctrine it has both preached from Parliament , and is understandably the cornerstone of British foreign policy . Indeed as the US seems to have somewhat stepped back from the role as protector of a 'rules based order', Britain has been eager in attempting to build a coalition to fill that void , with it in a key position. The promotion of Britain as a special guardian, protector and follower of International law is the cloak that gives Britain the international legitimacy, justification and authority to intervene in various parts of the globe to protect its own vital interests while also garnering international support for this. Examples of this can be found in the abstract, broader and specific senses of being in Britain's national interest.

In the Abstract:

As maritime law is arguably largely the basis for international law, it makes sense here to bring up the principle of Freedom of Navigation. This is a concept embedded in International law as a customary law, and was codified in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (While the US did not ratify this treaty, it still respects and indeed enforces the customary law- thus International law has real power alone, even un-codified). It is stated in the UN convention as the 'freedom of movement for vessels, freedom to enter ports and to make use of plant and docks, to load and unload goods and to transport goods and passengers' and in customary international law is defined as 'ships flying the flag of any sovereign state shall not suffer interference from other states, apart from the exceptions provided for in international law'.

The upholding of this has historically been an important tenant of British foreign policy unsurprisingly as a maritime state. The ability for warships to be deployed legally near crisis zones to exert pressure, create a deterrent, reinforce diplomatic initiatives and project British influence is integral to Britain's power projection and security according to the UK government's own 2017 Maritime Power Doctrine . Beyond facilitating British 'smart power' abroad, Freedom of navigation, particularly the ability of commercial and transport ships to move unmolested in international waters, seek safe harbour when needed and travel without fear of disruption is absolutely key to a maritime economy like Britain's where we import 80% of our food , and rely on international trade as 28 per cent of all of the goods and services produced on British soil are sold or distributed abroad, while 30 per cent of all products and services purchased in the UK are imported from overseas .

Britain's geography, primarily its lack of arable land for its population size, lack of rare earth materials and oil mean for its modern economy to function it cannot do 'self-sufficiency' it must be part of a globalized trade network, in which shipping is key, with 95% of all imports and exports in the UK transported by ship .

Due to this, Britain has a global interest and indeed necessity making sure that shipping all over the globe can travel without incident or disruption, as if it's not allowed the British economy will either directly or indirectly end up suffering. Thus an abstract construct of international law such as 'Freedom of Navigation' has very real roots and tangible effects for Britain. It is in this vein that Britain is getting involved in the South China Sea, where China is attempting to circumvent international law by making a 'sea grab' and claim disputed and formally international waters as its exclusive economic zone (and with it, the ability to interfere with, tax or disrupt passing shipping). Considering that a third of all the worlds shipping goes through the South China Sea , it's very easy to see how this would impact Britain. Britain thus sends warships to the area as a means of 'flying the flag' for freedom of navigation , and alongside international partners like the US and France it aims to try and deter China's ambitions here. It does so citing International law as its legitimacy to get involved (and Chatham House here ), and thus here any public, open and large-scale undermining of that same International law, as Britain has now threatened to do with the EU would both diminish the legitimacy of such operations which are both in the global, and Britain's own national interest, but also could see China come back with a very effective defense that Britain equally does not respect it's obligations or International law and so its criticism can be sidelined, ignored and ridiculed as hypocritical.

In the Broad Sense:

In a similar vein the cloak of International law legitimizes UK criticism (and political or even military intervention) in 'hot spots' around the globe either in support its own interests, its ideological outlook or in supporting partners. A key example is supporting Canada in the Arctic circle. While not an Arctic state itself, the UK has recently dubbed itself a 'Near-Arctic State' in its new Arctic strategy and has identified the Arctic as a potential economic hot spot of opportunity in the near future for Britain as the ice melts by 2050 (or indeed even as early as 2035 ) to allow for a summer-time Trans-Arctic route , which Britain is geographically well-placed, with extensive shipping infrastructure to exploit for economic gain. The regions stability is thus important for the UK both economically and in security terms with it being right on the UK's northern border.

Russia has recently made significant inroads into the Arctic, building military complexes in the region, asserting authority over larger areas of the Arctic , in contravention of International law as again Freedom of Navigation operations are being used to deter Russia from expanding it's claims as it has tried, right up to the North Pole , in much the same way as Britain is doing in the South China Sea.

These operations are also being participated in by Britain to help out its partner Canada, who is an Arctic power, and who is in direct regional competition with Russia . Aligning with Canada is good for the UK in several areas. Firstly Canada is a key post-Brexit potential trading partner both theoretically as a partner in the envisaged CANZUK group which some politicians across the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand wish to develop but also more practically in current trade negotiations, which have so far had a rather shaky early start with Canada actually walking away due to the UK's proposed global tariffs strategy being less than generous for Canada , with the UK climb-down on this talks are back on, but greater cooperation in the Arctic could go a long way to smoothing relations.

Secondly, fostering closer cooperation with Canada may give the UK access to key Arctic commercial activities, something that its 'Beyond the Ice' strategy paper identifies , as the UK can directly offer Canada and other 'friendly' Arctic powers its expertise, investment and resources. Thus a Canada with a strong Arctic presence will be more beneficial for the UK than one with an unstable, diminished one due to increased Russian pressure.

The UK's support of Canada is both done directly through cooperative treaty, but also under the banner of International law, the argument against Russian expansion is based on concepts like freedom of navigation, and anti-land grabbing rules which are enshrined in customary International law . Once again then International law works to Britain's direct benefit, and the indirect benefit of curtailing aggressive expansion and the creation of instability. However, a Britain that joins those who flout openly international law loses this defense of its interventionist actions and thus the legitimacy of its actions become questionable. Currently the Arctic international narrative is of Russia as an aggressive mover with Britain and Canada moving in response, and so garnering international sympathy from most quarters. However a Britain who also is perceived to flout International law when it suits may take on a far more ominous perception of its Arctic interactions. As Polar geopolitics expert Professor Klaus Dodds has stated, we currently look at China as an Arctic imperialist of sorts, yet Britain has made the exact same moves as it has by re-dubbing itself as a 'near-Arctic' power and seeking to become more active in Arctic circle affairs. It is only because Britain shrouds itself as a paragon of the rules based order that its international and public reception has been far more favorable.

In the Specific:

Britain's historic support for International law has allowed it to personally punch far above its weight, even in the most dire of circumstances. The perception that Britain is a champion of a rules based order has given it the opportunity to amplify it's smart power ( the concept created by Joseph S. Nye that traditional hard power, soft power and influence should be seen not separately, but taken together as a key tool of state), or indeed replace a much diminished 'hard power' deterrent with it. A key example of this is in the British Antarctic Territories, where prior to 1959 it seemed very likely that the growing 'hard power' presence of the US, Argentina, Chile and Russia in the region would see Britain forced out of the territory that it discovered and claimed as well as the nearby Falkland Islands (For more see my work Britain's Antarctic Empire). By 1957 a telegram dated 17 April, To Henry from Chancery at the Buenos Aires Embassy (The National Archives, FO 371/126125) clearly stated that it is likely Argentina will force Britain to retreat if no other options can be found. Luckily, what Britain lacked in regional budget, presence and assets it could make up at the international level. Britain played an instrumental part in developing the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) due to its ability to co-opt other nations like the US, Chile, France and even Russia based on its reputation as a follower of International rules and norms. Because of this, despite a difficult negotiation, the Antarctic Treaty was eventually agreed on, which essentially allowed Britain to keep its territory and claims through 'freezing' the conflict. This suited a de-colonizing post-war Britain immensely, and has meant that Britain is still a major Antarctic player. The region, much like the Arctic presents a scientific and potential economic opportunity as the globe warms and the ATS moratorium on mining comes to an end in 2048 (Britain in the 1980s advocated for Antarctic exploitation , but was overruled). Since then China has arrived on the Antarctic scene, and international law has meant that while it openly wishes to overturn the ATS , it does not outright ignore its strictures by starting a new militarized 'base race' and flooding the continent with its presence. Instead, the coercive nature of International law means that China has to work slowly and surely to getting the change it wishes. International law and Britain's respect for it, thus provides Britain with a shield from larger powers, and with time to adapt, and indeed to form a solution based on International law (in this case the ATS) by modifying the treaty to close the loop-holes China is exploiting and gather a coalition together to prevent the Antarctic becoming a major center of international tension.

International law, and Britain's use of it thus allows actors to engage with one another on something resembling a more equal footing where a 'might makes right' philosophy can be tempered with one in which legitimacy and reputation matters. This is what Britain is risking undermining with its open acknowledgement of being prepared to break with international law and its treaty obligations- what then would stop China simply ignoring the ATS to put things in a purely logical perspective.

2) Damaging it's post-Brexit prospects:

Britain's attitude though is not simply going to damage its national interests, influence and 'smart power' abroad. It directly imperils Britain's post-Brexit future. The former Prime Minister Theresa May rightly questioned why anyone should trust Britain's word if it willfully rows-back on treaty obligations it has signed up to . A key part of negotiating trade deals is that there is trust between the two (or more) parties that what is agreed will be done and that both parties are acting in good faith . If there is a perception of trust, that a country honours its commitments and obligations (as Thatcher rightly pointed out in the opening quote) then it is liable to be able to create deeper and more detailed trade links, faster and with greater efficiency that a country which is perceived by the international community to be lacking trust- i.e. one that does not follow International law when it suits it, despite consistently decrying its importance as Britain is in danger of doing here.

A key example of these consequences are that on hearing the news that Britain is prepared to break international law and obligations it signed up to with the EU, significant elements of the US political elite are threatening themselves that this will put in danger any hope of a good UK-US trade deal (or indeed any hope at all). These elements run across the political spectrum of both Democrat and Republican . It's partly due to the lack of trust it instills, but also because the US places a lot of emphasis on the Good Friday Agreement and arrangements at the Irish Border with the US Congress being dead against a 'hard border' . This is because there exists in the US an influential and significant Irish-American lobby which British commentators tend to overlook, but that historically has caused major headaches for British policymakers prior to the Good Friday Agreement. That Britain's breaking of international law may result in a 'hard border' in Northern Ireland means then that the prize of Brexit, that US-UK Free Trade Deal may fail to materialize, even if Trump supports it, as it's Congress who has to approve it. Likewise if Biden is elected in November, Britain is already in for a rough ride regarding a US deal due to his pro-EU outlook , and so it would be valuable to shore-up our relationship now, not simply create new antagonistic points as the government have done here.

In broader terms too, the post-Brexit vision of a 'Global Britain' which champions International law, free trade and a rules based order and that is very much 'part' of the global system as Boris Johnson has envisaged is fundamentally undermined with Britain's current 'pick and choose' approach that is open to derision, calls of hypocrisy and contributes to the erosion (as the 2015 report identified) of the very thing Britain needs to prop up if we are to wield not just global influence, but to be secure in our own Island nation's safety and prosperity .

Conclusion:

The damning thing here is that this is a deal, that despite his current protestations of having to move at pace through the process, and thus being rushed into signing something he now deems unfit for purpose (not a great excuse when the opposition attack line is centered on branding Boris Johnson and his government as 'incompetent'), Boris Johnson re-negotiated and signed Britain up to this deal, he even made it part of his 2019 election campaign to have an 'oven ready' deal, one that's turned out to be partly inedible it seems. So it's not even as if Britain can hide behind a change of government to justify itself, these are the exact same people who saw the renegotiated agreement as a triumph.

I can understand the argument from some that there is worry about the European Court of Justice still having far too much of a say in the laws of a post-Brexit Britain than a sovereign country would be willing to put up with. However, there are ways of negotiating around this point that do not shoot Britain in its own foot as a key cornerstone of its national interest and foreign policy is undermined by statements from it's own government. For instance, that a trade deal needs a legal dispute mechanism is obvious (and trade deals almost always involve the out-sourcing of elements of sovereignty), the UK could push for an alternate institution to the ECJ to be set up by using the Withdrawal agreement's own mechanisms to renegotiate, instead of unilaterally putting forward an 'Internal Market Bill' to change a joint treaty without working with the other side to do so. Even if then the renegotiation's failed, the 'no-deal' Brexit that Britain would end up with would be less disastrous than the 'no-deal' that unilaterally changing the treaty and breaking international law would result in. This is because the US an other partners we'd need to make trade deals with quickly in this situation, would be less angered and could trust a Britain with it's international reputation still intact more and so seek more quickly and efficiently, deeper and more complex agreements due to this mutual trust that Britain honours its commitments. Even the EU in such a scenario would be far easier to get along with in future as 'no deal' would not have come about due to an internationally disreputable act from Britain. Anything is thus possible and better to have solved the ECJ sticking point, but having a minister stand at the dispatch box and openly state Britain will break International law, is the worst possible thing to have done, especially as if Britain is taken to an international court, it makes defending itself rather difficult.

Expect then those infamous words to be thrown back at us at every opportunity by powers who seek to overturn the rules based global order that Britain directly relies upon for its prosperity and security, in favour of a return to the 'might makes right' strongman-ship which modern Britain is ill suited to compete in. Britain's post-Brexit future and success relies upon the perception, if not fact, of our commitment to International law.

Britain’s tangible national interest: The case for the High North and South Atlantic as a baseline for Britain’s tangible national interests abroad- A preliminary study.

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Sun, 30 Aug 2020 19:52:51 GMT

The polar regions present Britain with two of its only physically tangible global 'national interests'. Due to global warming they present unique opportunities for a post-Brexit Britain and should be key considerations at the baseline of British foreign policy and any definition of a national interest.

Abstract:

A hushed tone descends upon Whitehall, tremors are felt in the earth and West Country MP's swear they saw a drunken woman throwing stuff out of a lake she fell into at passers by... The Cabinet's Integrated Review is upon us to decide not only the shape, size and scope of Britain's foreign policy and army, but just what Britain's national interests are.

In this latest article i make the case for a baseline of Britain's national interests being our physical presence in the Arctic and Antarctic. Two regions which unlike the more distant South China Sea, have a direct and tangible impact upon the future economic prosperity and security of Britain. We are like it or not, still a 'global player' (though not power), we need the ability to project power and have overseas assets that far from being 'imperial relics' are the future basis potentially of the UK's post-Brexit posterity.

Introduction:

So, the Cabinet Office’s Integrated Review of Security, Defense, Development and Foreign Policy begins to loom large, the call for evidence having gone out on the 13 August. This is the review that expects to analyse and decide upon Britain’s national interests, power projection and defense needs for the next few decades. It’s important, particularly in a post-Brexit world and interesting, because Britain in the recent past has been rather terrible at defining its role in the world and what its interests actually are. For instance, we hold up the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ not as a tool for mutual support of interests, but as the end unto itself, not a very sensible take.

Debates to come over the nature of Britain’s armed forces:

It’s already been leaked that the MoD wants to scrap Britain’s Tank capability , it being costly and the Challenger II existing battle-ready in such small numbers that it makes it entirely inadequate for a war in which they’d actually be ‘efficient’ (i.e. the right bang, for the right buck). A relatively recent RUSI paper has highlighted too how a British infantry squad not only lacks the battlefield support expected of other modern powers (i.e. the artillery, air cover and heavy equipment that the Russians, US or Chinese deploy to aid their infantry), but also that due to its lack of firepower , it would only be able to ‘exist’ a matter of minutes in a firefight with its counterpart from Russia. This is mainly because the Governments ‘British Army 2020’ plan, conceptualized by David Cameron re-envisaged Britain’s army as a ‘light’ expeditionary force to tackle conflicts in the developing world . The issue here being that hostile states and non-government actors are increasingly able to get access to the kind of equipment that would see Britain’s ‘light infantry’ army lose its already limited firepower advantage.

Thus, decisions need to be made about the role of Britain’s army, is it a first-class full-spectrum force capable of war fighting against developed nations? Or is it a ‘world police’ expeditionary force that is cost-effective at tackling terror groups, piracy and hostile rebel groups in the developing world? Or should it be a garrison force for Britain and its global outposts?

Meanwhile beyond the army sphere, there are also questions as to the nature of Britain’s navy. We now have two super carriers (Though only one will be operational at a time). However, due to the budget being splashed on them we actually lack the ability to provide proper escorts for them , courtesy of a lack of other surface ships and cuts to the numbers of escorts being built. The navy then is overstretched, it cannot deploy its carrier with adequate protection, while also maintaining its global commitments (let alone the defense of home waters). This isn’t even going into the fact that the carriers currently are not being used properly in terms of the firepower they should provide, and will not be able to be unless the rest of the navy relinquish even more of its budget (so even less for the escorts and other surface vessels).The salient point here though is stated by Rear Admiral Chris Parry , who said that militarily you should only have something that you are prepared to lose. Given that it is now debatable how safe a fully escorted carrier is in a modern warfare context , Britain’s carriers lacking a full escort are highly vulnerable to the point of being potential useless.

So, the role of Britain’s navy needs to be assessed- anti-piracy force? Power-projection force? What and why?

Growth of Cyber-warfare

There are urgent areas of Britain’s military in need of a re look. Some argue that Dominic Cummings intends to try and cut Britain’s conventional armed forces in favour of investing heavily in ‘Cyber-warfare ’. This is a new frontier of war fighting where military hackers aim to disrupt a rival nations internet, satellites, energy grid and online infrastructure hoping to sew chaos, limit the ability to counter-attack. It can even attempt to cause food shortages .

These are debates over the tools though, the big question we firstly need to answer is ‘why?’. What is the point of Britain’s armed forces in the modern era? Why do they exist? There is scope for a huge debate here that just isn’t happening yet. Why for instance does Britain need a multi-spectrum force? Who does it envisage having to fight?

What can be said today in this limited format is that Britain is still a country with global commitments. Both ‘ideological’ in terms of being a proponent of free trade (and thus contributes to protecting global trade routes and freedom of navigation), but Britain also does have tangible physical interests worldwide. So, I’m afraid for those who fairly argue that Britain needs to ‘wind-down’ its military, and accept the role of a medium, defensive power- we’re not quite there yet.

Britain’s tangible self-interest national interests:

What are these physical interests that require a global presence? Well there are two key areas where I can see Britain having a clear self-interested ‘national interest (as opposed to simply wishing to support allies worldwide and protect its ideological commitment to a global trading system- hence why Britain has warships deployed in the South China Sea currently).

The High North, the lure of the Arctic Circle:

Firstly, the Arctic Circle. The British government have recently moved to a ‘pro-active’ stance in regard to the region for the first time in decades with their ‘Beyond the Ice’ strategic review . They recognize Britain as a ‘near-Arctic’ state, and thus we have an interest in keeping the region stable (due to its proximity), as well as being ready to exploit the potential dividend that comes from melting ice. This dividend takes the form of commercial support and offering of expertise to Arctic state allies like Canada and Denmark, but also in the potential for busier Arctic shipping and indeed a wholly new Trans-Arctic shipping lane , in which Britain geographically is well placed to take advantage as a trade/re-export port if it chose to invest properly in the required infrastructure and global relationships (Yes, the EU being a key one here considering Britain is better placed to be a gateway to the continent given its location and existing large-scale maritime infrastructure).

The Arctic though also has overlapping claimants , and a steady military build-up on behalf of Russia and the US , alongside growing Chinese interest (They recently have declared themselves a ‘near-Arctic’ state just as Britain has). Denmark, Canada and the US also all have issues with one another over the extent of their claims. Thus, it’s a diplomatic minefield which Britain needs to be sure to carefully tend and navigate and to keep the growing potential for conflict in the region under wraps. In terms of Britain’s military deployments due to the lack of a British outpost in the high north beyond one scientific summer station, this is more though a sphere for the Royal Navy and a light, expeditionary style military (in case of the need for a physical presence or deterrent). This is particularly important if a Trans-polar route becomes a key ‘growth line’ for the British economy in the near future

The Low South, an Antarctic Empire:

A region where the British army become far more important is in the South Atlantic, and particularly the Antarctic. Here Britain has a physical presence in the form of the Falkland Islands and its attendant garrison , as well as the British Antarctic Territory with the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) providing boots on the ground for science and sovereignty (Given that a key part of Britain’s historic strategy to shore-up its Antarctic position is to maintain a permanent presence, indeed that’s the main reason why BAS and its forerunner the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey was established - see my work on this to find out more ).

This is a region where there is economic of opportunity, as increasing temperatures make the exploitation of its potential bio (For instance with a growing international demand for Antarctic Krill ), mineral and oil resources commercially viable. Politically too the moratorium on mining comes to an end in 2048 and so its no surprise we are beginning to a see an increased Antarctic presence from nearly all nations with a stake (or who wish for a stake, like China ).

There are also though problems for Britain here. Argentina disputes the Falklands, South Georgia and the vast majority of the Antarctic territory, Chile to a lesser extent does too for the latter. While military conflict is unlikely (though not impossible- see the 1948 , 52 , and 53 incidents to see just how close things came to a small-scale ‘conflict’), deterrent and display are key parts of the Antarctic policies of all Antarctic powers, and is especially true of Britain who has created ‘Fortress Falklands’ partly to deter Argentina, but also as an outpost for the wider region. The need for a military presence in the South Atlantic and deterrent increases though as even before 2048, there may be issues with Russia and especially China coming in as a power who openly opposes the Antarctic Treaty System and has been steadily undermining it alongside Russia. So again, if Britain either wants to exploit the Antarctic’s economic potential ( likely given that in the 1980s it was Britain who led the charge for mining to be allowed ), or want’s to simply keep the status-quo, and with it Argentine and Chilean claims to its territory under-wraps, it will need to maintain a comparatively significant South Atlantic presence, particularly as China appears to be seeking out greater cooperation with Argentina in the area . The current expansion of the British Antarctic Survey alludes to this need, but there is also the need for a similar military presence (though of course not directly on the Antarctic, unless the ATS fails or is changed- both of which are not unlikely to happen in the near-future).

Polar opposites, yet the same need:

These ‘polar fronts’ are two areas opposite areas of the globe, in which Britain has a fundamental physical national interest in having a presence- for the Arctic its partly tied to its own direct economic and inherent security, while for the Antarctic its protecting its physical assets and continuing with its historic policy of being ready to exploit the economic and scientific dividends of a continent it had a huge role in exploring. If nothing else, Britain’s physical power projection capabilities need to be geared towards providing a sustainable, efficient deterrent in these regions. This is ‘ground zero’ in terms of need, and so the review will if carried out seriously take these aspects as a springboard for which to re-imagine Britain’s place in the world. We still have global commitments, like it or not.

The Union in crisis?

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Sat, 01 Aug 2020 10:12:17 GMT

The Boris whistle-stop tour didn't work, and now the Conservative government if they want to save the union with Scotland need to answer the question that has dogged the British establishment since the 90s- What is the point of the United Kingdom? All the while doing so in such a way that avoids arguments that may have a negative parallel to Brexit.

So Boris' whistle-stop tour to some of Scotland's most isolated places has backfired (Boris and the Conservatives brand for quite some time have been very unpopular in Scotland)-

Scottish approval ratings:

Nicola Sturgeon:

Approve: 66%

Disapprove: 30%

NET: +36%

Keir Starmer:

Approve: 38%

Disapprove: 37%

NET: +1%

Boris Johnson:

Approve: 22%

Disapprove: 73%

NET: -51%

Via @YouGov , 28-30 Jul.

Interestingly it would seem that Keir Starmer is the 'best' hope to save the union and there clearly needs to be more of a cross-party approach from Westminster if they were serious about Scotland not going independent ( currently consistent polling over the last few months has a 'Yes' to Scottish Independence at 54% ).

A union in danger:

The old economic arguments that won (though on an unstable footing) the last Scottish Independence Referendum in 2014, no longer apply- these were that Scotland would struggle to get EU membership ( And remember in 2016 Scotland overwhelmingly voted to Remain in the EU - the catalyst for a real split in outlook), would be economically worse off and that trade would be harder.

These arguments are ineffective when they are the very same that the Conservative government have been battling against to do Brexit. The government by the necessity of having to challenge, ignore and undermine the economic arguments against Brexit, have undermined them being able to use these against Scottish independence as they'd simply look like hypocrites (And it may have repercussions on the attitude towards Brexit- if you are telling the Scots that leaving the UK's 'internal marker' is a terrible idea for their economy, it begs the question why then the UK is leaving the single market- the answer- 'greater opportunities open up' applies equally for Brexit and Scotland- rendering it useless as a way to show the point of the UK).

Instead a 'positive' case for the Union is needed. The benefits that being part of the UK bring should be articulated.

However, this is difficult currently for several reasons. Firstly as historians like Linda Colley argue , 'Britain' and the 'United Kingdom' are essentially comparatively recently created identities by parties who agreed to participate in a joint-project- that being the creation of the British empire. Essentially to horribly generalize, England and Scotland (and Wales in a less clear cut way) realized that competition would hamper their prospects at 'keeping up' with their European neighbors (also rivals) in the creation of global empires from whom wealth, power and prestige could be extracted. Instead by having a 'stable and safe' unified island, and by complimenting each others political, economic and military clout England and Scotland would be better off (the alternative was as we saw with Scotland's own colonial attempts like Panama - to become direct imperial competitors and risk rival empires like France or Spain manipulating their divisions to keep them as minor players in the imperial game).

In this light though, the foundational reason for Britain is the joint-project of imperialism, and the British identity is an imperial one, that only has 'meaning' when Britain has an empire/is one of the worlds foremost powers. This is something explored in my paper '[Shake] at Royal Force: British and Colonial soldier’s letters from the Boer War (1899-1902) and what they can say about Imperial and National Identities.'

You can see then the issue- what happens when the UK no longer has a global empire? It's no coincidence that the 'crisis of British identity' began when decolonization did. What's the point of an imperial identity when there's no empire? Thus the rekindling of Scottish, Welsh and indeed England identities at the expense of being 'British' begins apace (even in people who recognize themselves as both British AND Scottish- the late Victorians for instance had a growing conception that Scotland was simply 'North Britain' - such was the growth of the British identity- something unthinkable today).

Essentially to keep the Union intact, the UK needs to come up with a new reason for it to exist. A new purpose or joint project that benefits all its constituents either economically, politically or indeed morally. This is a tall order though, it's something that Britain's politicians, policy makers and academics have been grappling with since the 90s, if not before - just what, if anything, is the UK's 'new' place in the world post-empire? There is no clear answer still yet.

This already difficult case is made harder by...

The need to not de-legitimize Brexit:

Brexit was, and remains contentious and polarizing. For it to be carried out (as it must for the Conservatives to not return to the electoral oblivion they faced potentially pre-Boris) it needs to rally support of the populace, and build up to a stable majority support, lest the issue continue to dog British politics and as with the 2014 Scottish Referendum, become an issue a few years down the line that risks being a recurring staple. To do this, the benefits of Brexit need to be extolled, perceived and then delivered (or at least perceived as being delivered by the public). In this context the case for Scotland to NOT leave the UK becomes hampered, as it mainly relies on the same arguments that Remainers used to argue against Brexit- thus to reuse these arguments and rely on them risks Brexit being drawn back into the main political sphere and open to dispute and being undermined, particularly as currently polling seems to imply there is a slight majority for remaining in the EU among the British public as the previous link highlighted.

Can you then dear reader think of any reasons that Scotland should remain part of the UK, but that also would NOT undermine Brexit? (So for instance- 'greater access to trade' or 'greater political clout' are off the table- as these are arguments for why Britain should not be Brexiting too). This is the difficulty facing Boris and the Conservatives- Brexit is why his government was elected- it has to be done. But it also endangers the Union by if nothing else (even if we disregard that Scots clearly have a very different political outlook now post-2016 than the English) nullifying many of the existing arguments for why Scotland should remain part of the UK (which are almost all entirely economically based). If Boris loses Scotland then, as i evidenced in my previous article , it's likely he'll be toppled by his own party and the Conservatives electoral prospects will take a hit (the party that shrouds itself in Unionism, and that goes on to lose said Union is a very bad look).

A tall order?

So, the government needs to not only answer a question that which has plagued the British establishment since at least the 90s- Why UK? and what UK? but also to make sure this case doesn't rely on economics that undermines the Brexit project, but instead competes on the emotional political field. In the same way that the SNP can evoke the cry of Scottish pride and independence from England, Westminster needs to be able to elicit the same strong emotions of support for being British somehow...and in less than four years (perhaps even just a year). Yikes Crispies.

It might be that the Conservative government manages to scrape through, not having to answer this directly but relying on a soundbite short-termed campaign of why Scots benefit from Westminster (Barnett formula no doubt will be touted- though this is the same formula that many Conservatives and English voters want to see scrapped as they deem it unfair, so this isn't a safe play politically either lest you open up to highlighting the perception of anti-Scottish currents in England for the SNP to exploit), but this will as we saw in 2014 not put the issue to rest, maybe allowing them to muddle through for the next few years before having to fight the same question all over again. Frankly it means that economically and politically the UK will be somewhat stunted due to its instability (Who wants to invest in a state whose attractive legal or economic links may not exist in a few years?).

So...any thoughts on how we resolve this? Or is the Union dead? I don't yet have any answers for the former, but suspect the latter will be the case sooner or later, pending something drastic (like a federal UK).

The now missing Page 48 of the Conservative Manifesto, and a looming second Scottish Independence Referendum

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Thu, 23 Jul 2020 10:07:26 GMT

Boris Johnson quietly shies-away from controversy as he shelves Page 48 of the Tory Manifesto, while Scotland becomes a 'make or break' issue:

So, something big just happened in British politics that potentially only those who get their dramatic kicks from watching long sessions of Parliament tv might realize (I am unapologetic about this...).

The Conservatives have quietly dropped their famous/infamous (depending on your view) 'Page 48' manifesto commitment to investigate, scrap and reform the 'broader aspects of our constitution: the relationship between the government, parliament and the courts' (I go into more detail of this in my article last year here ).

In practice this means the Government will no longer form their pledged 'Constitution, Democracy and Rights Commission' this year, or any other year, to investigate and reform Britain's political and legal establishment according to Paul Goodman .

This would have potentially seen the UK take a radical shift in the nature of our constitution, the power of the government vs the legislature, how the devolved settlements work, and the place of British courts in scrutinizing government actions.

Cummings, Boris and his clique have backed off even considering this, it's not really clear why honestly as they have a majority of 79 and constitutional reform was a key part of the Tories pledge (especially after Boris's fiasco with proroguing parliament and the 'lawfare' they so disliked carried out from 2016-2019). Also scrapping a Manifesto commitment is a big deal, as it means their will inevitably be upset Conservative voters who may feel angered or betrayed that they are not getting what they voted for, especially from a Conservative government with a majority of 79.

The only possible reasons at this point for dropping this commitment is that the government have burnt through much of its political capital (Some over very poor issues- such as Cummings and Barnard Castle), and so feels unable to take on such a weighty and controversial challenge, fearing both external opposition and internal rebels ( as i highlighted previously the majority of 79 for Boris is highly factional and he's lacks overall control given his many u-turns in the face of backbench demands over for instance free school meals and Huawei ).

Indeed there has been talk over the summer recess (traditionally a time when Tories plot to get rid of leaders) o f talk about ousting Boris from certain party factions, should Scotland leave the UK . Which currently is fairly likely with not only support for Scottish independence not with a majority of 54% in Scotland compared to 46% who still support the Union, but also because as polling expert Professor Sir John Curtis highlights , this is the longest period of time ever, that independence has had a sustained lead in the polls over remaining part of the Union, which highlights this appears to not be a blip, but perhaps the seeds sewn by the Brexit referendum where Scotland voted to Remain in the EU by 62% to 38% , beginning to take hold as the first shot highlighting significant political divergence between Scotland and England.

To add pressure to Boris, Conservative backbench MP's have formed the ' Union Research Group ' recently for hardline pro-Union MP's, which reportedly already has 40 members. While ostensibly to 'support' No.10 in its attempts to shore-up the Union, much like the groups inspiration- the famous European Research Group, such entities have the ability to exert significant pressure on the Prime Minister and Cabinet to toe their line, or indeed if not appeased act as the vanguard for attempted coups against a PM (As Theresa May found with the ERG).

The coming fight over Scottish Independence between Westminster and the SNP could explain why the Conservatives have dropped their controversial Page 48 Manifesto Commitment. If they envisage a tough fight ahead, and they clearly do , it might be better to pull in the wagons and not give their critics further ammunition through the controversy their constitutional, legal and political reforms would generate, when the very Union that they are seeking to change, is in a fragile state.

However, the coming and seemingly rather panicked 'whistle stop tour' of Scotland may be geared more towards shoring up Boris' position as leader from critics within the party, than actually trying to shore up the Union yet. This is because Boris visiting has the potential to do more harm than good for the Unions case given Boris' unpopularity in Scotland, especially when compared to the SNP's Nicola Sturgeon . 55% of Scots have no confidence in Boris Johnson compared to 40 who do, while in Nicola Sturgeon 71% of Scots have confidence in her, compared to only 23% who do not, making Boris the wrong person to 'fly the flag' for the Union given he is personally disliked and his party is floundering in the polls at only 22% compared to the SNP's 51%. The fact too that Boris is avoiding Scotland's most populous areas like Glasgow, Aberdeen or Dundee in favour of the sparsely populated north of Scotland where his presence is more likely to get a 'good' photo opportunity with limited chance of protest shenanigans, but less likely to actually engage and make an impact with Scots (Something that echoes of Theresa May who was criticized for hiding in a sparsely populated forest during her visit to Scotland ), highlights that this more to show any rebellious-minded Tories that he is doing something rather than being a tour aimed at putting the hard work in to start saving the Union.

Just in-case anyone was unaware of the issues within the Conservative party, and the precariousness of Boris' position here are a few leaked quotes from backbench and senior Tories reflecting on Boris' first year ;

A year after he became leader, the Conservative backbenches are already restless. One former cabinet minister said they thought the “clouds had gathered” – and not just because of the pandemic, but owing to a feeling that a “good-time” prime minister was not what was needed for the massive economic challenges ahead.

“The hard facts are that Boris is a good-time prime minister; his grip on detail is shocking. He’s the chairman of the board rather than the chief executive. And he’s got a highly contentious, divisive and controversial chief executive in Dominic Cummings.”

Another MP said: “In this No 10, the Conservative party is just something they need to govern. And the party is becoming gradually unwhippable as a result.”

“The party has no emotional attachment to Boris because he does not give us something to believe in, apart from as a vehicle for power,” one MP said. “So a year out, if the polls look bad, it could happen.”

Few are daring to predict whether Johnson can keep hold of power beyond the next election. “He is definitely intending to fight the next election. Politicians like Boris are about winning and not about anything else,” one frontbencher said.

It's an odd time that we live then, where despite a near land-slide majority, the Conservatives are already backing away from controversial Manifesto commitments, and the man who won it for them is looking to be on shaky ground with his party and may not if things in Scotland go ill, last into 2022 let alone survive to lead the Conservatives into the 2024 election.

Britain's post-Brexit trade flounders- what happened and why? The risks and opportunities

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Wed, 22 Jul 2020 14:21:07 GMT

Britain's 'big two' post-Brexit trade deals are on heading towards the rocks. How did we go from 'oven ready' to here?

The 'big two' trade deals that Britain needs to secure its existing 'post-Brexit' economic security (let alone growth) are now in doubt. The Financial Times and Reuters both report that the British government have 'abandoned hopes' of reaching a deal with the US ahead of the coming presidential election in Autumn.

Likewise, the Telegraph and Reuters report (coincidentally also today) that 'the government expects it will trade with Europe on World Trade Organisation terms when the transition period ends'.

Why does this matter?

The EU case:

The EU is Britain's foremost trading partner by far. According to British government statistics , In 2019, UK exports to the EU were £300 billion which is 45% of all British exports. UK imports from the EU were £372 billion which is 51% of all UK imports. The extent to which we are still reliant on this market, despite Brexit cannot be overstated. Indeed in 2019 Britain's exports to the EU rose from 43% to 45- our market integration is increasing, making a 'good' Brexit deal (from an economic perspective) imperative.

World Trade Organization Terms are alas not a 'good' deal for Britain in the economic context as it would mean new tariffs and costs - in the government's own words ;

'If we maintained our current external tariff regime and applied it to the EU, this would impose new tariffs on EU imports, driving up prices for consumers and disrupting business supply chains.'

If though the UK decided to unilaterally drop these tariffs to minimize at least any increase to our cost of living, it would mean also that under WTO rules the UK would have to drop it for all our trade partners which in the government's own words would ;

'open the UK to competition from other countries including those with unfair trading practices.'

Thus, destroying British jobs and industries as we become non-competitive (unless we are politically and socially willing of course to give up on working rights and protections, like sick pay, controlled working hours, minimum wage etc- highly unlikely, though there are small factions in politics advocating this).

The UK does have a plan to attempt to mitigate this issue though , it will implement (published in its March 2019) a new 'temporary' tariff regime in the case of a WTO Brexit, where Britain lowers tariffs to allow 87% of goods to be imported tariff free, while 13% will be subjected to tariffs to protect certain key sectors of the British economy from being out-competed globally- this includes tariffs to aid agriculture, the automotive industry, and products vulnerable to aggressive foreign competition like fertilizer, ceramics and bioethanol.

This plan favours a liberalizing 'free trade' basis for imports because Britain has a trade deficit of £24 billion (It imports more than it exports). So, while it aims to protect British consumers from price rises by making it easier for foreign exporters to continue to sell their goods in Britain as cheaply as possible, it does nothing to address our trade balance (Or more correctly called ‘ current account deficit ’, economists differ on if this is simply a neutral issue for the UK, or if it has negative consequences in social, political and economic spheres).

It also of course does nothing to help British exporters (Remember the EU and US are our two biggest markets). If Britain unilaterally has to lower its tariffs for all WTO members like this, there would actually be very little incentive for any other state to sign a trade deal that is beneficial to Britain as they would have access to British markets on a no tariff basis without having to give us any reciprocal agreement in return.

This will have a detrimental impact on British exports and businesses as they under this tariff arrangement risk being vastly out-competed due to having increased costs and barriers selling their goods globally, while in their home market they also risk facing increasing competition on an 'even' playing field by larger international and foreign based companies who have a bigger war chest and better market stability to back them at home.

This could thus see British owned companies struggle and the specter of job losses loom. Especially as we are in an environment already economically scarred by Covid-19 for the next few years.

This is not to mention that services ( which account for 81% of the UK's economy - we are not big manufacturers) are uniquely vulnerable as most tariff regimes and trade deals do not inherently cover the export of services (for instance there is a big issue for UK financial services in a WTO Brexit due to the limited protections WTO terms provides ).

Why are we approaching a no-deal Brexit? Politics trumping economics:

The reason for this WTO Brexit is not that the EU and UK have fundamentally different economic goals, fears and aims (which can be negotiated and bargained around), but because there is a fundamental political disagreement and divergence happening (which is much harder to fix).

If we look at the areas of contention that are being blamed for holding up the talks , we have fishing rights, the European Court of Justice’s role in governance and the so-called ‘level playing field’ guarantees.

Of these, only Fishing rights is remotely about ‘trade’. For instance, 40% of Denmark’s fishing comes from British territorial waters . Yet this still is only 0.5% of the Danish economy . Likewise fishing for Britain is only 0.12% of our economy . While of course not represented in these figures are the secondary and service industries that are reliant, or make use of that fishing industry, these are still going to be relatively small elements of the overall economy for both Britain, and the EU states. However, Fishing has become a key stumbling point and blown up in the media .

While remain-supporting analysis of this tends to point out the sheer ludicrous nature of Britain crashing out of it’s largest market due to wanting to protect 0.12% of its economy (trade deals often see far more economically important sectors subjected to horse trading), they tend to miss the bigger picture that both the EU and British governments are giving to this- that being the political and ideological statement it makes. Fishing rights have become embroiled in the ‘sovereignty’ element of the Brexit argument. It’s a symbol for Boris’ government, in the same way to use a ridiculous example, Stalingrad become a symbol for the Russians and Germans during the second world war. Strategically it makes no sense, but it’s become important to the political message, and stability of the government. Brexit means ‘taking back control’, and nothing says that like Britain being able to (in theory at least) control and police its own waters.

Likewise for the EU, they are worried about a ‘loose-cannon’ power on their northern border which may present an economic challenge, or fall into bed with a geopolitical rival (Like China, or as the US may fast be becoming given its disagreements with the EU). In this context keeping access to British waters is a reassuring achievement that essentially means no matter what happens there is something of a bridge still open to Britain, its not become an Island distant from EU influence.

It thus is essentially a sub-disagreement over the bigger argument surrounding the so-called ‘level playing field’ guarantee - this is where Britain agrees to abide by similar regulatory legislation and working rights as the EU does to ensure that that the UK doesn’t deregulate it’s economy, and lower its working protections as a way of gaining an ‘unfair’ competitive advantage against the EU.

Britain’s issue with this is again, sovereignty. While it’s very unlikely ( and indeed the government has committed to enhancing British regulations and working rights ) to ever happen, the idea of ‘Singapore-on-the-Thames’ would not get the backing of voters who would see their quality of life and work-life balance lowered, and indeed British businesses are against it , it’s the principal that matters. Britain is leaving the EU to ‘take back control’ thus, staying linked to the EU in a legislative matter does not meet this requirement. Indeed, Britain points out that Canada did not have to sign up to a ‘level playing field’ to secure its own trade deal with the EU. The EU’s response to this is to highlight the discrepancy in distance , which does matter in trade and geopolitics. Canada is too far away to set itself up as an aggressive economic rival to the EU which aims to divert investment and business to its own shores from the EU- its on the other side of the world. However, the UK is right on the EU’s shores and if it chose to deregulate aggressively and make itself attractive to foreign investment looking to invest in Europe from an infrastructure perspective, that would originally go to the EU, it would thus present a viable threat to EU interests as Britain occupies the same geopolitical space, has an advantageous position on global shipping routes, and could exploit this vis-à-vis the EU by lowering its entry barriers to levels the EU could not feasibly accept.

Sovereignty then and geopolitics are what is stalling and potentially preventing any EU-UK agreement to be reached before the deadline- these are concepts that unlike economics are not as ‘tangible’, they are far more interpretive and subjective and so far harder to resolve.

A note on Sovereignty:

This I would note (something I extensively went into in my Brexit talks) is something badly misunderstood and abused by both Remainers and Leavers. Sovereignty is not absolute, every trade deal a country signs involves it outsourcing some of its sovereignty (especially if it is the weaker party), and indeed the argument could fairly be made that if the UK really wanted to ‘take back control’ it would leave organizations like NATO, whose membership commits us to defend other NATO states (even if we have no real interest in doing so) who are attacked by a foreign aggressor- it thus in one school of thought, severely limits our foreign policy.

The US case:

Britain exported £118 billion worth of goods and services to the US in 2018 . This is around 18.6% of UK exports. UK Imports from the USA were worth £77 billion in 2018 . which accounts for 11% of UK imports. The US then is our second largest trading partner (first, if you treat the EU as individual countries) and a key market for Britain.

To put the EU and US in perspective , the entire Commonwealth (including India, Canada, Australia et al) accounts for 9.3% of UK exports (£65.2 billion) and 8.9% of imports (or £64.5 billion) . You can see then just how much of British trade is geared towards the EU and US, with limited (current) opportunities for making up this loss elsewhere (especially as China given current geopolitical tensions is no longer a viable, or safe, potential trade partner).

It was thus expected that a Free Trade Agreement with the USA might pick up some (as again EU trade is worth slightly more than double to Britain) of the slack, and mitigate a portion of the short/medium term economic consequences that a no-deal WTO Brexit would have for the UK, given that there are now readily available large markets out there to pick up the loss.

However, it appears that no new US deal will be signed in the immediate future, despite a WTO Brexit looming now with only a few days before Boris's July deadline for an EU agreement. Effectively the UK will not have its hoped-for cushion of US trade to soften the blow.

The reasons for this with the US are many, as I've written about before (see my blog 'indebted to history') the US always plays hardball in its trade deals, and nearly always manages to protect its interests while gaining significant concessions from the smaller party. In this case the US are gunning for access to British agricultural markets and the NHS and do not have the same 'need' to get an FTA signed with the UK as the UK does with the US.

The power-imbalance and tough US line has led Britain's trade minister Liz Truss to have criticized the US government by complaining they talk “a good game” on free trade while restricting import access. The US is not merely gunning for as much as it can get, while giving away as little as it has to, but also has its eye on influencing British policy (again sovereignty rears its head), for instance in demanding the UK drop plans for a digital tax lest it sour relations, a demand that Britain promptly capitulated to in January this year . The US also identifies the UK and US have competing business interests in the spheres of financial services, investment, e-commerce, and pharmaceuticals . The UK may have to be prepared to throw these under the bus, alongside agriculture if it is to finalize eventually a US FTA.

That this is a surprise to British officials perhaps shows the slow dawning of the responsibility that having an independent trade policy as a medium-sized power entails. The US already runs a trade surplus with the UK , and so will not want to change things to allow the UK’s position to improve against it, without getting significant concessions. The US will naturally as it always historically has, leverage its advantages in economic clout and the fact Britain needs them, more than they need Britain to ease out the concessions they want, and they are prepared to walk away.

Indeed, according to the Telegraph and the Independent , the British government are now willing to potentially drop their protections of British farmers in the face of their US counterparts as a way to make progress back in May. This is a move that the National Farmers Union has said will essentially see the end of British farming as they simply cannot compete in the economies of scale that their US counterparts can. The death knell would truly be sounded if the US also gets its way in removing British farmers and companies’ ability to label their packages to identify themselves as British or show through the package labeling that their goods meet a higher regulatory standard.

Likewise, yesterday's vote in the Commons to not allow parliamentary scrutiny of trade deals to ensure the NHS is protected has sent warning bells to some that Britain is prepared to capitulate to US pressure on this point too . Though Conservative MP John Redwood rightly points out that Parliament already does have the ability to scrutinize trade deals (though not enshrined in law in the manner proposed).

The Biden Issue:

So, the loss of a 'fast' US FTA agreement is a blow to providing political, and at least some element of economic mitigation to the fallout of a WTO Brexit, but it also raises questions about the future viability of the US FTA as a centrepiece for Boris's 'Global Britain' . While the Trump presidency is driving a very hard bargain currently, Trump is at least in rhetoric, publicly favourable to securing a deal with the UK , partly as a move in the bigger US-EU trade deal negotiations (For instance it would be a chip to threaten the EU with if it doesn't back down on its digital tax plans, which the US sees as an attack on its companies who dominate the market ).

However, given a US FTA will now be signed after the presidential election, and given Joe Biden's lead in the polls , it's now equally likely that the UK will have to tackle a new presidency, with very different goals and outlooks.

Biden is on record as saying that Brexit 'diminished' US interest in the UK , he is much more orientated towards the EU, and appears to be against any FTA between the US and UK (Though Britain might potentially get around this by joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which the US under Biden would also likely join).

It's clear then that the best chance Britain has/had is to get what it can from an FTA with the US under Trump, lest it risk a far more difficult battle than it even currently is having with US trade negotiators.

So, what now?

Overall, this presents something of a political and economic set-back to the government's post-Brexit plans, ideologically, politically and economically a quick FTA with the US (and one that did not have too many negative consequences for British businesses) would have been a huge boon, not only strengthening the UK’s hand in the EU negotiations by providing a cushion to somewhat mitigate the damage, and also putting US weight behind the UK’s negotiating position, but also it would have somewhat started the validation of the Brexit project, which remains controversial domestically, with polling recently putting (with a hint of irony) Remain on 52% and Leave on 48% if a second referendum was to take place . Too close to really call one way or another, but clearly highlights how Britain remains polarized by Brexit.

Any economic fallout from these setbacks may be able to be politically covered by Covid-19, the fallout of the pandemic acting as a very useful scapegoat to hide the economic losses under, so its unlikely we’ll see a Remainer backlash among the general public pending serious government media mismanagement, but it will mean that in the practical field of economics and creating prosperity and wealth, Britain will have to work significantly harder to secure favourable trade deals.

It also comes in the wake of smaller deals like Japan becoming harder for the UK to achievable a favourable outcome with. For instance , Japan set a very short timeline for talks , which gave it all the leverage and scuppered UK hopes for a comprehensive free trade agreement. While politically the faster timeline would give the British government something to publicize, in practice it means that economically British businesses miss out on gaining significant access to agriculture, manufacturing and services in the highly lucrative Japanese markets.

Japan did though dangle the prospect of Britain joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership , something the UK has now committed to doing . This is a trading block that constitutes 13% of global GDP in 2018 and which would rise to 16% if Britain joined. In 2019 Britain did according to government figures more than £110 billion worth of trade with Trans-Pacific Partnership countries , of whom 11 are also Commonwealth members. Thus, there is room for growth, and it could potentially help alleviate the loss somewhat of EU markets (Though not replace by any means), or the delay/loss of an FTA with the US.

Likewise the Commonwealth whose figures I presented early also present an alternative economic partnership if the political will might be marshalled, containing as it does both India and many states in Africa- two key regions that are set to become the economic powerhouses of the future potentially and so room for growth here is there.

However, both the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Commonwealth and very long-term options and opportunities, requiring extensive and lengthy trade negotiations and political restructuring to become viable for the UK. There is currently no short- or medium-term replacement for the EU or US. This might become a political danger for the British government and may see British consumers and businesses take a hit.

My summarized opinion on the Russian Report

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Tue, 21 Jul 2020 12:15:51 GMT

Now I can see why Boris tried to delay this until after 2019

So the UK's long awaited (and much delayed- i can now see why Boris tried to stall publishing until after the 2019 election) Russian Report in effect puts Britain's Security Services, alongside David Cameron, Theresa May and Boris Johnson in the dock for turning a blind eye to Russian interference from 2014 onward in UK elections and referendums.

The report while having its most significant aspects redacted clearly highlights that Russian interference in British politics and elections has been the 'new normal' for quite some time- moreover successive Conservative governments have been aware of this, but for a variety of political reasons.

I would note that the extent Russian influence may have actually affected the outcome of elections and referendums since 2014 is unknowable. You cannot measure this, and the report rightly makes no attempt to do so. This is to head off the inevitable triage of 'Russians fixed Brexit' etc- not true. The report makes clear that Russia was active in attempting to influence that referendum, but we cannot know how effective that influence was, ditto for 2017.

These reasons are two-fold essentially. Firstly that Russian donors are big funders of British political parties (The report is neutral as to which parties, but Russian oligarchs are big backers in spending for the Conservatives war chests). The report makes clear that as with China, Russian business interests and money are always closely aligned with Russian political goals (Due to the nature of Putin's relationship with his Oligarchs).

Secondly, Russian influence was ignored/investigations into it refused because the government didn't wish to tackle the 'hot potato'. Implicitly this is because partly the outcome favoured them somewhat (This is not to say at all that the Conservative government were happy that Russian influence may have swung things there way, but that after winning an election its difficult politically to them de-legitimize your victory by saying foreign actors had a hand in it- i'm not sure any party, left or right has ever, or would ever do such a thing).

It is also though because these elections and referendums were so contested and so polarizing- that from a political perspective is not the time any government would want to be launching security investigations into elections because you are going to infuriate the 'winning' side.

However, the report makes clear that from a national interest and national security perspective (one i agree with wholeheartedly) that goes beyond tribal politics the government absolutely failed and shirked it's duty to Britain when it chose to ignore well-known Russian activity and refused to contemplate or investigate it.

That is a harrowing concept- that the British government are simply prepared to sit back and accept a hostile foreign power influence our democratic system because it's politically 'awkward' for the government to try and stop it. For that, David Cameron, Theresa May and Boris Johnson are rightly going to be lambasted for knowingly leaving Britain, its society and democracy vulnerable and to the machinations of a foreign authoritarian regime. It's a disgrace.

Why Britain, and why did our security services fail to tackle it?

Just leading on from this- The report makes absolutely clear that Russia seems the UK as one of its foremost targets (due to the UK's prominent place in the western 'liberal order'- UNSC seat, NATO- contributes to the defense of Eastern Europe, Five-eyes etc- that is also going through a very challenging political and global realignment and change and thus presents a good opportunity for chaos).

It also makes clear that while the UK's intelligence community knew that Russia was heavily investing in influencing UK domestic politics, they were also like the government reluctant to engage for fear that they might be perceived as 'interfering' in British domestic politics themselves at a time of great polarization.

That reasoning is both ridiculous (i.e. essentially give a foreign power significant lee-way and scope while being mostly unchallenged to interfere in the society and democracy of the nation because their scared they might be accused of doing the same thing...a clear and disgraceful abdication of their one sole remit- protecting the integrity and security of Britain), but also it's understandable from another angle given just how polarized the UK has been (There have been are are continuing attacks on the Civil Service for instance as they are perceived to be either 'blocking brexit' or seeking to aid it and make the UK a low-rights state- all because they have been doing their job of providing ministers with credible action plans to implement policy and advising when policy is too ambitious or a stretch or has an unrealistic outcome).

Boris' delay in publishing

In these contexts then, while the report was finished by March 2019, and apparently was vetted and approved a while after, certainly before the December 2019 General Election, its obvious why Boris Johnson politically at least wanted to delay it being published for as long as possible- firstly prior to the 2019 General Election because parliament was so polarized, and the Conservatives about to be toppled, with Brexit's future perceived to be at stake- such a report released into this environment may have totally undermined both the government and Brexit at and indeed faith in the democratic process among the public at a time when the political environment in parliament and outside it was highly charged.

After the election gave him an 80-strong majority, Boris no doubt felt safer in the report now being published, however did not do so immediately because post-election the more distance between the event and the findings of the report, the better and the less the government's legitimacy might e questioned (not that an 80 seat majority could ever be entirely put down to foreign inference). Not to mention during 2019, Labour also indirectly benefited form Russian interference with its use of the leaked (and now officially recognized) trade-talk documents for an Anglo-American FTA that had originally been procured by a Russian-backed hacking group according to Dominic Raab last week . This spreads the blame slightly. However, it is interesting to imagine that if the Conservatives had won 2019, but with a hung parliament, or by only a few seats- would the Russian Report still be sitting buried?

Regardless though of the political necessity, Boris Johnson's government put 'party over country', or at least chose to prevent any potential deterioration in the political and social stability of the UK in the short term, instead of fulfilling the one clear role of the British government; that being to protect the United Kingdom from aggressive foreign acts intending to cause damage to the fabric of the British nation. A foreign power has insidiously influenced British politics and society (no matter the actual extent they had an impact), and our government choose to do nothing, even after the report was fully finished (in March 2019), favouring short-term politics. That is a badge of shame for Boris to carry.

The Russian Report- Boris gets his defenses in order.

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Thu, 16 Jul 2020 12:54:07 GMT

Now that he's lost the battle for his 'yes-man' to be chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, Boris prepares his fallback position for tackling anything embarrassing in the upcoming 'Russian Report'.

So now the newly independent MP Julian Lewis is chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, and the committee this morning have voted to release the Russian report early next week (Which many suspect may be in some way embarrassing for parts of the Conservative party), the government have clearly gone into 'diffuse mode' and are laying the ground for their own counter-attack lines to any criticism.

They have released this statement by Foreign secretary Dominic Raab -

' “It is almost certain that Russian actors sought to interfere in the 2019 general election through the online amplification of illicitly acquired and leaked government documents,” said the foreign secretary, Dominic Raab.

“Sensitive government documents relating to the UK-US free-trade agreement were illicitly acquired before the 2019 general election and disseminated online via the social media platform Reddit,” Raab said.

“The government reserves the right to respond with appropriate measures in the future,”'

This is interesting as it is rather out of the blue, and thus clearly setting the government's defensive line up for when the Russian Report is released by building the foundations for a political lifeline that will attempt to shift or diffuse the focus of Russian tampering from the Tories in the 2016 referendum and the 2017 General election and instead focus on the 2019 election, not covered by the report, and which would see them attempt to tarr Labour with the same brush that they will face as Labour famously made use of those leaked NHS documents- which perhaps ironically the government discounted at the time, but are now admitting were correct.

The Russian report itself focuses on Russian tampering in the 2016 Brexit referendum and 2017 General Election. So the government are going on a 'but they benefited too' defense by bringing Labour into the potential mud pit with them.

What's interesting though, and this might not age well, but i don't actually believe there will be anything particularly 'explosive' in the Russian Report for the government- at most it might see some large Tory donors embarrassed as their exposed as being close to Putin and Russian policy, and so some Tory MP's have no doubt been speaking to people they shouldn't, but i think the left have built up the contents of the Russian report to be far more scandalous than it ever actually be- it's certainly i suspect no smoking gun (Though No.10s refusal to rule out attempting to topple the democratically elected chair of the ISC committee through an act of parliament might say otherwise- however to do so would be such an act of political stupidity and democratic/constitutional vandalism that i think it's a hollow gesture). I stick by my analysis in my previous blogpost on this topic where i relay the quote that there are 'details of interest, worth examining' in the report definitely, however, this does not imply 'government toppling' material.

Conservative divisions resurface:

In other Julian Lewis news though- the ERG, led by Peter Bone today have attacked the government as having a 'hissy fit' by removing the whip from Lewis (one of their own) and Conservative backbench leaks to the Telegraph have highlighted how the Conservative 'rank and file' 'do not get one with no.10' - this clearly gives flesh to what we've been seeing in the u-turns and splits, that Boris Johnson's government is struggling with different factions within the party who are unhappy with the direction their going in.

Chris Grayling fails again- the Russian Report and the Intelligence Committee Chairmanship

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Wed, 15 Jul 2020 22:38:38 GMT

and Boris Johnson takes a small dent to his majority in the process.

So Boris Johnson's majority of 80 is now down by 1 to 79.

It's all thanks to some rather poor handling by the government regarding who was to Chair the Intelligence and Security Committee- this is the key body that provides oversight and scrutiny to the governments security policy (an area that encompasses, domestic, intelligence, armed forces, foreign policy and cyber/space).

It was established in 1994 and has always been important, and who leads it even more so as it is the key vehicle (especially after 2013) of scrutiny for the government's security policy- an area that touches so much of our lives, but also British policy elsewhere. However recently this importance has increased not merely due to the advent of a bi, or multi-polar world (I tend to see the latter), and the emergence of Russia, China and the still-present threat of political and religious extremism, but also due to the government's delay in publishing a security report that was commissioned to look into the extent (if any) of Russian tampering during the 2016 EU referendum and 2017 General Election . The report was completed in March 2019, but the government has sat on it since then.

The government claim the delay has been due to the 2019 General Election and the need to carefully consider who should be on said committee. Cross-party groups though have stated there has been an unacceptable delay . Meanwhile, critics of the government argue its because the report may be quite embarrassingly for the Conservative party, with some noting it may be because certain Russian businessmen who are big Tory party donors are put under scrutiny .

The delay both of the committee being convened and the report being published has been the longest since the committee was founded in 1994 .

Those who have read it say that there are 'details of interest worth examining' - implying that the report could be politically explosive (for who and in what way though we'll have to wait and see...if the report is ever published in its full format).

The committee is made up of 9 members- currently 5 Tory MP's, 3 Labour and 1 SNP (It's supposed to reflect the make-up of parliament, however, Theresa May for instance weighted committees in the Conservatives favour, despite not having a majority ).

So, what happened?

Well -Boris Johnson has been adamant that the needed 'Chair' of the committee was a matter for the committee to decide and vote on by itself ... however, it's also been well known that for the last few months Boris had chosen Chris Grayling to be his 'man' for the Chair.

Yep...Chris Grayling, the man who has had one of the most error prone parliamentary records in recent history- from leading the terrible and inefficient part-privatization of the prison service , who presided over the collapse of private rail services and gave a ferry contract to a company that had no ferries, and had never been in shipping before, to then (unsurprisingly) have to cancel those contracts at significant cost to the taxpayer.

There had been heavy criticism of Grayling being up for this role, even among Conservative MP's . Grayling frankly has no experience in security or defense, something that his 7 predecessors all at least had- either from active experience, or from running or being part of the government's foreign policy or armed forces apparatus at some point previously in cabinet.

But Grayling is loyal, and the one criteria Boris has for his MP's is loyalty (not competence). So it was expected by no.10 that this would be a 'shoe-in'.

However, one backbench Conservative MP, Dr. Julian Lewis- a supporter of Boris Johnson, a brexiteer (He voted against May's Brexit deal because he deemed it to be a capitulation, while Boris actually voted for it) a member of the ERG and a Tory MP since 1997 who has extensive experience in security matters, at the last minute put himself forward (which according to Boris Johnson was supposedly a 'matter for the committee'). His doing this meant in all likelihood the 3 Labour and one SNP members voted for him, alongside perhaps the other Tory committee members- the reason being that Grayling was ill suited to the role, and was 'too close' to number 10 . (As you cannot have a committee that is meant to be scrutinizing government policy being led by a Government loyalist).

Chris Grayling whose political radar seems to just not exist, and who expected an easy ride to gaining the chairmanship was taken utterly by surprise.

So Lewis got the role- it's unknown if any of the Conservative MP's backed him as it was by secret ballot . Boris Johnson then took the rather extreme action of throwing Lewis out of the party- hence the majority is down to 79. Boris's reasoning is that Lewis used opposition votes to increase his own influence at the expense of the Conservative party ...essentially he was disloyal and opportunistic in the eyes of no.10.

However this move by no.10 might strike many, including other backbench Tory MP's as a rather extreme and unwarranted move- it's in keeping though with Boris's commitment to loyalty over competence and his attempt to centralize as much power directly under no.10 as possible.

The fact remains though that it's likely if Boris Johnson had picked nearly any other Conservative, this likely would not have happened, as the opposition and criticism from both opposition parties, but also from those within the Conservative party would have been far less- with the quite fair points about Grayling's competency not being a key justifier for Lewis' actions. By trying to ram-rail Grayling, Boris made it look for all the world like he was just trying to get in an inexperienced 'yes man' on the committee as it's chair to give his government an easier time, a different choice, who had experience in this field would have given the government counter-ammunition to its critics. With Grayling, it really had no justifiable reason.

It makes the government's reaction to all this that much more 'extreme' and seem based totally on loyalty and wanting a 'yes man' over any other concern like ability. It's not a good political look at a time when Labour are doing their best to cast themselves as the 'professional' choice to the current government's perhaps 'overly-optimistic' outlook.

Does this matter?

Actually yes, this committee is a hugely important (Since it got its 2013 teeth at least) and with the Russian report still looming it essentially means that Boris by kicking Lewis out the party, has severely weakened any potential control or influence he might have over the committees findings, timetables and scrutiny. For the next 4 years Lewis will sit as an independent MP, and now can effectively scrutinize the government without pressure from the Conservative Whips for him to toe the PM's line. It's great news for the opposition (and democracy), but terrible news for a government wanting to shore itself up.

It also means that the Russian report is now far more likely to be published soon , some note as early as next week, given that Lewis is something of a security 'hawk'.

I am assuming here of course that Boris doesn't attempt to unseat Lewis. Such a move, while potentially possible as laid out by Paul Goodman here , would be politically inadvisable, to be seen directly interfering to remove a democratically elected MP from a committee which scrutinizes the government and its security policy, and to attempt to push Gralying back on the proverbial throne would be the height of stupidity as it would look exactly like a grubby power-grab to avoid being held accountable to parliament and public, which no.10 had been strenuously denying the appointment of Grayling in the first place was originally going to be. As Goodman points out indeed, recently there was a minor Conservative rebellion over the appointment of Bernard Jenkins to Chairman of the Liaison Committee, a man who you would struggle to characterize as a government 'stooge', so any attempt to overturn Lewis' election now for any type of 'Boris loyalist' would likely meet far greater Conservative backbench resistance.

This also feeds into another key point, With Boris potentially overreacting in such a way, he might further alienate other factions in his party on the backbenches that he needs (I went through a while back how the Conservatives are very much split, with Boris perched precariously- indeed there's a small, but persistent voice that emerges from the dark recesses of the Tory party and its activists that Boris may be toppled before the next election due to him having lost the 'rock star' effect he promised given Starmer's rise and the Government's polling drop).

It's a reminder then that this large majority is not a sign of stable government as it should be, but is one filled with tensions and missteps . The government by removing the whip has sent a message- how much backbenches will heed it though, remains to be seen (coming debates over China for instance will be interesting given the forced climb-down by the government over huawei). What's interesting though is the 'bigger picture'- the fact the government felt it needed to send a strong message over this, hints that they expect bigger trouble perhaps further down the line that might cause them problems (Maybe over huawei, a second wave of Covid-19 or the finalization of the future relationship with the EU and post-brexit FTA's). A 'stable' majority then this ironically seems not.

David Starkey and slavery

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Fri, 03 Jul 2020 15:55:39 GMT

Historians can sometimes be idiots, or wrong, or sometimes both (I await for your shocked gasps of incredulity). (Originally published to my personal profile 2 July 2020)

Historians can sometimes be idiots, or wrong, or sometimes both (I await for your shocked gasps of incredulity).

David Starkey has been today, i would say, both.

In an interview with Darren Grimes (A right-wing commentator) for ReasonedUK, Starkey said, and i quote-

'Slavery was not genocide, otherwise there wouldn't be so many damn blacks in Africa or in Britain would there?'

There are many things wrong here- if you can't see that, simply replace 'damn blacks' with 'damn Jews'- it's a racially charged attack (Which Grimes nods along to).

Also...for something to be a genocide, it doesn't actually have to be 'successful'. Again to use the Jewish people as an example here- there are many Jewish people around in the world today, does that mean the Nazi's didn't attempt a genocide? According to Starkey's logic, he seems to think the answer could be there was no genocide.

Slavery as a genocide though is also something fairly easy to highlight; Firstly the gold-standard definition of 'Genocide' as used by academics is the one presented in the 1948 UN Genocide Convention. The writing of this convention was helped by the man who first coined the term 'Genocide' in 1944, the Polish lawyer Raphäel Lemkin. Thus it's pretty much THE authoritative version.

It states in Article II that Genocide is defined as;

Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

British slavery more than meets this definition of a genocidal institution. If we take Caribbean plantation slavery (where the vast majority of British slaves were concentrated) and the 'Triangle trade' which facilitated the importation of more slaves to the region we find that the conditions, which could have easily been vastly improved, were horrific . Slave traders purposefully over-stacked their ships as they knew around 10-15% of their human cargo would die on the trip across the Atlantic. Moreover the conditions plantation owners provides were not much better. With harsh punishment for small transgressions such as maiming, abuse, rape and dire living conditions and diets that led to wide-scale disease and ailments . The attrition rate for slaves was so high that a constant (and flourishing) slave trade developed bringing consistently more and more slaves into the Caribbean to replace the labour force. Again all these conditions were not 'natural' they could have been vastly improved, but were not, because profit was put first, and the profits were vast . In the mid-1600s Sugar provided a huge 40-50% return . While this had decreased by 1800, it was still around 8-10% (and was roughly 3.9% per each slave). These profits were solely due to the fact slaves were cheap, as was their upkeep and they always turned a profit, despite the high cost of importing more. This simply put means that while there was not a systematic attempt to 'wipe out' Black Africans by the British, slavery was still genocide as high death rates were expected, accepted and calculated within an economic model which put profit above all else. This meets 1, 2 and 3 of the definition. The forcible transferring of children also happened . Starkey is frankly wrong.

Incidentally one of the few 'successful' genocides in history (i.e. ones that Starkey would it seems accept as being genocides) was conducted by the British Empire in the 1820s against the aboriginal peoples of Tasmania in the 'Black War'. The British nearly entirely wiped out the indigenous population.

This is an important point for Starkey, who in the same interview tried to place 'British imperialism' as being the first step towards a globalized civilization. Starkey ignores the fact there are many different types and models of imperialism that can and did contribute to developing the modern globalized world- and not all of them were British, or included racism or slavery. So his point makes no sense, unless you subscribe to the concept of 'British exceptionalism' in the development of the modern world (and you really shouldn't).

Britain's response to China's National Security Law in Hong Kong

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Fri, 03 Jul 2020 15:29:54 GMT

Too little, too late? (Originally published on my private profile 1 July 2020)

As China's new National Security law comes into effect in Hong Kong today, the British Government confirms it is extending the offer to live and work in the UK (an offer which has a track to full British Citizenship) to Hong Kong citizens who have a British Overseas passport.

This potentially will allow between 2.9 and 3.4 million Hong Kong Citizens to start a new life in Britain if they want to.

The UK has made this offer (which builds on the existing rights of Hong Kong British Overseas passport holders) due to China's new National Security law violating the principles of the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1997 (negotiated in 1985 in preparation) which came into effect when Britain handed back Hong Kong over to China. The handover came with certain stipulations to protect Hong Kong's autonomy, democratic structures and rights, as newly founded as they were as it was only in 1984 that moves to universal enfranchisement and democracy actually began in Hong Kong.

China however, is only bound by the Sino-British Joint Declaration until 2047, after which it was likely the current 'one country, two systems' of the Chinese-Hong Kong relationship would have come to an end.

However, as China has violated the agreement beforehand it's created a storm. It's National Security Law violates the agreement in several ways, most troubling of which is it's broad scope- for instance it makes 'collusion' with foreign forces in a way that makes the citizens of Hong Kong 'hate' the Chinese central government illegal.

As Eva Pils, professor of law at King's College London states 'What is troubling is how broad and malleable their wording is. Under this law, could mere criticism of the central party state be treated as subversion or inciting subversion?'

Already today there has bee a heavy-handed crack down on pro-Hong Kong protesters. In these contexts, Britain has a duty to ensure Hong Kong's residents are protected as far as possible. Whether the offer of providing refuge and eventual citizenship to potentially 3.4 million residents is effective, or goes far enough is yet to be seen.

This is not least of all because of the potential for domestic resistance that may be seen to damage the Conservative party.

Britain indeed has a rather horrific track record at inviting (or indeed begging) previously colonial peoples to come to its shores only to promptly reject them from society and keep them as 'second class' citizens. The Windrush scandal and the experience of the 1972 Ugandan Asians to name a few show that past precedent isn't in Britain' favour here.

I'd be interested to see wider up-to-date polling on the issue when/if any comes out. But from my perusing of the political pages comments sections (very academic i know...) already there are two consistent complaints repeated by different people across different sites-

1) Outright fear of the 'other'. The first most common complaint seems to be 'we ended free movement, only for 3 million foreigners to come'- Given that those from Hong Kong eligible are actually BNO holders or eligible for it (Not immigrants at all really), this seems very much a complaint that they don't want British people here who are 'different'.

2) Anti-Immigration- This one is something I've seen from both right and left. That where are these 3 million people going to go? What schools, what houses, what hospitals?. The part that adds a racist/'othering' tinge to this is that instead of blaming the government- who after all can fix these ills- too few houses, too few hospitals, too few schools- all can be built. They blame an influx of 'new' people to Britain for adding pressure to this- Despite the fact that if we build a huge wall around the UK and let no one else in, we'd still have a housing crisis, underfunded schools and too little infrastructure- it's not an immigration problem, it's a government problem in that they've refused to invest properly where needed for the past 30 years.

There's also a really weird argument I've seen several times, though from far fewer people, that we should only take the 'rich' Hong-Kong citizens... So we can add classism and exploitation to a racist outlook among some people over this.

However, beyond these strands i have yet to see much about the wider polling. There was an article by Conservative Lord Green, president of 'Migration Watch UK' who described the British government's current offer to Hong Kong citizens as an

“extraordinarily ill-conceived policy that could cost it the next election”

The extent to which he will be correct is yet to be seen, we are being plunged into the worst economic crisis in recent history (some argue recorded history) due to Covid-19. As we saw in 2008, when people are hard-hit and economically suffering, they tend to lash out at immigrants who in better times they'd have no problem with as perceptions regarding job scarcity and competition come to the fore.

I'd like to hope though that we as a nation recognize our commitments to the people of Hong Kong, and to Hong British Nationals (That is who BNO holders are after all) and that we will do our upmost to safeguard them, if that means providing them with a place of refuge or a new home, so be it. There are multiple approaches to an economic crisis that can mitigate the fallout and damages, so this argument shouldn't hold water. The fact is for Hong Kong BNO holders (or those eligible), they are British. And more to the point they are humans in trouble. I think both left and right can get behind that.

The UK's National Security Adviser Debate

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Fri, 03 Jul 2020 15:15:34 GMT

Mark Sedwill resigns, David Forst takes over. Is this a politicization of a previously impartial role? (Originally published 29 June 2020)

Mark Sedwill has stepped down from his roles as Head of the Civil Service, Cabinet Secretary and National Security Adviser.

Mark who?

Sedwill had been appointed in late October 2018 by Theresa May as her 'first and only' choice for the role, based upon his decades of experience, particularly in security and foreign affairs. His CV implies heavily he had connections to MI5 and MI6 (Likely given his FO work) and it has been noted he's more comfortable in the company of soldiers and spies than politicians.

Why Sedwill had so many high level roles is open to interpretation. British Prime Ministers (and to an extent their senior Mandarins) can mostly at whim change the organization of state and what jobs and roles their actually are to be had at its top. Sedwill who was perceived to wield huge influence in the May Government (At times the right-wing press claiming it who he leading government policy on Brexit and not the PM- though this might be simply an attack due to the fact he had been a very public remainer) combined the three roles to create a stable and quick reacting center of 'policy fusion' in the heart of government which was arguably needed to navigate Brexit. His critics though argued he was 'empire building'.

Why Resign?

In his resignation letter the wording 'we have agreed I will stand down' heavily implies what many leaks have foretold, a rift between himself and the Prime Minister based on tensions between Sedwill and Dominic Cummings and Michael Gove (Cummings of course is Boris Johnsons key adviser, and arguably the intellectual power behind this government and Gove is the Minister for the Cabinet Office- all in very close proximity to each other with overlapping spheres of power) have finally come to a head.

The spark for this though appears to be the developing 'blame game' over the UK's awful Covid-19 track record. Conservative leaks (Likely at the behest of Cummings and Gove) have been keen to paint the UK's failures as Sedwill's fault for not 'taking command' properly. A charge that other Cabinet sources have called 'bullshit' In this way the government hopes to shift the blame for the very high death rate (One of the highest in the world alas), failures over PPE and provision contracts (Conservative supporters were given key contracts for equipment and services, despite not being able to fulfill them or established options being available), and place this onto the apolitical Civil Service, Public Health England and the NHS 'structure' (Being careful not to attack those on the 'front lines' though).

Why does this matter?

The wider backdrop is that Cummings has long made his views clear that he detests Civil Service lifers and prefers government led by data scientists, physicists and specialists (The Civil Service being generalists). It is known that last week he promised a 'hard rain' was about to fall on the Civil Service as Boris Johnson's government begins its promised Civil Service reforms (Directed by Cummings). This is backed up by Michael Gove's speech this week in which he accused (and disparaged) the Civil Service for 'group think' and said change was needed. Expect some very radical changes here (and 'streamlining/cut-backs if the merging of Departments such as that of the FO with the International Development continues).

Indeed one of Sedwill's former roles- that of National Security Adviser has already been filled by David Frost. Frost is not currently a Civil Servant, and has no actual experience in the sphere of security. Though he has extensive experience in international trade (He indeed until recently led Britain's trade negotiations with the EU). Every single past occupant filling this role has hands-on experience, and knowledge of working alongside MI5 and MI6.

Frost is however, a Conservative party supporter and 'Brexiteer'. This points towards the potential shift in thinking that at least at the top, an apolitical Civil Service based on merit is not fit for the PM and Cumming's vision- they want political appointees whose loyalty they know (A well-known critique is that Johnson in his own cabinet selects people based on their loyalty to him specifically, rather than their actual merit and competence).

Lord Ricketts (A former National Security Adviser) wrote on Twitter about the appointment of Frost that it "completely changes the nature of the role, no longer a politically-neutral civil servant giving dispassionate advice. Plus he is made a peer, so will he be a minister accountable to parliament?"

Thus the former accountability of the role (Civil Servants are answerable to Parliament), its provision of impartial advice that is politically neutral and the fact the role was filled with someone previously who at least had extensive experience in what they were advising on, has been scrapped. This does not bode well for the wider Civil Service Reforms.

Nor is it particularly a long-term view. It sets the precedent for instance that a rival Labour government may appoint its own appointees now based mainly on political loyalty. UK security policy then moves potentially from being long-term and on the merits of 'national interest' to being based on party-political short-term whims (See the promotion and now U-turn on Huawei having a prominent role in UK infrastructure potentially) that may change with every election.

Of course this is me holding a generous interpretation that party-political whims have no influenced British security policy in the past, which is perhaps very debatable. Also i am keeping an open mind (though i have to have my optimistic hat on) somewhat, as Frost's experience of international trade might be Downing Street seeking to rationalize a longer-term plan (As seen by the roll up for the Department for International Development with the Foreign Office) where UK foreign aid and security policy are closely tied to UK economic interests globally, as a way that might be considered by some to strengthen the UK's trade power and economic clout on the world stage. The efficacy of such an idea though (If it indeed does exist) would be questionable, both from a moral and a pragmatic perspective (It potentially severely restricts the UK's rather large wealth of 'soft power' in favour of a much smaller pool of hard power). I may have to write a further blog post on it sometimes if we see a shift towards this...

The persistence of Edward Said's 'Orientalism' in modern politics?

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Fri, 03 Jul 2020 14:53:40 GMT

Do citizens of the 'West' attach a higher moral standard among their governments than they do to those of 'non-western' states? (Originally published to my personal profile 25 June 2020)

Something to ponder- the nature of protests politics and the role of American political and cultural dominance over the 'West' in it:

Quite rightly there has been a massive backlash in the western world at the brutal murder of George Floyd by a US police force, that has become a symbol for the wider issue of racism in society.

But, why was there such a reaction to THIS event among those in the 'west'? Why did people in Britain, France, Germany and indeed as far away as Japan (considered an open, democratic, capitalist state) come out in force to protest, while there is no equivalent action and indeed absolutely no opinion is cast in regard to the actions of 'non-US' global powers among the general public to the same extent; for instance the mass incarceration of Uighur Muslims by China (in what are arguably concentration camps), the steady stifling of democracy in Hong Kong, Russia's annexation of Crimea, or the fact there is next to know public opposition to the actions of authoritarian regimes with questionable human rights records like Iran, Syria or Saudi Arabia? All of whom Britain and the 'west' has an active political, economic and social relationship with.

Is this because we hold the US particularly to a higher standard given it's cultural dominance and familiarity to us? (I.e. many Europeans assume, rightly or wrongly that if they moved to the US, things would not be radically different from their living at home due to the US dominance of economic, social and cultural norms), we see in the US a country that is like our own, that is democratic and we thus are specifically angered when they behave below our expectations (Though again- something to note the Windrush scandal brought to light in 2017-18 in the UK, that was against our own citizens and was based entirely on racism got nowhere near the same reaction as has happened recently).

Or is it as one senior European diplomat put it, the public participation in 'politics as performance art'- that we recognize the US for what it is, one of the worlds foremost powers whose hegemony we are under, and thus we in the 'provinces' of Britain, France, Japan etc wish to voice discontent at what is happening in the imperial motherland that seems to run counter to what the idealism's and values of the 'American empire' promised us (A meritocratic, democratic, society with equality in opportunity regardless of race, colour or creed).

I suspect it's probably the latter, simply because the US must be commonly perceived as having firm, almost imperial links to the 'west' (and by extension here) for such a visceral response to happen (Especially as UK citizens appear to not even have perceived the Windrush scandal- something very much based on racism, as being of the same 'scale' as a shooting in the US produced), while we give other global powers (who are not hegemonic powers regarding the West...yet) what amounts to a free pass.

Because of this, are we in the West not guilty of a slight warping of Edward Said's 'Orientalism'- we are still seeing the 'non-west' as a 'different' place that is an 'other' to us. We accept it is different (perhaps alien?) and so when horrific unspeakable things happen there to fellow humans, we are not shocked, or outraged- at least not enough to respond as we rightfully have to US police brutality and the debate over structural racism in the 'west'.

I would invite the thoughts of others though if they have any here- why the US? Why did Windrush not achieve the same scale of response (Despite it being a specifically UK issue) and why do we give 'non-western' states a free pass comparatively? Is it because they are 'alien' to us in culture and society (In which case our scope for social justice is seemingly rather introverted).

India-China clash in Galwan Valley and 'World War 3'

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Fri, 03 Jul 2020 14:43:31 GMT

As the Daily Express has labeled it with it's traditional British restraint and understatement... (Above image credited to PTI) (Originally published 16 June on my personal profile)

So a while back i posted on a developing situation in the disputed Ladakh region, where China had essentially 'invaded' the region, it's troops digging in, backed up by heavy military hardware have pushed into the area. India who for all intents and purposes was being invaded, built up it's own military forces in the region, but made no moves to respond.

Well, happily talks began between the two powers earlier this month to resolve the dispute.

Unhappily though last night along the 'Line of Actual Control' (What stands in for a border along the disputed zone), saw a clash between an Indian and Chinese patrol- actual weapons were not used, but clubs and stones were (which is in some ways far more brutal), leaving three Indian soldiers dead. In the same vein their are reports that 5 Chinese soldiers have also been killed- though it is unclear in the reporting if this was in the same incident or happened later.

There have been border clashes before, but this is the first time in 30 years where it has resulted in the loss of life and marks a significant escalation (particularly in regard to the very visceral violence of close quarter beatings).

Tensions have been markedly raised, and while the Daily Express is of course being sensationalist by claiming World War 3 is about to start, it has made a deteriorating and unstable situation far worse.

The Editor in Chief of China's 'Global times (The Chinese state's official mouthpiece) stated- "I want to tell the Indian side, don’t be arrogant and misread China’s restraint as being weak. China doesn’t want to have a clash with India, but we don’t fear it."

Likewise Indian commentators have accused China of 'misrepresenting the incidence' both in number of killed on the Chinese side, as well as who started it.

Developments:
I thought it better to just add here, than write a new blog post- but a few days on from my original post here and more information has come to light ,

It was far more serious than previously suspected. Over 600 soldiers fought hand to hand in the icy Himalayas.

"India has accused Chinese troops of meticulously preparing an attack on its soldiers on the treacherous Himalayan border, claiming they erected a tent on the Indian side, dammed a river, brought in machinery and then lay in wait with stones and batons wrapped in barbed wire.

The incident on Monday night, in which 20 Indian soldiers died and 76 were and injured, was the worst violence between India and China for 45 years. China has not said whether it sustained any casualties.

Ten Indian soldiers who were reportedly captured by China troops during the attack were back in India on Thursday night. China said it had not seized any Indian personnel."

Getting reliable information from either India or China is incredibly difficult. It's likely China suffered some casualties (Simply due to the brutal nature of the hand-to-hand fighting). On the Chinese capturing troops- it's likely China would admit it as keeping the capture of ordinary soldiers secret serves no purpose, so more likely MIA currently.

Tensions are running incredibly high though. This is a problem spot, and while apparently Chinese and Indian military officials are meeting to de-escalate, politicians and media on both sides are stoking the fires.

The wrong statues

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Fri, 03 Jul 2020 14:30:23 GMT

When a minority of narcissists attempt to attention-seek, they risk damaging the legitimate concerns of the movement. (Originally published 12 June 2020)

A protester has vandalized the battle of Bannockburn memorial and the statue of Robert the Bruce, scrawling 'Racist King' on it...

Bruce died in 1329. Hundreds of years before the British partook in the horrid system of slavery. In the 14th century of Bruce- Africa and large tracts of the world were completely unknown and unvisited by contemporary Europeans who would only begin to found 'global' empires from the 1450s (With Portugal leading the way).

I am utterly stumped by how stupid some people can be. This shows a complete and absolute ignorance of history and is the antithesis of what positive change in the UK should mean. To top this off the 'Topple the Racists' group who have compiled a list of statues to target for removal have, again out of complete ignorance, added those like Robert Peel to the list (Despite Peel publicly opposing slavery and supporting legislation to curtail it globally).

Unlike Bruce for which it's complete stupidity on the part of some protester and there is no link to slavery at all- Peel's father (Who was also called Robert Peel) did in-fact support slavery (though Peel Jr. himself opposed it). For 'Topple the Racists' apparently that is enough... yet if we go down this 'fast and loose' route of history, why hasn't Karl Marx (who was racist) or Gandhi (who despised Africans and had problematic attitudes towards women) also been added to the list? Instead Peel who opposed slavery is on there, and Robert the Bruce who had no conception of imperialism, racism or slavery ('white Slavery' had died out in England by the 12th century) are apparently viable targets.

What's worse is that there is also currently a petition to topple Peels statue in Manchester, this petition was created by an Associate Lecturer of History at Manchester University. It appears to have originally been based on error as prior to an edit, the petition had mistaken Peel for his father. When this was pointed out, instead of removing the petition the academic in question shifted his reasoning- he replied to my questioning of this on Twitter with;

'Wealth based on the plantation economy and slave trade

1 million deaths in Irish genocide

Proposed Coercive Act/Anti-catholic until possible rebellion forced his hand/Wore the disguise of abolitionism because proslavery was repugnant and concerned about his own legacy'

These are problematic. Firstly it's incredibly poor history- Peel is down on record as being opposed to slavery. He spoke out against it, and voted for legislation to curtail it globally. It is for instance evidenced here from his own parliamentary speeches- 'Annual Register Or A View Of The History And Politics Of The Year 1843', for those after the source. P.173 provides a general summary if you do not fancy reading the whole debate. There is no evidence to support the assertion that Peel 'wore the disguise of abolitionism', it is a complete fabricated assumption presented as fact, contradicted by the actual facts made by a historian who should know better.

The point about his fathers wealth is true, however since when does the role of a person ancestors mean we judge their child? Peel did a lot of good as PM and laid the foundations for modern Britain and policing by consent by professionals (to prevent another Peterloo massacre)- its for these he has a statue and is celebrated. The actions of his dad should not change that.

Secondly though, the parts about the 'Irish genocide' are hotly debated by historians (and does not relate to Black Lives Matter- so at best he's trying to derail a movement for his own personal crusade). Indeed none of these reasons actually appeared on the petition originally when i first took issue with it. O riginally he had simply instead said that Peel was 'Pro-slavery'- when all evidence to the contrary.

Historians are meant to be myth busters, who seek to understand the past properly to provide lessons for the present (while recognizing our own bias). Abusing and misusing history for political or personal gain by anyone but especially historians is detrimental to what we seek to achieve, this Associate Lecturer alas falls very short of where he should be. It's clear this was motivated by a wish to either not publicly admit they had confused Peel with his father, or to shallowly score 'woke points'- the narcissism this entails demeans the actual point of Black Lives Matter and other similar protest movements. It is attention seeking for 'likes'. The Associate Lecturer, the idiot who vandalized Robert the Bruce and the guys at 'Topple the racists' all not only need to educate themselves and look beyond their own narcissism, but also recognize they are actually damaging the movement they supposedly profess to support.

There is no better way to lose public support for a movement than through acts of, or calls for, vandalism and violence that have zero justification for them (Chartism and the Miners vs Thatcher are key examples to learn from). The protesters who somehow think this is 'fine' are literally endangering any chance of positive change from the BLM movement in the UK. So if you see morons who know nothing of history calling for vandalism or violence (as i spoke about in an earlier blog post)- educate them, or shut them down, before they screw it up for everyone.

The 'use of violence' by protest movements (weighing in on the debate)

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Fri, 03 Jul 2020 10:16:21 GMT

The looting and violence of a minority risks a protest movement losing support and de-legitimizing itself in the public eye. However, critics need to not pounce on the actions of these minorities to dismiss wider legitimate concerns. (Originally published 8 June 2020)

The use of violence as a method for social change is a growing debate right now, that is distracting from the real travesty of American police brutality against ethnic minorities and discussions of how far racism may be ingrained within society. Alas like most recent political debates both sides of the 'use of violence' debate are misusing and abusing history to suit their own agendas.

On one side- I’ve seen some fairly learned people have been using the French Revolution and Women’s suffrage to support their argument that violence is a part of positive social change that can further a cause. Wrong. Any glance at the actual history of these struggles would show the violence of the French Revolution terrified an entire people and saw even its most ardent supporters and founders destroyed and the subsequent rise of a brutal regime that was far worse than the economically inept monarchy it replaced.

Likewise, the use of violence in the Women's suffrage movement is complicated (a word historians love). Emmeline Pankhurst shunned violence (Though not unlawful activity necessarily) in the years proceeding actual change, yet it was she and her cohorts of non-violent activists who were responsible for the movement’s success. The use of violence by some may indeed have held back the votes for women's as it alienated public opinion and played into their opponents’ hands. However, the violence of some women's vote activists did help to break down contemporary gender stereotypes- a contribution to gender equality that should not be overlooked (Though this is a longer-term cultural change, not a social or political one as was desired).

On the other side- equally learned people are using outbreaks of violence within the larger protest as a way to simply shrug off the legitimate concerns of its wider participants. They should learn from history too that ignoring or putting off legitimate grievances often fosters violence itself. A cursory look at the role of violence in imperial decolonization both in Europe, Asia and Africa would highlight this- and it just so happens I’ve written an article about it… please do read everyone!

Overall though, I request a few things- firstly may both sides of the 'use of violence' debate please stop misusing and abusing history. It is an issue that has become far too common in contemporary social and political debates- we need to understand the complexity of these events in history if we are to ever learn from them, or indeed put them to good use. Neither side of the ‘use of violence’ debate has covered themselves in glory here.

Secondly- the use of violence in the vast majority of cases is absolutely counterproductive to getting the social and political change needed. It historically turns the majority public opinion against them and their cause, no matter how just, and allows the state to legitimately (and indeed with growing popularity) ignore and crack-down on those protesting for change (Chartism, or Thatcher and the miners are two key examples to learn from here). So those advocating or being apologists for violence, stop and think, take a serious look at history, realize the huge damage that violence does to a legitimate movement and for the love of the gods stop extolling the virtues of the French Revolution as a case study for the positive impact of violence…

Beyond the Lock-Down: Why saving lives is still more important than the economy, stupid (and why the economy will be fine, providing austerity remains dead)

Thu, 02 Jul 2020 20:46:26 GMT

Human life is more important than the economy, especially as alive humans are more economically productive than dead ones... (Originally published on my LinkedIn 7 April 2020)

So, the current UK lock-down and those practiced by other countries around the globe, is something of a historic first. It is the first-time state governments of all colours, have chosen to sacrifice the health of their economies in an effort to try and save every single citizen (or as many as possible at least) from a viral pandemic.

Previously this was just not possible. The Spanish flu of the early 1920s (Not actually originating in Spain) [1] which bears some similarities in both infection spread and the danger is presents to human lives as our current Covid-19, was a pandemic in which it was totally unthinkable and unfeasible for any government to shut-down its entire population and for economic activity to cease just to essentially protect the nation’s most vulnerable members. The reason being that the economic fall-out and risk of state collapse, let alone those of markets would have been far more devastating in terms of lives lost than the death toll from the Spanish flu itself, which eventually rose to between 50 and 100 million casualties globally. [2] Even up until 2013, the British state had no serious plans during a global pandemic to pursue a nation-wide lockdown, despite the biggest threat at the time being seen as an outbreak of influenza. Indeed the government had plans that accepted a death rate of between 210,000 – 315,000 over a 15 week period (roughly 0.5% of the population) in the best case scenario. [3] This was the best case scenario, and it was assumed, as it has been throughout history that protecting individuals must be superseded by protecting the health of the wider-nation, and that means it’s economic well-being.

Luckily for us, for the first time in history state governments are able to at least attempt to protect everyone universally, a very radical shift from anything seen before. This shift is due to two entwined issues.

Firstly the comparative wealthiness of societies (and its worth currently sparing a though to the dilemma facing states like India, where lockdowns are a calculation between societies poorest dying from starvation due to loss of income, or from exposure to Covid-19) allows First-World governments at least to have the ability to sustain their quarantined citizens in relative comfort. The measures taken by the British Treasury amount to the biggest state intervention in the peacetime the economy in British history with the government offering to pay the salaries and wages of its citizens alongside support to business, all to the tune of £330 billion and rising. [4] This is state intervention ‘unimaginable’ on a scale even a few weeks prior to its announcement, and has been justified as being needed to fight an unprecedented economic battle due to the virus and the measures being implemented to confront it. [5]

However, this overlooks the fact that this unprecedented economic battle, and the massive state measures being used to combat it, are entirely optional. If anyone remembers it was only a week or so before the announcement of the £330 billion, that the government had allotted a substantial, but infinitely smaller £30 billion extra spending.[6] This was back in the context when the British government was intending to keep everything functioning as ‘normal’ as possible- in line with its historic reaction to pandemics. Shops would remain open, Ascot went ahead, and while vulnerable groups were told to self-isolate, everyone else was informed simply to ensure that they washed their hands to the tune of ‘happy birthday’.

The idea was that the UK would follow the concept of ‘Herd Immunity’, this being that the government wanted as quickly as possible to have 60% of its healthy population infected by Covid-19 so that they could suffer, get through it and develop an immunity to it, with the majority being immune eventually those who could not risk getting it would now also be protected as there would be no one likely around who is still infectious. [7] The government now denies that ‘herd immunity’ was ever its official policy, yet the evidence such as allowing gatherings like Ascot to go ahead alongside such a small amount of extra spending, followed in subsequent weeks by the historically large £300 billion and a rushed regime of extra measures all delivered one after the other point to the government actually sitting back and letting herd immunity take its course, before u-turning radically and following the example of the rest of the world (bar Sweden and the Netherlands) in doing radically economically interventionist measures, alongside a national lockdown.

This is because by mid-March the British government were given the now famous Imperial College model of their interpretation of Covid-19s outcome that reported with the government’s current rather lax (though historically normal) response to the virus, around 260,000 people would die.[8] This was backed-up by the example of what was happening in Italy, essentially a total contagion, and so the British government radically altered course. The reasons for this were a mixture of political, but also ethical. The fact is that the expected 260,000 people dead were numbers any British government previously would be familiar with- from Spanish flu and before, right up until 2013 where the government in the best-case scenario to a pandemic were expecting and willing to accept up to 315,000 deaths. The fact is the extreme measures of a nation-wide lockdown that have been taken are totally historic, unprecedented and required a political willingness and economic ability to pay-out a vast amount of money from the state coffers. Due to this though the current expected death toll is placed around 20,000 if we are lucky-[9] a horrid number, but one that is comparatively tiny from what governments pre-2020 were prepared to put up with.

So the state being wealthy and willing to spread its wealth out has facilitated the lockdown (As well of course its fear of the political consequences if it did not follow the example of the rest of the world, while the Imperial College report was banging around), but also technological advances on a scale undreamed of have allowed the lockdown to be possible. Even in 2013 with the large expected death-toll, the internet infrastructure we are now so used to, was not in place- the scale of home delivery services, fin-tech, working from home software etc simply was not there. Hence why no nation-wide lockdown was ever mentioned. In 2020 though, while there have been some teething issues (to be expected for the first ever time) such as there not yet being the total capacity by the food service sector to meet the demand for home delivery (the local superstore is currently booked up until early May), its well on its way to getting there. Indeed an article for another time- but expect the world to change in huge ways post-Covid-19, already there has been talk of commuters and businesses based in the city realizing they don’t have to commute into work necessarily, particularly not every day- this will have a large impact on the cost of living in cities and house prices, if workers do a reverse exodus- to live in the countryside or smaller towns instead of having to be within a two hour drive or train journey. These are not ‘new’ trends- indeed we were well on our way to a more ‘home-working’ orientated economy where possible (climate change and the cost of living crisis had seen to that), but the reaction to Covid-19 by the state has forced businesses and people to adapt much faster than they otherwise would.

Due to these technological advancements in the internet and mass transit specifically, it has meant that at least some level of economic activity, communication and of course supply distribution can continue in a total lockdown. Something which again the 2013 and before governments could not expect. Thus, with these things available it is absolutely right that governments have taken the decision to attempt to save as many of their citizens as possible and keep the death toll far away from the over 100,000 mark that a 2013 government would have expected.

The Ethical-Economic balance of lockdown (And the growing criticism that we’re sacrificing to save everyone)

However, it is important to note that even with a lockdown being deemed politically necessary, and with technology facilitating a continuing hum of at least some economic activity there is still a huge cost to taking the ‘moral’ and ethical route of saving lives over the short term, over the economic path. The world was sliding into recession anyway due to increasing instability in the global economy (Trade wars, African loan crisis and increasing tensions over the Arctic, South China Sea and OPEC-Russian oil has not helped).[10] But the effects of Covid-19 on consumer behaviour, and the dwindling of economic activity due to the lock-down has exacerbated this. The lockdown indeed currently has actually hidden the fact that we are now/will about to be (depending on measurement used) heading into an economic crisis far worse than the 2008 recession.[11] It may even become a global depression as the US, still the engine of the world economy, and thanks to king-dollar the cornerstone of financial markets, may potentially reach its 1930s Great Depression unemployment rates of 1 in 4 Americans being made jobless.[12] Regardless of it reaching these heights, the UK’s in trouble due to its Covid-19 response. It’s debt to GDP ratio is now set to rise from its current 80% (Which is very high) to 100% and potentially beyond by next year due to the mass borrowing the government has and will continue to require to fund the lockdown measures and its attendant economic aid.[13] This number does not include the amount of money the government will borrow and lend to businesses that will then have to be written off due to their inability to pay back. The IFS has stated that this year alone the UK will need to borrow an extra £200 billion to fund the lockdown measures, and that the government may actually need to go far beyond even that huge figure.[14] Longer-term the UK is suffering a jobs crisis, not merely with rising unemployment,[15] but also with the wipeout of businesses permanently or indeed potentially whole industries such as commercial airlines.[16] We are potentially looking at a world defining economic crisis looming, that will have permanent repercussions on how we live and work and that is far worse than anything anyone living has experienced.

Due to these facts there is a growing complaint from certain segments of society that the balance between ethical-economic has shifted too far to the ethical side (i.e. save everyone and damn the longer-term fallout). They make the case that the economic damage will see far more lives ruined, and people potentially die than anything Covid-19 would do. They have the example of the 2008 Financial Crash to draw upon, and how the subsequent austerity (Which they may or may not argue was necessary) was incredibly damaging- as described by the UN special Rapporteur’s damning report on the British governments presiding over ‘wide-scale poverty’ that dropped British life expectancy, forced people to rely on food-banks and saw 40% of children living in poverty.[17] Furthermore, there is evidence that while disputed, argues that austerity subsequently caused the deaths of 120,000 people living in England.[18]With this in mind they make the case that the economic damage that lockdown causes will see far more lives ruined or even destroyed than anything Covid-19 might bring.

The British government places the value of a human life at £1.8 million.[19] This is the figure used to deem if safety equipment, operations, new drugs or indeed wider assessments of crisis response and war planning are deemed efficient, effective and ‘worth it’ in the money spent vs human lives lost or saved calculation. The NHS themselves provides treatment roughly on the basis that an extra year of life is worth spending up to £30,000 or less on.[20] These statistics feature heavily in policy considerations, and essentially are to ask how much should the British taxpayer be willing to pay to help their fellow citizens. They are intended then to provide a quantitative balance between the moral and the economic that is arguably ‘fair’. The argument then is that these figures are largely being ignored in the response to Covid-19 by the government’s new lockdown response. They put forward that the original ‘herd strategy’ was right and that the U-turn was based on political considerations of electoral survival rather than being based on a clear cut plan (And indeed this may be right, considering the lack of testing in the UK that is needed to go alongside a lockdown is not happening as the equipment needed was originally envisaged as not being necessary).

Indeed, both the Guardian and The Telegraph- two media groups from very different political outlooks are running an increasing number of articles about how the lowest-earners, young people, retired people and entrepreneurs are suffering/will suffer the most from the economic fallout from the lockdown, and how the economic consequences of the lockdown are building the further it continues. They are acting as a warning against further extension of lockdown powers or a continuation of the lockdown itself.

However, to put some things in perspective here, while yes, the government did certainly U-turn from herd immunity and implemented a half-concocted lockdown plan that lacked the proper equipment and aid packages necessary- hence why self-employed people were forgotten about until much later,[21] and why freelancers, newly self-employed and those on a 0 hour contract at the time writing at least are still not receiving the same level of help, if at all, as everyone else. Nor is there any actual ‘exit plan’ with the kind of testing that a lockdown strategy needs. As it’s pointless if you cannot track the infection spread correctly meaning you do not know:

A) When to stop the lockdown, and what regions and areas may need further measures, or indeed what areas you can ease restrictions on

B) You are keeping people who are potentially already immune from being able to either help others, or to get economic activity jump started again.

It though, is still not right to say yet that we should be willing to risk people’s lives needlessly for the sake of alleviating the economic fallout (And thus saving out futures). The reason being that even if the UK is on track to being in a far worse economic crisis than 2008, or indeed the Great Depression, it need not mean that people have to suffer, or have to die. As unlike Covid-19 which is left to the immune system to fight, the correct government policy can directly alleviate economic issues.

The right response to an economic crisis caused by a humanitarian crisis (and the wrong one):

An example of this can be found in our history. Post-1945, the UK debt to GDP ration was a whopping 250% (let alone the 100% predicted next year).[22] The war (which everyone and their mother is equating to our current coronavirus struggle) saw Britain almost bankrupted,[23] millions of businesses had been destroyed or turned to war purposes and entire economic sectors had been wiped out.[24] Ernest Bevin, Britain’s foreign secretary in 1947 commented that German miners were actually eating better than their British counterparts.[25] All this is a far more extreme situation than our current position could ever reach, on top of this the Britain also faced a hostile USA demanding repayment of our war-loans unexpectedly and who terminated lend-lease without prior notification on 2 September 1945- this meant Britain now had to pay the US for the consumer and civilian goods, food and equipment it needed to function as it had turn its economy almost entirely over to war production. On top of this the US now began attempting to dismantle Britain’s trading relationship with they key markets it needed to pay back the US itself.[26]This is objectively a far worse position than current predictions of our circumstances.

So, what did the heavily indebted Labour government do post-1945? It spent. Massively. It nationalized entire sectors of the economy- the Bank of England,[27] Iron and Steel,[28] Coal,[29] Civil aviation,[30] Telephone and Wireless,[31]Transport and delivery services,[32] and Energy to name a few.[33] These not only provided massive funding and state protection for key services for citizens and business, allowing the private sector to jump off this spring-board and expand their own activities far more cheaply than they otherwise could (and thus rapidly expanded the tax base) but also gave private enterprise confidence to invest in Britain and to help rebuild its economy. Further to this Labour embarked on an unprecedented house and infrastructure building spree to provide employment and stimulate regional economies but also founded the NHS in 1946 and vastly expanded the welfare state. These moves were much in keeping with Maynard Keynes’ teachings on how to revive an economy after a crisis- the government must spend and directly intervene, and as Keynes predicted, UK debt steadily and unremittingly came down. By 1960 it was 100% of British GDP, by 1970 it was 54% where it would largely remain- perfectly healthy for state finances.[34]

By comparison, the Conservative’s austerity has not seen any fall in the debt to GDP, in fact it grew it. In 2010 it had risen to 62.9% as a result of the financial crash and massive government bailout of the economy. Austerity has since seen this grow year on year to 78% in 2014 to 82% in 2018, it only began to slightly fall in 2019 when the Conservatives themselves ditched austerity in favour of turning the spending taps back on.[35]

The reason that Attlee’s spending splurge post-1945 worked to tackle the UK’s debt and Cameron’s austerity objectively has failed was because, and say it with me- A state economy is nothing at all like a household budget (the myth Cameron’s Tories created to win the 2010 and 2015 elections). Such an idea while being snappy with voters totally misrepresents the complexity and role that a nation-state has in maintaining its own economic well-being. A state economy is only like a household budget IF- your dad or mum promises that for every £2 you spend shopping, they’ll spend £1 and give you a further 50p directly to you, and pay for your car, re-invest your rent in lovely things specifically for you, much of which will help make you more money by making your own endeavours easier, all the while they implement a series of tax-breaks and support systems to ensure that you and your siblings while benefiting from the fruits of your labours also remember to buy your struggling younger brother a birthday present each year, as well as being able to get what rent you do pay, partially back. Your parents also keep you safe from your pushy neighbours, nasty falls and illnesses from the rent you pay, instead of demanding extra. They then give you even faster internet, more money for your college/uni course and double your Netflix. Thus, all building your confidence to stay there, do better at your business, maybe start another one and so end up paying more rent back, while also keeping more money in your own pocket at the same time.

If your house is anything like the above…then ok, you can compare the economy to a household budget. If, however your household is a normal one- then it works nothing like a state economy. Governments beat economic crises by spending, not by indulging in austerity that the UN has labelled as an ideological motivation, not a necessary economic one.

Wait, why does this matter to the anti-lockdown crowd?

Why does this matter at all to the guys arguing about how we should end the lockdown asap to protect the economy? Its because the underlying assumption they have is that with the UK economy teetering on the brink due to the government periodizing lives over the economy they expect that 10 years or more of austerity will be on the cards to ‘fix’ things. They do not envision that the government does have other, far more effective options at its disposal. As shown Attlee’s Government and the subsequent Keynesian post-war consensus adhered to by both Labour and the Conservatives until 1979 dealt with UK debt, while also improving standards of living for all, far more effectively than the last 10 years of Conservative austerity, which as of September 2019 had still not got rid of the government’s deficit, let alone even started to tackle the debt,[36] and that had also seen a real-terms drop in the living standards, life expectancy and provision of public services enjoyed by the British people.[37]

Now in fairness Attlee’s Labour managed this partly because they also went on a ruthless export-drive. The UK took aim at new and old markets, and the government helped businesses, and in some cases nationalized them to go toe-to-toe with other exporting nations like the USA and France to compete for trading opportunities.[38] This indeed is something that China, the USA and EU are doing now. It’s also partly why Britain joined the EU, as its Commonwealth markets became in the 1970s less dynamic and viable. The UK currently lacks the manufacturing industry that it built up from 1945-1979, but it does have a large and renowned service industry to who the same principles apply, as well as the potential to again become a manufacturing nation in new frontier areas like Space-tech (See ground-breaking British projects like Skylon and the SABRE Engine)[39], Eco-tech (Of which it is already a leading light)[40] and the Technology industry of which again the UK is at the bleeding edge, with it being the fourth largest market for tech investment in the world.[41] Britain just needs a government (of any political colour) who is pragmatic, not ideological. Who realizes that nationalization and government intervention is back on the agenda if we wish to do the right thing- save lives from Covid-19, and also save lives and livelihoods from the economic fallout which follows from the perfectly right lockdown measures. The ethical-economic balance is absolutely fine providing this is the path followed, and not a return to austerity in the aftermath.

Luckily both Boris Johnson's Conservatives and Keir Starmer's Labour are proponents of state-led intervention.[42] They will carry out nationalizations where needed (As Johnson did to the trains last month to prevent them from going under)[43] and are committed to the state taking an active role in shaping the economy and making sure markets are fair (such as forcing banks to not exploit struggling businesses).[44]

So providing Johnson and Starmer both remain committed to their 'big state' platforms, and the economic illiterates who think a national economy is anything at all like a household budget remain trapped on the fringes. There is no reason to advocate putting lives at risk to Covid-19 for the sake of the economy or arguing that we've gone too far in trying to save everyone. The fact is, states are now able to protect their citizens, they should do so, and any economic fall-out can be overcome with the right policies, no one need suffer.

Providing austerity remains dead...

Footnotes:

[1] Indeed, it may have come from China, though this is disputed; M. Humphries, ‘Paths of Infection: The First World War and the Origins of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic’, War in History, 21 (2014): 55–81

[2] J. Talha, J. Radia and S. Abdul, ‘H1N1 Influenza (Swine Flu)’, The National Center for Biotechnology Information (2019), available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK513241/ (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[3] Cabinet Office, Preparing for Pandemic Influenza (2013), 14, available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/225869/Pandemic_Influenza_LRF_Guidance.pdf (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[4] C. Cooper, ‘UK sets out £330 billion coronavirus business loan package', Politco (2020), available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-sets-out-330-billion-coronavirus-business-loan-package/ (Accessed 6 April 2020)

[5] Ibid.

[6] P. Brand, ‘Chancellor Rishi Sunak announces £30 billion Budget boost to combat coronavirus threat’, ITV News (2020), available at: https://www.itv.com/news/2020-03-11/chancellor-rishi-sunak-delivers-budget-amid-coronavirus-covid-19-pressure-and-focuses-on-flooding-spending-potholes/ (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[7] C. O’Grady, ‘The UK backed off on herd immunity. To beat Covid-19, we’ll ultimately need it’, National Geographic (2020), Available at: https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/science-and-technology/2020/03/uk-backed-herd-immunity-beat-covid-19-well-ultimately-need-it (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[8] E. Sommerville, ‘UK Lockdown to cut coronavirus death toll by 254,000, experts say’, Evening Standard (2020), Available at: https://www.standard.co.uk/news/health/coronavirus-uk-death-toll-lockdown-china-imperial-college-a4400431.html (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[9] T. Helm, ‘UK can keep Covid-19 deaths below 20,000, says medical director’, The Guardian (2020), Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/28/uk-can-keep-covid-19-deaths-below-20000-says-medical-director (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[10] L. Elliot, ‘Global recession a serious danger in 2020, says UN’, The Guardian (2019), Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/sep/25/global-recession-a-serious-danger-in-2020-says-un (Accessed 4 April 2020)

[11] M. Valladares, ‘Market and Macro Data Signal Covid-19 Economic Crisis Will be Worse Than in 2008’, Forbes (2020), Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2020/03/31/market-and-macro-data-signal--covid-19-economic-crisis-will-be-worse-than-in-2008/#69545bc46f1e (Accessed 5 April 2020); Reuters, ‘IMF sees coronavirus-induced global downturn ‘way worse’ than financial crisis’, The Economic Times (2020), Available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/imf-sees-coronavirus-induced-global-downturn-way-worse-than-financial-crisis/articleshow/74978719.cms?from=mdr (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[12] J. Bartash, ‘The soaring US unemployment rate could approach Great Depression-era levels’, Marketwatch (2020), Available at: https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-soaring-us-unemployment-rate-could-approach-great-depression-era-levels-2020-04-03 (Accessed 6 April 2020)

[13] Reuters, ‘Fitch Downgrades UK to Aa- Negative outlook, Reuters (2020), Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/brief-fitch-downgrades-uk-to-aa-negative/brief-fitch-downgrades-uk-to-aa-negative-outlook-idUSFWN2BK1P7 (Accessed 5 April 2020); P. Minford, ‘Here’s how our public finances can still emerge from coronavirus broadly intact, The Telegraph (2020), Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/04/07/public-finances-can-still-emerge-coronavirus-broadly-intact/ (Accessed 5 April 2020); G. Howes, ‘Coronvirus Economic Forecast’, Poundsterling Live (2020), Available at: https://www.poundsterlinglive.com/economics/13049-34-lower-gdp-every-day-the-shock-continues-uk-gdp-forecast-from-bank-of-america (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[14] C. Emmerson and I. Stockton, ‘The economic response to coronavirus will substantially increase government borrowing’, Institute for Fiscal Studies (2020), Available at: https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/14771 (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[15] T. Bell, ‘In the coronavirus jobs wipe-out, the young and low earners suffer most’, The Guardian (2020), Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/05/covid-19-jobs-wipeout-young-low-earners-hardest- (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[16] FT, ‘Years of UK jobs growth wiped out by coronavirus’, Financial Times (2020), Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/9f3661b9-14cb-472a-9246-d784d436ea52 (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[17] United Nations Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights (2019), Available at: https://undocs.org/A/HRC/41/39/Add.1 (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[18] J. Watkins et al, ‘Effects of health and social care spending on mortality in England: a time trend analysis’, BMJ Journals (2017), Available at: https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/7/11/e017722 (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[19] University of Bristol, ‘Fatal flaws in UK Government’s price of a life’, Physorg (2019), Available at: https://phys.org/news/2019-10-fatal-flaws-uk-price-life.html (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[20] C. Cook, ‘How much is a year of life worth?’, BBC News (2014), Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-28983924 (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[21] E. Langford, ‘Rishi Sunak under pressure to support ‘forgotten’ self-employed workers’, Politics Home (2020), Available at: https://www.politicshome.com/news/article/coronavirus-rishi-sunak-under-pressure-to-offer-support-to-forgotten-selfemployed-workers (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[22] UK Public Spending, ‘UK National Debt Analysis’, Available at; https://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/uk_national_debt_analysis (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[23] The National Archives, London, CAB 128/12/6, Cabinet Conclusions, 22 January 1948

[24] The National Archives, London, FO 800/516, Telegram from Washington, 25 February 1949

[25] The National Archives, London, FO 800/514, British Economic Position, 30 October 1947

[26] The National Archives, London, FO 800/514, Arms for Latin America, 22 March 1947

[27] The National Archives, London, CAB 128/1, Cabinet Conclusions, 13 September 1945

[28] The National Archives, London, CAB 128/5, Cabinet Conclusions, 4 April 1946

[29] The National Archives, London, CAB 128/2, Cabinet Conclusions, 13 December 1945

[30] The National Archives, London, CAB 128/1, Cabinet Conclusions, 26 October 1945

[31] The National Archives, London, CAB 128/13, Cabinet Conclusions, 15 July 1948

[32] The National Archives, London, CAB 128/6, Cabinet Conclusions, 4 July 1946

[33] The National Archives, London, CAB 128/6, Cabinet Conclusions, 19 December 1946

[34] UK Public Spending, ‘UK National Debt Analysis’, Available at; https://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/uk_national_debt_analysis (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[35] United Kingdom Public Sector Net Debt to GDP, Available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/united-kingdom/government-debt-to-gdp (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[36] Office for National Statistics, ‘UK government debt and deficit: September 2019’, Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/publicspending/bulletins/ukgovernmentdebtanddeficitforeurostatmaast/september2019 (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[37] Child Poverty Action Group, ‘The Austerity Generation: The impact of a decade of cuts on family incomes’ (2017), Available at: https://cpag.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/Austerity%20Generation%20FINAL.pdf (Accessed 5 April 2020); R. Partington, ‘UK faces longest fall in living standards since records began, says Resolution Foundation’, The Guardian (2017), Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/nov/23/uk-fall-living-standards-resolution-foundation-budget (Accessed 5 April 2020); Centre for Cities, Cities Outlook 2019: A decade of austerity, Available at: https://www.centreforcities.org/reader/cities-outlook-2019/a-decade-of-austerity/ (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[38] The National Archives, London, FO 800/514, Arms for Latin America, 22 March 1947

[39] Reaction Engines, SABRE (2020), Available at: https://www.reactionengines.co.uk/beyond-possible/sabre (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[40] European Commission, ‘Eco-innovation in United-Kingdom’ (2015), Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecoap/sites/ecoap_stayconnected/files/field/field-country-files/uk_eco-innovation_2015.pdf (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[41] D. Prosser, ‘How Britain’s Tech Sector Staked Its Claim On The World’, Forbes (2019), Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidprosser/2019/05/14/how-britains-tech-sector-staked-its-claim-on-the-world-stage/#3dc95ae04681 (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[42] For a full overview of Boris Johnson’s shift away from traditional Conservative economic policies and towards a left-wing state interventionist approach see my articles on the post-2019 General Election Results and what they mean for the country available at: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/2019-post-mortem-red-wall-crumbling-your-general-guide-jardine/ and https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/2019-general-election-aftermath-part-2-rise-snp-fall-lib-dems-samuel/

[43] O Gill, ‘The railways have been nationalized- and there is not turning back’, The Telegraph (2020), Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2020/03/23/railways-have-nationalised-no-turning-back/ (Accessed 5 April 2020)

[44] A. Verity, ‘Denying coronavirus loans ‘completely unacceptable’ banks told’, BBC News (2020), Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-52126658 (Accessed 5 April 2020)

British Politics beyond Covid-19:

Thu, 02 Jul 2020 10:29:51 GMT

Coverage of Covid-19 has dominated the media for weeks, yet big things are happening beyond it. (Originally published 22 May 2029)

Let's sneak past the Covid coverage and through the hidden door...

I hope you’ve all been keeping safe and well and aren’t going too stir crazy yet.

For those who are interested in British politics beyond the debates over the government corona-virus response, things have never been more alive. While Covid-19 has dominated the headlines, a LOT has been going on that’s rather flown under the radar. I’ve avoided doing too much politics of late, because quite frankly I don’t think anyone wants to hear about the divisions and disputes among the government at a time when people have put their faith in them to safeguard those they love. However, after a few months it's probably a good idea to get the lay of the land. So… I’m here to give you a brief run-down of what’s been happening beyond the Corona-virus response.

Those who feared/hoped that Boris Johnson's 80-strong majority would lead to a calmer, quieter political front have been proved quite wrong. So, some key events-

1) U-Turn on NHS surcharge - Just yesterday there was a government U-turn over charging foreign-born NHS staff a surcharge for using the health service they work for. Keir Starmer, Labour’s new leader brought the issue up at PMQ’s on Wednesday, Boris launched an immediate defense and refused to scarp it. This was in line with the Conservative’s 2019 promise to in fact increase this surcharge from £400 a person to £625 which they claimed would raise over £500 million a year for the Treasury. How they reached this figure is unclear, particularly as currently I’ve seen it mentioned that the surcharge raises only £90 million a year, though that figure also lacks context. It does appear though to be a relatively insignificant amount.

A day later after Boris Johnson’s defense of the surcharge, he decided to scrap it. This is mostly due to pressure from a seemingly (for now at least) revitalized Labour. Keir Starmer indeed has been enjoying approval ratings among the public which actually exceed Boris Johnson’s (One poll has him at +23 and Boris falling to +22). While we’ll leave the so-called ‘Rise of Starmer’ aside until a later day, it does mean the 2024 election is (as I said way back in my article on the 2019 election) very much all to play for as Labour has a leader who the public are happy to endorse.

However, it must be noted that it wasn’t just Starmer who forced Boris into a u-turn, after all it’s the job of the opposition to oppose, criticize and highlight the flaws of a government. In turn the government are usually quite happy to dodge, duck, dive, dip… and dodge this. However, this time Boris’s own backbench MP’s joined the fray and threatened to back Starmer in a vote, going against their own government, if Boris did not back-down. They were quite heated, some even publicly calling him ‘immoral’ for wanting to keep it. So, in what was literally less than 24 hours later, ministers and the PM who had been on the air waves defending the surcharge, now announced ‘well of course it’ll be scrapped!’.

This presents something of a theme that we’ll see develop as I go on. Boris Johnson is very much hamstrung by the deep divisions in the Conservative party, his majority of 80 isn’t actually enough to paper over these fault lines and in many ways he’s a ‘Theresa May’ mark 2 in terms of having hostile factions competing with him and over him. This can be seen in our second case-study- The U-turn over the Irish border.

2) Brexit Climb-down, An internal-UK border - So the second big U-turn of the past month has been the government’s complete U-turn over border controls in the Irish Sea. Boris has caved to the EU essentially, despite promising he wouldn’t.

A quick-recap- We’re currently negotiating our future relationship with the EU after leaving it officially on 31 January. Boris Johnson prior to this agreed with the EU that N.Ireland would stay in the single market for goods and agriculture. This was a way of getting over the thorny issues surrounding the potential violation of the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ that brought peace to Northern Ireland after decades of fighting between unionists and republicans.

Of course if N.Ireland stayed in the EU’s single market, how would the UK ‘take back control’ of its borders more generally? The controversial idea batted about was to have border checks down in Britain, essentially ‘cutting off’ N.Ireland as an entity. This is something the DUP (Remember them?) were dead against as they felt it meant the UK was abandoning them. In part they are correct, an internal border between N.Ireland and the rest of the UK is essentially unprecedented in any first world state- it’s a huge loss of sovereignty over a part of the country.

Boris Johnson recognizing this promised in 2019 there would be no such checks between N.Ireland and the rest of the UK, no men guarding the border and inspecting people and goods. Indeed, such an idea was so heinous that Theresa May when she was PM refused to even consider it, stating that ‘no Prime Minister of the United Kingdom could ever sign up to such an agreement’. Boris agreed, he said and I quote “If somebody asks you to do that [present your goods for inspection at the new internal-border] tell them to ring up the prime minister and I'll direct them to put that form in the bin”.

Well a few days ago he caved to the EU, there now is going to be that exact Border that we were promised there would not be. In response the government said it has ‘always been clear’ that there would be border checks between N.Ireland and the rest of the UK. This is a huge Brexit capitulation, and if it wasn’t for Covid-19 dominating the news cycle may well have sunk Boris’s government. It's important to note that this arrangement will still exist even in the event of a 'no-deal' Brexit.

Certainly backbench pro-Brexit MP’s are fuming, again adding to the list of opposed factions within the Conservative party that Boris now has to contend with.

3) Spending on a socialist scale - Even prior to the Covid-19 financial measures to keep the country afloat, which has resulted in unprecedented peacetime spending and a massive increase to the national debt (predicted to be around 150% of GDP by 2025), Boris Johnson had already alienated the ‘traditional’ Tories in his party by making the Treasury his puppet (Sunak replacing Javid) and pushing for large-scale spending and leveling up to the tune of a huge £30 billion, centrists and left-wingers were delighted, as this was exactly what the state should have been doing (It was even argued that Corbyn lost the election, but won the economic argument- it was straight out of Labour’s policy book). It was an admittance that austerity had been wrong and had done more damage than good (Something that the Boris loyalists are keen to also state- even post-covid-19 Johnson has refused to even consider a return to austerity, instead adopting the Labour argument since 2010 that you should grow the economy to meet the debt, as we did post-ww2, and this involves state spending, not cut-backs).

However, this for the Conservative fiscal-hawks and Thatcherites does not sit well ‘fiscal incontinence’ has been used by them when describing Johnson’s spending. Opposition to HS2 is something of a rallying call for them- an expensive project, that has questionable economic gain for the cost, but is a flagship policy of Boris’s government.

Of course, it must be noted that partly a reason for the lavish spending is because to get a majority Boris had to win over Labour voters up north- who demanded Brexit, and investment. These are northern communities that have been neglected by the government for decades, so the spending taps had to be turned on, if they aren’t then its very likely that these voters who Boris recognized as ‘only lending’ their vote to him, will go back to Labour. Indeed in interviews, while these voters like Boris, they dislike the Conservative party- again 2024 will be interesting.

Which presents the other issue- there is a growing north-south divide among the Tories. Traditional southern Tories tend to be fiscally conservative, supported austerity and dislike large-scale state spending, and they are questioning why not only so much is being spent, but why are ‘southern taxes’ (as this is where the UK economy is particularly driven) going to the north? Meanwhile the new Northern Tory MP’s are pro-spending and are very careful (their seats are at risk) to make sure traditional Tories who might wish for spending cutbacks (or more spending down south) are kept out of the policy-sphere. So two new Tory factions, neither of which are ‘loyal’ to Boris particularly- to please one group, he must upset the other.

It isn’t though just domestic policy that is causing a ruckus-

4) China - Recently there was a threatened rebellion over Huawei's key role in facilitating Britain's 5G roll-out. It was feared the Chinese government would use the opportunity to spy on British interests and solidify a 'foot in the door' regarding their soft-power approach. The threat of a Tory backbench rebellion forced the government to 'stand down' and while allowing Huawei, Boris had to commit to kicking them out essentially in five years.

Covid-19 though has re-opened this can of worms, with the world re-appraising the nature of China’s growing power and influence there has been some alarm at what might be described as ‘neo-imperialism’ carried out by the Chinese Communist Party (The actuality of this is for a whole other article I will one day soon write when I can get access to the archives again).

On the back of this a new ‘China Research Group’ has been set up by Conservative MP’s (Remember the European Research Group who had a big hand in directing Brexit policy among the Tories…its basically the same people but now with the aim of ‘combating China’). Against this there is a smaller, though influential faction of pro-China Conservative MP’s- many of whom still believe in David Cameron and Theresa May’s ‘Golden Year of Anglo-Chinese relations). They make the case that a post-Brexit Britain will need to be open to business to the whole world to be a success, and we cannot go against the worlds 1st/2nd largest economy- we also need good relations with China to combat being dominated by the US or EU (and vice versa, post-Brexit Britain will have to play a balancing act now that it’s outside the safety in numbers of the EU). Both sides make valid points that bear investigation, but for the purposes of Boris, this is another nightmare- more competing factions to balance, and to appease one is to upset the other.

This is where Starmer’s Labour make a reappearance too, as they seemingly are taking a ‘hard-line’ against China, which for Boris will make votes on ‘China related’ issues a problem as it gives the anti-China faction in his own party the ‘outside support’ to be able to force his hand (Like with the NHS surcharge U-turn- Rebel Tories are able to temporarily vote alongside the opposition).

5) Personality clash - On top of these deep dividing lines- The Hard Brexiteers vs the ‘Boris’ Brexiteers, Pro-spending vs Austerity Tories, Global Tories vs National Tories, Pro-China vs Anti-China groups and North vs South Tories, there is also a ‘miscellaneous’ section that can be explained by Boris Johnson himself. I’m sure we’ve seen the reports (though at this stage I wouldn’t give too much credence to them) that the Tories in response to Starmer and the pressures of governing at such a critical juncture, may seek to replace Boris by next year with a ‘steadier’ pair of hands and by someone who ‘does detail’ (which Boris is famously bad at, being a ‘big picture’ kind of politician). This is because as one anonymous Tory has been quoted- ‘Boris is great at winning elections, bad at governing’. Regardless of if this happens or not (And the Conservatives are above all ruthless about their partying keeping power, as with Thatcher and May- they are quite happy to ditch leaders at will if it means avoiding losing down the line), Boris Johnson’s greatest strength- that he has no innate policy platform, has also become his biggest weakness.

Let me explain briefly- Boris is someone who became Mayor of London (A Labour stronghold), is quite happy to go ‘big state’ in spending (even before Covid) and intervention (He’s currently talking about directly tackling Britain’s obesity problem) when he feels its needed (To win over the new Northern voters). He also though is someone who has extolled Thatcherism (anti-big state), and famously mocked the ‘Nanny state’ (Indeed he felt the ‘sugar tax’ was too invasive and ridiculous, now he’s looking at expanding it). Boris during the Brexit referendum spoke extensively about a ‘free trading’ ‘global Britain’, yet is now looking at upping protectionist tariffs for Britain’s car and agricultural industries (An issue hugely at odds). To repeat a well-known statement, prior to becoming a leading Brexiteer, he actually also had plans to join the Pro-EU remain side. He’s flexible, and this can be a strength in politics- things change, compromises need to be made and sticking to an ideological position for the sake of it can do more harm than good- this is also why we’ve seen the U-turns. He is good at keeping in power and following the ‘mood’ to do so- these are qualities that the media tend to deride, and people may see as self-serving… they are, but they also mean when push comes to shove British policy will be pragmatic (though not necessarily good or timely).

So being flexible in terms of policy and ideology is something that has helped Boris get to be Mayor of London and now PM. However, it also means unlike most other MP’s that he has no ‘core’ support base in the party of his own to rely on. In this he is much like Theresa May. He threw his lot in with the ERG to win the leadership of the Tory party, but on getting it, left them and has now angered them with Irish/UK border issue. He stood up as a traditional Thatcherite and Liberal PM who appealed to the traditional elements of the Conservative party, but since then has u-turned into being a supporter of ‘big state intervention’ and huge public spending. It means then that when he comes against resistance where he cannot co-opt one side of the party against the other, he falls flat. It also makes him, as with Theresa May, vulnerable to leadership challenges and rebellion. Indeed he recently had to back-down on putting forward a bill that would provide ‘early release’ for those who committed ‘lesser crimes’- the idea behind this was a moral one, Covid-19 it was feared would run like wildfire through the prisons, and people being punished for shop-lifting were effectively going instead to get a death sentence.

However, there is no influential faction in the Conservative party who would support this, thus Boris had to drop it in the face of hostility. This has also meant that Boris Johnson’s policy platform is a scatter gun approach- there are policies from the left and right, and sometimes policies or decisions which are directly at odds- for instance allowing Huawei to provide 5G to Britain (appeasing the pro-China Tories), while then taking a hard-line with China over its handling of Covid-19 (appeasing anti-China Tories), while also remaining silent on the issue of Hong Kong. While on a case-by-case basis this makes sense as Boris is balancing the competing factions and trying to keep the party together, in terms of actual policy impact- British foreign policy towards China comes across as a mess. A similar issue happened with Theresa May, who also lacked a core group of supporters, at the same time she sent Philip Hammond to China to seek future economic cooperation, Dominic Raab also sent warships to the South China Sea to get into a staring contest with China- this resulted in Hammond being essentially thrown out the country with no real agreement in place and with relations between China and Britain soured.

Compare this to David Cameron, who had a core bunch of ‘Etonian Modernizers’ who all shared broadly the same view, and you can see the difference- Cameron agree or disagree with it, had a policy platform- reform of education, austerity, reform of British foreign policy, re-structuring of the armed forces and a realignment of British interests towards a pro-China stance. These were all controversial, some were incredibly bad for Britain (slipping in my own opinion) but he had the support base behind him to allow him to create a consistent and clear path forward to meet these long-term goals. Theresa May, who like Boris lacked this group of buddies, floundered with no clear drive forward- she did lay out an idea to ‘help those just about managing’, but then lacked the support to do anything towards achieving this stated goal. Likewise Boris has ‘leveling up’ and ‘Getting Brexit done’- both light on detail partly because the shape of leveling up and Brexit will depend on what other states allow us- but also because to definitively lay out a strategy would risk upsetting one faction or another, the support of all or most of whom he will need at one point or another.

This means then that policy creation is so far erratic, on the fly and involves many U-turns in the face of unexpected opposition, and subsequently broken promises (as we’ve seen)- which while ensuring the short-term survival of Boris as PM, in the longer-term start to make him look weak or unreliable- something which the Conservative party are highly intolerant of historically, who will act (as the rumours have already begun) to replace any PM who might hurt their chances of re-election.

The UK 2020 Budget (Even before Covid-19)

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Wed, 01 Jul 2020 20:22:54 GMT

Keynesian Economics or Modern Monetary Theory, call it whatever you like, but Austerity is over (Originally published 11 March 2020- Yep, this was even before Covid-19)

So Johnson's budget will see the highest levels of government-led public spending in real-terms since government records began in 1955 according to the Chancellor (However Labour are also right that it only reverses the cuts made since 2010, but does not fix the damage austerity caused directly- the OBR provides a middle-ground by pointing out that this budget takes day-to-day spending back to pre-austerity levels- that is still a huge increase though). As some Conservatives are currently bemoaning, the left has 'won' on the economy, this is a budget Corbyn would have been very comfortable giving (It's according to my rough estimation around £753 billion worth of government spending over the course of this parliament).

Likewise though Labour are now in trouble as they'll find it very hard to attack the high levels of spending being thrown out by Boris 'Call me Oprah- and you have a car' Johnson. He's stolen their thunder, although has now shifted the UK debate from 'should' government borrow and spend excessively, to instead 'how high' should governments borrow and spend.

So Keynesian economics are back with a vengeance- huge borrowing and government spending is on the cards to try and break-out of an economic cycle of low-growth, low-investment and low-productivity. It is an astronomical cash injection (And essentially an admittance that austerity was a huge mistake, and we've completely wasted the last decade in economic terms, particularly when interest rates have been consistently low since 2014/16).

It is also a clear signal that Johnson has shifted to the left of center on the economy (Something confirmed when you see how upset traditional Thatcherite Tories are at this level of state spending and intervention). An immediate £30 billion stimulus package to tackle any economic slow-down Covid-19 causes, £600 billion for infrastructure, £2.1 billion for a pot-hole fund alone, and UK's Research and Development spending will go from its current 1.7% to 2.4% over the next few years with an extra 22 billion to give a few examples.

For lovers of foreign policy, there's also a gem in there- the UK is going ahead with its 2% digital sales tax, despite violent opposition from the US to it (They see it as an extra tax on successful US digital companies). This could have significant repercussions in Anglo-American trade talks.

The budget has also though totally blown out the water any real hope of dealing with Britain's public debt (Arguably never really an issue of course). The work austerity did do to tackle the deficit will disappear, with the OBR revealing that the deficit will now actually INCREASE by 0.9% of GDP over this parliament (It had actually been decreasing over the past few years) especially as over the next few months Johnson is expected to ditch his already far looser fiscal rules on borrowing and debt entirely- rendering austerity as a pretty pointless thing to do over the last 10 years.

Something to consider in regard to this debt though is that government borrowing (to pay for all of Johnson's spending) will now be rising to around 40% of GDP by 2023, with total government spending rising to more than £1 trillion for the first time in its history. This totally eclipses the Tony Blair years (according to the Resolution Foundations findings).

This borrowing isn't merely though to fund long-term government spending, but also to service day-to-day and short-term spending, which is somewhat of a danger zone if you are a fiscal hawk- it means we're living well beyond our 'means' and are quite content to do so (Again i can't emphasize just how big a change this is for the Conservatives)

This budget then is a huge spending, huge borrowing, huge state intervention statement- Johnson (and Cummings whose hand is very much to be felt in this budget) has 'gone left', rejected Thatcherism and austerity and are taking a big gamble, as giving out/borrowing the extra money is only part of the battle- spending it sensibly is a whole other issue, especially when interest rates will not always be so low.

The 2019 General Election Aftermath (Part 2): The rise of the SNP, fall of the Lib-Dems and Boris Johnson's future juggling act

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Tue, 30 Jun 2020 09:56:56 GMT

State of the Union, Lib-who? and the juggling future of Boris Johnson (Originally published on my LinkedIn 18 December 2019)

Johnson’s majority is then far more unstable than it appears. He has until 2024 to convince lifelong Labour voters gone Tory to stay with him. Pragmatically this means delivering Brexit, but one that is closely-aligned to the EU, minimizing the disruption to northern manufacturing that his own statistics predict. At the same time polling has found core Conservative voters would gladly see the Conservatives destroyed to get a ‘proper’ Brexit done. Then there is the Union where to combat the rise of the SNP and Irish Republicans closer EU alignment is needed to minimize disruption and facilitate the argument that Independence for the Scots and Irish, would be more disruptive than Brexit.

These three spheres, which are largely at odds, will compete for Johnson’s attention over the next five years. He will have quite the juggling act if he’s to preserve the Union and the Conservative majority for 2024…and indeed the Conservative party itself, for Farage remains waiting in the wings.

Contents

The Run down
Rise of the Gaels
Scottish National Party conquers Scotland
Second Independence Referendum?
Northern Ireland: A border down the Irish sea
The Democratic Unionist Party gets burned
Heading towards a Border Poll?
Defender of the Union?
Conservative voters would rather see the Conservative party destroyed than Brexit to not happen
Conservative majority in 2024 or Brexit, or Union? Can you have your cake and eat it?
The Liberal Democrats dreams are dashed
The legacy of 2019 on British politics
Page 48
A Changing Climate
Towards 2024

The Run down:

-Scotland has a mandate for a second referendum, however pressure will increase if the SNP win the upcoming Holyrood elections. Johnson can delay, but cannot definitively put this off forever.

-Climate Change was the third most pressing issue for voters of all parties this election, in the future it is likely to become even more central.

-Northern Ireland- a Border Poll in the future is now a more distinct possibility, for the first time there are more Nationalist seats than Unionist.

-Boris Johnson is being pulled in several directions. On the one hand to preserve his new northern voters, who are integral for a Tory majority in 2024, and to preserve the Union by showing that the economic disruption to Brexit will be less than feared/better than these nations going independent, he will make a commitment to protect working rights in a flashy show at the Queen's speech, however these will not be equivalent to the EU's going forward. Likewise a softer Brexit is the most pragmatic way of securing the North for the Conservatives, as Governments forecasts place Brexit as effecting these places the most, and Scotland and Northern Ireland from leaving the Union. However this is balanced by the need to 'Get Brexit Done' in a way that will appease core Conservative voters, who polling has shown would gladly sacrifice the Conservative party if it meant getting Brexit 'done' in a way they deem an actual Brexit. Farage thus looms still on the sidelines. Johnson to this end has already sacrificed the DUP and Union cause somewhat in Northern Ireland through his deal placing a border down the Irish Sea to keep the core Tory voters on board, as well as throw a bone to former-Labour Leave supporters.

-Johnson thus will have to juggle these three competing factors going forward if he wants to not see the end of either the Conservatives chances to win in 2024, the Conservatives as a party generally, or the collapse of the Union. In the years ahead any one of these three issues may come to the fore. What is certain is that the nature of the United Kingdom will be fundamentally changed going forward and it will be dependent on how the Conservatives deal with these three concerns.

Rise of the Gaels

While England and Wales went to the Conservatives this election with Labours historic defeat which i detailed in Part 1, a different picture has emerged among the Scottish and in Northern Ireland that potentially sets up a second constitutional crisis for the United Kingdom, just as it is jumping over the first hurdle of Brexit.

Scottish National Party conquers Scotland

The SNP has seen huge growth, not controlling 80% of Scotlands Westminster seats, Out of Scotlands 59 seats, 48 have gone to the SNP , colouring Scotland in their yellow on the electoral map with an impressive gain of 13 seats since 2017 when they achieved 35 (still by far the largest party in Scotland). This has come directly at the expense of all unionist parties, with the Conservatives dropping from their 2017 high of 13 seats down to 6, Labour falling from 6 to 1 and the Liberal Democrats managing to retain 4, though in the SNP churn they lost their leader, Jo Swinson's seat of East Dumbartonshire to the SNP .

The SNP's leader Nicola Sturgeon also far outstrips Boris Johnson in popularity , with a +5 net approval rating, While Johnson's is -36.

This is not though a 'new' phenomena for Scotland. The SNP has dominated Scottish politics since 2015 at Westminster level when it gained a massive 56 seats , leaving the Liberal Democrats, Labour and the Conservatives on only 1 seat each. Interestingly this was after Scotland had voted to stay in the United Kingdom by 55.30% to 44.70% in its 2014 Independence Referendum . In 2017 this fell to 35 seats as the unionist parties regained some ground, however this still left the SNP as the largest Scottish Westminster grouping. The increase then this time around will be seen as as reconfirmation that Scotland is politically very different from the rest of the UK, and that there is a mandate for a second independence referendum due to the growth in SNP seats.

Second Independence Referendum?

The call for a second independence referendum argued as necessary based on the mandate of the 2019 results has gone out . It is something the SNP will now pursue consistently and strongly, capitalizing on their result and Scot's poor opinion of Boris Johnson, and the fact that Scotland voted as a nation to remain in the EU during the 2016 by 62% to 38%.

It is likely though that the real demands for one will begin after the Scottish Parliamentary elections have taken place in 2021. Scotland uses a form of proportional representation for its Holyrood elections, where voters have two votes . This is known as the 'Additional Member System'. The first is used to vote for an MP based upon Britain's traditional First Past the Post model, there are 73 Holyrood MSPs who are voted in this way. The voter then gets to use their second vote to vote for a party generally, dependent on how many votes a party gets in this section a number of the extra 56 MSP seats will be allocated to them. The idea is to provide a result that more broadly reflects the views of the electorate.

Currently the SNP are by far the largest party in the Scottish Parliament with 62 MSPs . The next largest party is the Scottish Conservatives on 31, Scottish Labour is on 23, Scottish Greens have 6 seats and there are 2 independents. The SNP have been the largest party in Holyrood for the past three elections, and have even managed to get a majority in 2011, despite the voting system being designed to specifically present that . There is thus a very clear and strong level of support in Scotland for the SNP as a party. However, at the last election, despite having more than double the MSP's of the Scottish Conservatives, the latter did gain 16 seats, while the SNP lost 6 . This growth of 16 seats, mostly at the expense of Labour, and while nowhere near bringing the Scottish Conservatives anywhere near the SNP's number of seats, could be used to make a weak but nagging argument that in 2021 we might see the Scottish people continue to vote for a Unionist party.

However, if the SNP remains the dominant party, and especially if it grows or against all odds achieves enough seats to become a majority government at Holyrood again, we should expect a second independence referendum to be demanded with greater urgency, with serious force behind it, and Johnson will have far less wiggle room to say no. He can delay it, but not deny it forever. Indeed his top Scottish minister admitted that if the SNP win the 2021 Holyrood elections then that is a mandate for a second referendum .

If a second independence referendum is essentially a sure-fire thing in the coming years, does this mean that independence is too? Well here, it is more complicated. While in 2014 the referendum gave roughly 10% of the electorate in favour of remaining with the union, much of this was achieved seemingly by David Cameron in the last few weeks going back on his previous opposition to giving Scotland 'Devo-Max' (essentially the promise of powers to almost have complete control over domestic policy in Scotland to the Scottish parliament) and promising exactly that if Scotland remained in the United Kingdom .

Recently polling has actually shown that since Brexit, support for Scottish independence has grown, some polls putting it as high as 50% . This isn't of course a sure-fire win for independence supporters, but it shows that clearly the 2014 referendum sorted absolutely nothing, and indeed the situation for the Unionists has deteriorated since, when it should have actually been improving (if the matter had at all been 'put to rest'). The speed at which support for Scottish independence is growing, suggests a very real possibility that Scotland could leave the UK in the next few years. Though an important caveat is that its the independence polls that might best be looked at, the SNP's growing support and dominate place in Scottish politics may also be due to a significant amount of voters not liking the Conservatives under Boris Johnson, or the other unionist parties, being unhappy about Brexit, or liking the SNP as a domestic government for Scotland, and as a shield for Scottish interests at Westminster as opposed to wanting to become fully independent.

What is apparent, is that the SNP is certainly going nowhere as the dominant force in Scottish politics, both at Holyrood and in terms of Scotlands representation at Westminster. The Conservative gains of 2017 have been made apparent as a 'blip' by the SNP, and Labour has not managed to ever recover is Scottish base since its collapse in 2015. In this context Conservatives like Michael Gove can delay a referendum on the issue , but they haven't really got the political capital to stand on to prevent it indefinitely, particularly if they wish to not damage the UK's international political capital and prestige, nor risk indeed further strengthening support for leaving the UK by acting as a authoritarian power (the kind the SNP argues that Westminster is already) imposing its will upon the Scottish people, playing right into the SNP's hands, instead of letting the Scottish people decide on a Scottish issue.

To the question of if an independent Scotland would rejoin the EU, well that's open for the domestic politics of that newly independent state. It is largely agreed by experts that Scotland already meets the requirements to join the EU , and would be able to become a member in relatively short order, particularly as Spain has now said it would not veto anymore an independent Scotland joining the EU . But it does not necessarily follow that supporters of Scottish independence are also supporters of Scotland joining the EU.

Northern Ireland- A border down the Irish sea

The simple fact here is that yes, there will be a border down the Irish Sea . Johnson's Conservatives had essentially ditched the DUP even prior to this election, and reneged on their promise to not have a border, Brexit itself was deemed more important. Johnson's deal factually, despite some... interesting... interpretations by Johnson himself (Admits to a border down the Irish sea, then goes back on it later), does as his own Brexit minister has stated, put a border down the Irish sea as infrastructure, as well as checks on goods and further red-tape for businesses selling goods to the EU through here (and subsequently those not selling goods to the EU, but the UK's internal market will see some new, if light barriers put up). This remember is a deal that Theresa May had rejected stating that no British Prime Minister could ever accept , because of this fact.

The Democratic Unionist Party gets burned

Perhaps as partly punishment for the DUP getting into bed with the Conservatives, and partly that Northern Ireland as a nation, much like Scotland actually voted to remain in the EU by 55.8% to 44.2% , but the DUP lost seats this election, going down to 8 from 10 and moreover losing their Deputy Leader, Nigel Dodd's seat to Sinn Fein in a huge blow to the unionist parties.

His fall was helped here the Irish nationalist leaning parties creating an anti-Brexit electoral pact . That unified the nationalist vote share allowing Sinn Fein to gain 47.1% of the vote share compared to the DUP's 43.1% .

Heading towards a Border Poll?

The honest answer is 'not yet'. We'll have to wait and see how Northern Irish politics continue to develop.

The DUP has blamed its losses on the fact that the devolved Irish assembly is still not back up and running to represent the people of Northern Ireland. It has been closed since January 2017, when the two largest parties, the DUP and Sinn Fein split from their power-sharing agreement over the DUP's botched handling of a renewable energy tariff that allowed private businesses to make millions in profit by accessing the subsidy which was actually far greater than the cost of using renewable energy to power their businesses. It is was then alleged that the DUP had prevented the fixing of this scheme when it was brought to their attention, and further allegations of corruption with the DUP at the center have emerged . Without Sinn Fein, Stormont (the devolved assembly) cannot be made operational again, leading to stagnation in policy, investment and services as major decisions can only be carried out by the assembly . However, arguments have since also moved to encompass traditional areas of conflict, such as the role of the Irish language in public life .

The DUP thus are claiming their poor results was a backlash against them for this disagreement, they are supported by the fact that Sinn Fein also lost vote share overall, despite gaining seats . Which might indicate public anger at them too.

They also argue that they lose seats due to the Unionist parties competing with each other , which splintered their own vote share, meanwhile the Irish nationalist parties cooperated in an 'anti-Brexit' pact in most seats.

However, the simple fact remains that for the first time ever the Nationalist and Republican leaning parties (Sinn Fein and the SDLP) have far more seats at Westminster than the Unionists do, with the former on 9 and the latter on 8 . A huge change to the political landscape. The big question of course is if these gains are permanent and continue.

The changing demographics of Northern Ireland are said to overtime by default favor a united Ireland as the 2011 census showed Catholic communities far outgrowing their Protestant compatriots, the link being that those who identify as 'Irish' and are nationalist or Republican are predominantly Catholic, while Unionists affiliate themselves with Protestantism . So as time goes on, we'll potentially see the vote share going towards Republican parties continue to rise at the expense of unionist parties.

However, this election we saw gains made by a third faction- the 'moderates' in the form of the Alliance Party, who gained 1 seat, previously held by a Unionist independent . The Alliance Party is a cross-community political group, of Catholics, Protestants and Unionists and Republicans. Out of all the parties in Northern Ireland their vote-share increased the most as 8.8%, the second fastest rise in vote share was from the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and Irish Nationalist party who gained 3.1% increase to its vote share. All other parties were below 1.4% and many actually lost vote share. This paints an interesting picture, that overall Nationalist parties have indeed increased their vote share, though there is a new dynamic political force potentially waiting to be unleashed overtime that provides a 'central' ground to the polarizing issue of Northern Ireland's participation in the Union. However, the nationalists are the ones who are both growing in vote share, who the demographics favour more and who already constitute the second and third largest parties in Northern Ireland. So while a Border Poll on if Northern Ireland should become part of the Republic of Ireland is still a fair ways off, the changing political landscape is sliding more towards that direction, than towards the Union. Brexit itself has not at all helped this case.

Defender of the Union?

To understand the man who the United Kingdom has been entrusted to is a difficult puzzle to say the least, despite the fact so much now weighs upon his personal actions, attitudes and convictions. There are two masks that Boris Johnson has worn, one is the follower of Margaret Thatcher, an economically liberal, decidedly right-wing Johnson, the kind who once gave a speech extolling the importance of inequality and how less intelligent people will naturally struggle to rise up from low incomes (as opposed to the argument that structural inequality and under-investment in certain regions is a larger factor).

In complete opposition to this is Johnson the populist, a 'One Nation' Conservative, whose manifesto commitments fly in the face of Thatcherism and liberal economics by promising a far greater degree of state intervention, including a comprehensive 'state-aid' system for British businesses to give them a competitive edge , a policy that would turn an economic liberal cold, as indeed it has. This is a Boris Johnson who favours pragmatism over ideology and will s hift along with public opinion, which also has drifted to the left economically , thus the Conservative manifesto did too. Indeed, Boris Johnson was able to become London's Mayor, a city that traditionally has leaned to the left by adapting to what left-leaning voters wanted .

The important caveat to this is that Boris Johnson is perhaps a pragmatist when it comes to life generally, not merely when winning over voters. He will do whatever is needed to achieve and keep power, and also ensure a positive legacy, and he also very much desires people to like him . With thus no ideological convictions he is able to speak to different audiences and reach them with policies that will get their support. The question of course is that these are not all always mutually deliverable, and again this is where the political pragmatism comes in as Johnson will do what is likely to best secure his government, For instance he in the end backed down from refusing to request an extension from the EU , something designed to appeal to hard-brexit factions in his party and has back-tracked on the liberal commitments of the Conservative party that he supported by delaying tax cuts to large corporations to he may instead fuel his spending plans.

In keeping with this political pragmatism the Conservative manifesto was not for the rich or the poor, but to tackle inequalities as it's co-writer has stated . This meant a shift to the left economically to state intervention. So it does not look like the 'child of Thatcher' will be the primary Boris Johnson, however w e may see it in coming tax-cuts to the working classes . An interesting difference is that Thatcher's economic context was one of high interest rates, hitting roughly around 4% in the 1980s (In a PDF format, search the link for a document entitled 'Government borrowing, debt and debt interest: historical statistics and forecasts'), while Boris Johnson enjoys historically low interest rates of around 0.5% - so interventionism is not incompatible, especially as Thatcher actually heavily centralized power within the state , just as Johnson's new interventionism will see the state take a more active role. It is important to note though, interest rates fall, but also can rise, and fairly rapidly at that.

It is thus difficult to see long-term what Johnson will do beyond get Brexit done (though how remains to be seen) and secure the former Labour voters by being more economically interventionist, as he will go the way the political wins are blowing- this is the man who on the eve of the Brexit Referendum had written two articles, one supporting the EU and one supporting Leave . He is no real ideological 'Brexiter'.

In this latter, bearing in mind Johnson is more a pragmatist than ideologue and some clues do emerge- a more comprehensive EU trade deal, which requites closer alignment than the ERG have wished may come to fruition as this is the easiest way to keep the North. Most deals will have a far more disruptive impact upon the North of England , and the closer aligned to the EU the better. Johnson cannot afford to do a very close alignment due to the haunting specter of the Brexit party, but a straight to WTO terms is now more unlikely that before. Ivan Rogers disagrees and argues Johnson will attempt a 'hard' Brexit. But this would be Johnson becoming a Brexit ideologue that he just never has been, pragmatically a 'harder' the deal, the greater the potential for economic disruption that will afflict the North worse, and the more money Johnson's Government will have to throw at the North to mitigate the effects if they want to keep these voters for 2024, not to mention it being the biggest risk to the Union, something Johnson at least pays lip-service to.

Though there is space for a harder Brexit just because of this, if the Government doubles down on its state interventionist manifesto (already will rescue businesses effected by Brexit) and is prepared to bend its previous fiscal rules further, then throwing money at the problem could well be seen as a fair salve for what might be seen as the greater global opportunities of a 'harder' Brexit.

However, again pragmatically this harder Brexit will create a secondary problem- the stability of the Union. A more comprehensive trade deal and closer alignment would be the perfect tool to perhaps take the wind out of the SNP's sails and show Scottish voters that Brexit will not be as bad as feared, with less disruption and less tangible change in the short-term.

Conservative voters would rather see the Conservative party destroyed than Brexit to not happen

This for a Johnson ,who has made up an entirely new title for himself- 'Minister for the Union' , shows that this pragmatically should be a key consideration. However, getting Brexit done in a fashion that would please Brexit voters and deal with the specter of the the Brexit party for good might be deemed more important considerations. Conservative members already see Brexit as being more important than the UK's economic concerns, and indeed would gladly see the Conservative party destroyed to get Brexit done - a clear note of the damage a resurgent Brexit party could do. With these calculations, its no wonder the Johnson threw the DUP under the bus and has placed a border down the Irish sea. In stark contract to the DUP themselves who would cancel Brexit if it meant that the Union was threatened by it . Johnson in this area has clearly picked his priority.

So the question is what does Johnson thus risk? A softer brexit and thus Farage rallying the troops and splitting or potentially destroying the Conservative party against a Labour party no longer headed by a divisive leader? Or does he protect the union to the best of his ability as his rhetoric at least implies he wishes to? This is a decision we'll have to wait for, but a good idea of what is to come may be given at the Queen's speech.

What i will directly comment on is the furor around Johnson looking to place leaving the EU in 2020 into law , while this might give an indication that he has chosen Brexit over the Union, and further is planning to throw money at the north to retain them, rather than work out a more comprehensive deal with the EU, it also is exactly the same tactics he'd used with the EU previously to get a 'new' Withdrawal agreement (or in reality- changes to the one May had made), and also to get MP's to pass it in Parliament, which they then did . It is thus, just as much posturing for the coming negotiations , based on the idea that negotiations take as long as the time given to complete, as it is perhaps the indication of where we will end up. It also is to highlight to his domestic audience both northern leave voters and the Conservative core, who both voted leave, and the latter who would sacrifice the Conservative to 'leave', that he will be doing just that.

It is worth noting though that a less closely aligned deal with the EU will concentrate on goods, in a limited extent, but will have little to no facilitation of services. A major issue for the British economy which is 80% constituted of services, and its reliance on London as a financial center, particularly as London essentially subsidizes the rest of England . Indeed its been said by the BBC's reality Check that Johnson's commitment to a timetable of no extensions and leaving by 2020 is essentially simply the government making sure it will do what its already said it will do, as it has a majority and thus the opposition is unable to interfere as they did with a minority government. Moreover it is likely that any deal agree under this break-neck time-frame would be Johnson signing up to a rather close alignment, and the deal only covering goods, not services . Essentially all the bits about 'soft' Brexit that the ERG dislike, but with none of the comprehensiveness in an agreement that a 'soft' brexit would actually entail. It's the worst of both worlds.

Likewise as with the reported dropping of a commitment to protecting workers rights post-Brexit , it is important to note that currently existing EU working rights and protections are being adopted into UK law , though of course they can be changed, adapted and amended by ministers using the so-called 'Henry VIII' powers , as well as the fact the Conservatives have an overall majority. So essentially in the short, not much will change (though its possible certain elements will be modified), but it's very easy to deviate after that (trade deal permitting).

It is likely indeed in the long-term a Conservative government may attempt to water-down British working rights and protections in the name of gaining a competitive edge in a post-Brexit context. However, the immediate dropping of a commitment Johnson made when first bringing forward his withdrawal agreement to Parliament is perhaps more in keeping with the fact that the Conservative Government does not wish to give any sort of sign that it may commit to any 'further' EU working rights and protections which may be coming in, in 2020 and later as the EU is set to craft a new 2020 strategy , which arguably a commitment to keep to EU standards would imply. Likewise there is political capital be gained from as the government presenting its own separate workers rights bill, announced during the Queens speech on Thursday, something the Government has committed to doing . Making it a separate piece of legislation will allow the Conservatives to show clearly to their new northern voters that their rights and protections in the workplace are not being watered down as many fear.

It would be incredibly damaging to Conservative prospects in 2024 if they hope to retain their new voters, to be seen to immediately water down workers rights and protections, In the longer-term of course anything may happen as Britain is able to deviate more fully (and indeed may have to considering the weakness of its negotiating position vis-a-vis other states, its not even clear yet if Britain's economic malaise has been due to simply Brexit, or something deeper ).

Conservative majority in 2024 or Brexit, or Union? Can you have your cake and eat it?

The essential summary of the waters for Johnson to navigate is that he needs to convince these former labour voters that the Conservatives are the party for them if he is to win in 2024, this pulls him towards protecting workers rights, and a softer Brexit.

At the same time, the Conservative party faithful want to see Brexit done, whatever the cost, economic or even at the expense of their own Party. This places Farage as a threat once more and will mean that Johnson has to make a success of Brexit. To this end, working rights to keep on board new northern voters will be enshrined in a flashy new separate bill...but one that can indeed easily be amended or changed later down the line, and that also does not bind the UK to the EU's rolling out of improved workers rights and protections post-2020. Likewise Johnson has also essentially sacrificed the DUP and damaged (though not delivered a killer blow) to Northern Ireland Unionists, as he puts a border down the Irish sea.

To keep the Union intact though, and the best way of convincing Scottish voters to back the Union, is to show that Brexit's economic disruption is either not too bad, or at least is less than an independent Scotland would face. This means again, working rights are protected as the Government are promising, and would argue for a quick and beneficial FTA with the EU that will lessen disruption. The balance here of course is that is cannot be too closely aligned, less he alienate the 'core' Conservative base.

How Johnson balances (or fails to balance) these three competing elements will shape the UK for years to come, the Union is not yet over, but a referendum on its importance is essentially assured in Scotland and later in Northern Ireland. However, the future of the Conservative party both depends paradoxically on convincing northern voters that they were right to trust the Tories, while also convincing its core voters that its done enough on Brexit for them to not rip the party apart. Difficult times ahead.

The Liberal Democrats dreams are dashed

The Liberal Democrats went into this election with a huge degree of optimism. From claiming that their leader Jo Swinson could become Prime Minister (A huge call for the fourth largest party), a claim made early on but then dropped by the second weak of the campaign, to hoping to potentially achieve almost 200 seats , or at least 40 in the worst case scenario, they had expectations that the outcome absolutely shattered.

Instead of these admirable, if highly optimistic goals being achieved, Jo Swinson lost her seat to the SNP , and the Liberals actually lost seats, only holding onto 11 , 4 of which are in Scotland, which is quite a dangerous place to rely on a significant number of your seats to be from in the next few years given the certainty of a second referendum. They did far worse than they had in 2017, when Tim Farron had actually won them 4 seats , despite that campaign also being disappointing.

For a party that took a firm Revoke and Remain position, the direct opposite of the Conservatives 'Get Brexit done' their should surely have been some votes in this? Instead we ended up with a Conservative majority able to 'Get Brexit done' in any way Johnson wishes, and the opposition now completely powerless to intervene. What went wrong?

Firstly the big moment was the Brexit Party unilaterally standing down in the 317 existing Conservative seats. With no split right-wing vote, the number of seats the Liberal Democrats realistically had a chance of winning fell .

This was then compounded by Liberal Democrats and Labour splitting each others vote share in seats where one or the other could clearly have one. The most painful being in places like Kensington , the site of the Grenfell incident, where the Liberal Democrats had no chance of actually winning, they scoring a mere 9,312 votes, while the Conservatives received 16,768 allowing them to take the seat from Labour who gained 16,618 and so lost by a tiny 150 votes, simply because the Liberal Democrats decided to stand as well. For a party that made its platform about stopping Brexit, to stand in Labour seats there were held by a knife-edge (Labour had only taken the seat by 20 votes in 2017) was never going to go well, it would do nothing but gift the Conservatives the seat.

An equally painful contest was over Ian Duncan Smith's seat of Chingford and Woodford Green . Here Labour had a high chance of toppling Ian Duncan Smith, so much so that other parties like the Green's stood aside to give Labour a clear shot and indeed they only fell short by 1,262 votes with Labour receiving 22,219 votes and the Conservatives 23,481, meanwhile the Liberal Democrats gained a mere 2,744 votes- a very distant third, but enough to have prevented Labour from taking the seat potentially.

However it was not solely the Liberal Democrats fault. In constituencies like Dominic Raab's of Esher and Walton , there was a high chance he could have lost the seat. The Liberal Democrats received 45% of the vote share to Raab's 49.4%, Labour only received 4.5%. This meant that Raab remained in place with a hugely reduced majority of simply 2,743 votes. If Labour had stood down it is highly possible the Lib-dems could have seized the seat.

A similar though more complex story played out in Eastbourne , the Liberal-democrats lost the constituency to the Conservatives by 4,331 votes. Labour gained only 3,848 votes, While there votes added to the Lib-dems would not be enough to win, not competing in that constituency in the first place may have seen a better result.

There are a fair few results like this around the country where both Labour and the Liberal Democrats have blocked one another from retaining or taking a seat, and the salient point is that as soon as Farage had unilaterally stood down in 317 constituencies, the leaderships of both parties should have thought long and hard about quietly forging localized alliances. Indeed the Liberal Democrat candidate for Canterbury on their decided to stand down in favour of Labour so as to not split the progressive vote . But the Lib-dems head office immediately placed another candidate there regardless. In the actual election the Lib-dems only received 5.7% of the vote share , hugely behind Labour who retained the seat on their steam with 48.3% to the Conservatives 45.2%.

This is a seat that the Liberal Democrats had no real strategic reason for standing in, it was a waste of campaign resources and at best all that could do was potentially allow the Conservatives to gain the seat back, by splitting Labour's vote. Bearing in mind in 2017 Labour won it from Conservatives by a mere 187 votes, the Liberal Democrats were nowhere near being a viable contender having received only 8% of the vote share in 2017. The seat had also voted to Leave by 51% in 2016 . It could not be clearer that this would be a tight, two-horse race between Labour and the Conservatives, and that all a Liberal Democrat presence would do is increase the chance of the Conservatives taking the seat.

The Liberal Democrats then made a further strategic error. Going back to our Eastbourne example, the result here highlights the second big issue for the Liberal Democrats this election- it was highly likely here even if Labour stood down that the Conservatives would still win, because the Conservatives on their own had enough , with a reserve of Brexit party votes that may have gone towards the Tories if Labour had decided to stand down as part of a local pact.

The issue causing this in former Liberal Democrat seats was their shift in Brexit policy. From being the party of the second referendum (and if they'd stuck to this there is so argument that an electoral pact with Labour could have been forged on a case by case basis in some areas), they overreached and argued to simply revoke article 50. A fact at the time that Liberal Democrat higher ups had feared they'd made a mistake by switching to a more hard-line anti-Brexit position and it proved to be true. It meant that in places like Eastbourne where 57% had voted to leave in 2016, they were far less likely to hold the seat as even those leave voters who might want or put up with a second referendum were driven into the arms of the Conservatives. This is a constituency that despite its leave voting credentials the Liberal Democrats had held in 2017, and actually had increased their vote share up by 8.7% .

The Liberal Democrat strategy was thus in poor shape, they overreached, while standing in seats they had no real chance of winning, gifting the Conservatives MPs they otherwise would not have. Now of course in fairness there is the argument to be made that the Liberal Democrats were attempting to appeal to Conservative remainers, and so no pact with Jeremy Corbyn's Labour party would go down well, but that would not have prevented the party standing down candidates quietly in areas like Kensignton where they were actively facilitating the Conservatives to take it. The issue of course here is also one Vince Cable has recognized, that while the Liberal Democrats made the mistake of becoming 'zealous' europhiles that alienated them from most , the Conservative remainers would naturally not be drawn to voting for the fourth largest party, if it was seen as simply being a conduit that would let a personally unpopular Corbyn in. That the Liberal Democrats did not foresee this at the time perhaps highlights at best a major gap in their strategy, or at worst an overestimation of what they are capable of achieving as Britain's fourth largest party. That they potentially hoped being a party of extreme remain would be a 'fast track' to rebuilding their party to the heights Clegg achieved before Labour wrested (and has subsequently held) the student vote from them in 2015 was an error that perhaps (as we see in the fears of Liberal Democrat MP's during the campaign) did not take hindsight to become clear.

In terms of leaders, for all of Corbyn's responsibility for Labours defeat - as highlighted in my part 1, Labour's policies were popular (as in the 2017 manifesto, not neccessarily the endless bounty promised in 2019), but his leadership was not, and more so than Brexit is what caused Labour's vote share to collapse, By comparison Liberal Democratic policies were perceived as underwhelming , with voters not being able to remember what was on offer beyond 'Stop Brexit' (A damning indictment when the Conservatives actively tired to make their manifesto forgettable beyond 'Get Brexit Done'). While Jo Swinson suffered somewhat of the same fate as Corbyn in terms of leadership. During the election polling found that the more voters were exposed to Jo Swinson (a relative unknown) the less and less they actually liked her . This was not helped by Swinson's mistakes, like being perceived as too trigger happy with nuclear missiles, or again being mocked for the claim she was a serious third contender for Prime Minister , an ambition that was so unrealistic that even the Lib-Dems dropped it later in the campaign. She was certainly the wrong leader to run a presidential-style campaign around. A campaign that much like the Conservatives online shenanigans (See my article of FullfactUK) attracted controversy, as the Liberal-democrats to try and eat into Labour's vote share presented a series of dodgy polls and quotes on their leaflets that essentially misinterpreted their evidence to present the Liberal Democrats as being the constituencies best hope of ousting the Conservatives, even when this was not true.

There will be a lot of soul-searching for the Lib-dems to do given their campaign went so badly wrong. The election has given Labour a historic kicking that they may or may not recover from in 2024, but for the Lib-dems this election has set back the very poor recovery they had in 2017, from their grand fall in 2015. A few more elections like this may indeed see them, as some commentators like Simon Jenkins are demanding, consigned to the 'dustbin' of history , for doing no more than facilitating a larger Conservative win. The big questions in the near-future must be, how do the Liberal Democrats carve out a niche for themselves? The center of politics has shifted economically left ( as seen by the popularity of Corbyn's core policies , and the Conservatives moving to meet them), but 'progressiveism' is certainly divided at a time when if it is to continue being a successful political position it needs to unify, some of this might indeed be as Simon Jenkin's suggests, not that the Liberal Democrats disband themselves and become the moderates in Labour, but the Liberal Democrats shift to left economically so that they can work with Labour, but act as a needed moderating force, both on elements where Labour's policies go too far, but also on ensuring that Labour is an open progressive force, not where some factions promote intolerance to different rival political views or likewise the Lib-dems act in the same way for the Conservatives, acting in tandem to mediate some of their factions intolerance.

The future of the Liberal Democrats, at least for now, is not as a King-Maker, that time passed in 2015, but in acting as the minor party it is, at least while it finds its footing, and waging asymmetrical political warfare, much as UKIP and the Brexit party did to the Conservatives, successfully able to change their policies without holding any seats, well the Liberal Democrats for now at least have 11. They should be able to be of equal influence if not more, it would require them though to recognizing the political reality, however temporary, that they are not a party of Government. This doesn't mean though they cannot pragmatically sculpt the UK's political divides, so instead of standing in constituencies (like Kensignton, or Chingford and Woodford Green) that they cannot win, scale-back to where you can, do not seek to disrupt the vote share of the Conservatives or Labour when in the views of the Lib-dems at the time the 'worst' option may then win due to the split created, but use the threat of Lib-dem splitting votes to adjust the policies of the big-two, to hold them back from their extremes and so achieve the Liberal-Democrat goals in part or eventually in full.

Jo Swinson's parting speech claimed;

'I still believe we, as a country, can be warm and generous, inclusive and open and that by working together with our nearest neighbours we can achieve so much more'

These are aims that could and still can be achieved by the Lib-dems adapting the hand they've been dealt since 2015 and exerting pressure to shift the political narrative of the big two towards this. But they must, and i emphasize this again, must give up on the idea so ridiculed at the beginning of the election that the Liberal-Democrats could ever be again a party of Government, or even default king-makers. That time is over in this current political context.

Who knows yet though in the longer term, if Brexit becomes a complete disaster instead of the opportunities promised, there may be space for the Liberal Democrats to wait and see and give the Conservatives a run for their money, the Liberal Democrats greatest strength is they do have the ability, when its expectations are managed sensibly, to reach across the voter divide and hoover up the key voters each side needs to win a majority, while this will likely not result in the Cleggmania that saw them as king-makers, it highlights the UK wide-reach they have, that the third largest party, the SNP, lack.

An interesting note though- if Britain adopted Proportional Representation instead of First Past the Post, the Liberal Democrats would currently have 70 seats , and no party would have the majority needed to form a government. From this we can see it's not that the center-ground of British politics is politically dead, but Britain's FPTP system means there is no place for a centrist political party to succeed.

The legacy of 2019 on British politics

This election was a race to the bottom, there was no doubt. Corbyn, Johnson and Swinson (By the end of the election campaign certainly) were all unpopular candidates. The is epitomized in what actually happened to the overall vote share this election. It was not that Johnson caused a Thatcher or Blair-esque landslide for his historic gains in Labour's heartland, but actually that he only got an extra 270,000 votes or 1.2% from the Conservatives 2017 result . Essentially the Conservatives did not gain anymore supporters. Meanwhile Labour's vote share dropped by 8% compared to 2017 , this means that the Conservatives could essentially win new seats by merely keeping their same vote share due to FPTP constituencies as the Brexit Party and Liberal Democrats ate into their vote share. Essentially the winner of this election was due to the other side being more unpopular, or more divided (for those using a remain-leave lens, interestingly and a testament to how Brexit will continue to potentially dominate British politics in the near future, only 47% of voters backed 'Brexit' parties , the rest all voted for remain- now while this of course could be for a variety of other things, leavers feeling Labour or the Lib-dems had a better domestic policy or remainers preferring Conservative stewardship, there is clearly a 'Brexit factor' that will continue to be at play, we are not a united country yet and will not be for probably the next decade or more as i talked about in my Part 1).

In this context, there isn't really many pressing lessons we can take. For instance the Conservatives running a singular issue campaign with a stripped down Manifesto did not exactly 'work'. If Labour had kept the same core policies as 2017, not been silly about adding a ton of new ones that had not been discussed prior to this election, and whose leadership was different , then we might now be talking about a Conservative minority or Labour majority Government. It cannot be stressed enough that Labour's mistake lies with the leadership. With this in mind, unless Labour makes the same mistakes again, it's unlikely the Conservatives will be able to 'win' on a stagnant vote share and the same leader.

It all essentially depends now on what Labour does in 2024, if they keep the core policies, change the leadership and keep discipline in their party and manifesto it is fairly certain they'll retake their heartlands in 2024. For the Conservatives though, these results while providing them with a historic majority, may also provide them with a fleeting worry for 2024. It's clear that to get a majority they will need to retain their new northern gains, but Johnson as mentioned earlier has three competing spheres, new norther Conservative voters, traditional Conservative voters and the Union, all of which could prove his downfall next election. It also alludes to the fact that the Conservatives may need to shore up the south, as if their voters have only increased by 270,000 and the north is unstable territory, they could be consigned to minority government or worse fairly easily without sweeping changes.

Page 48

This is an election where Boris Johnson has a majority based on a rather vague manifesto. Beyond the commitment to 'Get Brexit done' and to fulfil his promises for a more interventionist and economically left-wing Government. Not much else is all that clear. He thus has a huge degree of wiggle room over the next five years to do as he pleases while not being bound to many specific manifesto commitments.

However, it is unlikely that Johnson will keep to a 'safe' legislative agenda, sweeping changes are predicted. Not merely with Brexit, but page 48 of the Conservative Manifesto stated;

'After Brexit we also need to look at the broader aspects of our constitution: the relationship between the government, parliament and the courts'

A simple and streamlined statement in keeping with the rest of their manifesto, but one with huge implications going forward. This promises the potential for a major overhaul of Britain's political constitution. There is not enough really to speculate on what this may be, however some have noted this might be an attempted to strengthen the Government at the expense of the courts and Parliament generally. The last parliament saw the British political constitution stretched and arguably broken as both the Conservative's minority Government and the opposition employed various tactics, from Johnson proroguing parliament unlawfully and seeking to avoid parliament scrutiny as far as possible to Cabinet Ministers ignoring calls from Parliament to answer emergency questions, boycotting opposition day votes they were going to lose, and weighting committees despite their lack of majority to the opposition seizing the order papers and thus creating a 'shadow government'. Though if this is unconstitutional or not is debated , but it was unprecedented, and having a speaker who was controversial for being too interventionis t. Both sides then have their hands dirty in what has been a vicious battle across parliament.

In this context, there is a case that with many conventions broken and the traditional constitution in tatters the UK desperately requires constitutional reform. In this context the manifesto commitment seems very proper, much in line with Tony Blair's half-finished reforms to the UK's legal and political constitution , which proved to be controversial too.

The big question-mark and fear though is that the Government doing the reforming are also the same ones who were responsible for it in part becoming so broken in the first place, and so may simply seek to solidify the governments position from anything like that happening again. Indeed back in 2017 under Theresa May the Government had already made moves so that post-brexit British citizens would be unable to take legal action against the British Government to defend their rights . This does not bode well then.

However, clarity of the executive, legislature and courts role is something that the British constitution does need, perhaps even in a written constitution. What we do see so far is Johnson's Government toying with the idea of an elected House of Lords , an idea pushed for by Dominic Cummings his chief strategist and one that is designed to give more representation to the UK's constituent nations to try and help tackle the rise in support for Irish nationalist parties and Scotland's SNP.

It also is important to note, that for those who fear Johnson will attempt to strengthen the executive at the expense of parliament or the courts, this would be supremely short-sighted. The Conservatives will not be in power forever, indeed 2024 is likely to be a fraught election with the north being the deciding ground and a high chance that five years will not be enough for the Conservatives to hold onto these constituencies, against a resurgent Labour, while appeasing their traditional Brexit-voters and keeping the UK together. This is why i'm not too concerned yet by the potentially ominious sounding reforms to the political constitution, as no party yet is in a comfortable position to soundly enhance themselves in Government, to not have it bite them on the proverbial at the next election. Indeed, Tony Blair came close to ending the Conservatives as an electoral force , but still the electoral cycle continued.

When it comes to constitutional reforms, the governing party will always eventually reap what they sow and thus i'd expect the Conservatives to either keep it to a minimum or place their trust in further democratization (such as an elected second chamber) rather than artificial ways to increase their power, which under Britain's Westminster Constitution is already massive once a government has a majority. There already is very little the opposition can do to oppose Government plans beyond scrutinize them publicly in preparation for 2024.

One aspect to bear in mind going forward is that the findings of the Electoral Boundaries commission, submitted in 2018 will more than likely be enacted prior to the 2024 election . This cuts the numbers of MPs from 650 down to 600, at the time of its conception it was criticized for the new boundaries potentially favoring the Conservative party, for instance in 2017 with the proposed boundary changes, Theresa May would actually have won a majority of 14 . It is unknown yet given the voter church and the Conservatives need for the north, if Johnson might not rethink on its implementation, particularly as currently it would see his majority effected the most, but do not expect changes (if they come) until the last possible minute prior to 2024.

A Changing Climate

Some news that all sides can take heart from, for the first time the environment and climate change was considered by British voters to be more important than the economy as an election issue , and in other polling just as important as the economy and crime . This places climate change as the third big issue in the 'Brexit Election' behind Brexit and the NHS. The climate indeed featured heavily in all manifestos, with the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats all engaged in a 'tree planting' war . Luckily then for Britain, the argument on climate change is not stuck on 'if' it is happening, but 'how fast' can we respond with all parties committing to 'net zero' carbon emissions at the latest by 2050 (for the Conservatives which they had already enshrined in law), while Labour and the Liberal democrats committed to early dates . I would expect this issue to feature more prominently now that potentially Brexit, while not anywhere near to being 'done' by 2024, will not have as large a pride of place to the election (unless something really messes up)

Towards 2024

So with the Conservatives juggling their mutually opposing three spheres, protection of the Union, the necessity of northern voters for a Conservative majority in 2024, and the necessity to deliver a 'proper' Brexit, Johnson's next five years are going to be fraught with peril despite his majority. Indeed even with this majority it is likely that new conflicts will flare up as Conservative MP's rally to one of these three spheres, where success in one risks antagonizing the other two.

I'll leave you with a snapshot of this internal wrangling from Professor Rob Ford :

'The government will face a new pressure to spend and invest from the party’s new MPs, who will want to show that “getting Brexit done” delivers some tangible results for constituents in their marginal seats. But big spending runs very much against the ideological grain for the Conservative party, and the challenges such seats face after decades of stagnation and neglect cannot realistically be addressed in a single term of government. Voters who discover that Brexit brings little positive change to their lives may soon turn against a party they have long disliked and still distrust.’

Add to this the Conservative core who want a 'real' Brexit more than they care about the Conservative parties continued existence and a Union that while not yet terminal, is certainly going to face some severe questioning over the coming few years and far from heading into the dull certainty a majority usually gives, we're looking at fraught and exciting times in politics with dramatic changes in store for the UK and its union.

The 2019 Post-Mortem: The 'Red Wall' crumbling- Your general guide to the consequences of the General Election (Part 1)

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Sun, 28 Jun 2020 22:03:13 GMT

What happened, why it happened and what might we expect to see going forward? (Originally published on my LinkedIn 14 December 2019)

This is part 1 of my 2 part series (Yep, its detailed ladies and gents!) Charting the outcome of Britain's 2019 General Election- what happened, its results and the longer term consequences, opportunities and risks. This first part concentrates on the 'Big two' and their mutual 'frenemy' the Brexit Party. Part 2 concentrates on the rise of the Celts and the dashing of Lib-Dem dreams as well as the macro effects this election will have on our politics. Enjoy!

So, after staying up all night on the 12th, into the small wee hours watching the 2019 General Election unfold, I explain below (in layman's terms) the details of what happened, why it happened and what we may expect to see in what is still a highly turbulent Britain. My publicly available Facebook real time commentary is also available.

Refer to the contents page (CTRL + F acesses sections of interest)

Contents:

The run down
The Conservatives
They've gone left!?... economically
Brexit means...?
Going soft... on Brexit?
Boris's Babies
The Brexit Party
A true 'Frenemy'
A PR Snapshot
The Labour position
Loved the policies, but oh. Jeremy Corbyn?
The Un-Civil War
Cue outro and the tantalizing promise of a Part 2

I'm dividing this analysis into two parts.

PART 1 = the big two parties and their common frenemy, the Brexit party, in detail analyzing what happened, the impact and what will happen now.

PART 2 = the smaller parties and the 'rise of the gaels' as well as the collapse of the Lib-Dem dream and the macro effects of this election on British politics.

Without further ado, lets begin!

The run-down:

-Labour's northern 'Red Wall' was breached by the Conservatives in an historic victory

-The Conservatives have shifted economically to the left, but then so has the country (more generally)

-This Conservative shift is because Labours policy offering appears still popular among the electorate, but the countries dislike of Corbyn's leadership as well as Labour's policy on Brexit sealed Labours fate and far outweighed the popularity of their individual policies (Note the fact that compared to 2017 Labour were offering far more comparatively radical policies did contribute to their defeat- while the both Labour and Conservative voters want more state intervention and public services, free broadband was not high on the agenda, the issue for Labour then was also that they offered too much in a short burst).

-The Scottish National Party dominated Scotland

-There are now for the first time ever more nationalist seats in Northern Ireland (10) than there are Unionist (8)

-This was an election to see which leader was least unpopular, not who was better.

-While in Parliament at least this will end the Constitutional quarrel over Brexit, as both remain-leaning opposition groups have been culled, and the Conservative majority is large enough for Boris Johnson to comfortably sideline the previously influential 'hard-brexit' groups like the European Research Group, a new Constitutional battle opens up with the SNP having swept all before them in Scotland, which gives them a mandate they will argue, for a second Independence referendum.

It was not an election of 'triumph' for anybody though and before I get shouted at for being blind to the historic Conservative gains in the North (and they are historic, make no mistake), let me explain. The Conservative vote share in 2017 was 42.4%, there vote share in 2019 is now 43.6%. This is not a huge victorious swing to the Conservatives, its a change of 1.2%. What really happened was that Labour's vote share collapsed, in 2017 it was riding at 40%, in 2019 its now 32.2%. Both parties in 2017 were riding on their 'highest vote share' in recent decades, so Labour essentially got toppled off its top spot, and this is clearly seen as parties like the Liberal Democrats increased their vote share from 7.4 in 2017 to 11.6% this time around.

If we add to this picture the fact that nearly 50% of voters have a negative opinion of Boris Johnson , and equally that only 49% of voters feel that Boris Johnson would be a good Prime Minister and that for those who voted Conservative, unlike for other parties there was no expectation of of trusting their motives and policy once in office , and a picture emerges that this is not a positive endorsement, to paraphrase another analysis, but Boris Johnson and the Conservatives have become not popular, but 'less unpopular' . Labour on the other hand failed to improve their situation, Corbyn for instance had an approval rating of only 31% , and as we see in the vote share, got eaten into by a growing Lib-dems, SNP and indeed importantly up north saw the Conservatives make inroads into their heartlands.

This Conservative growth in the North came somewhat at the expense of their position in the South of the country (hence why their vote share stayed pretty much the same as 2017- its geographically shifted). An epitome of this is there loss of the affluent London suburb of Putney to Labour, but more typical is that in the seats in the South's urban areas that they did hold or take, their vote share dropped- for instance Kensington become a Conservative win despite a drop of -4.3% in their vote share from 2017 , simply because the Liberal Democrats split the Labour vote, due to Brexit and Corbyn's unpopularity. So this is not a clear picture of sweeping the nation up, the story instead is one of geographical voting shifts, that are potentially temporary. Something the Conservatives themselves acknowledged both on the night and also in Boris Johnson's own victory speech when he said;

"You may have only lent us your vote, you may not see yourself as a natural Tory...your hand may may have quivered over the ballot paper before you put your cross in the Conservative box, and you may think you will return to Labour next time around"

This is a recognition both of the work now needed to be done to 'bank' (as one former Conservative Cabinet minister said on the night) these new Northern seats over the next five years, lest the Conservatives lose their majority by 'default', once the pressing issue of Brexit (The core reason that so many of the former Labour seats who voted leave switched to the Conservatives) is perceived to have made progress, and Labour's leadership has changed.

For Labour of course there is a chance to regain these seats, which in many cases were won by slight changes to their vote share and compounded by a rather low turn-out. This can be epitomized by the constituency of the Vale of Clywd , where the Conservatives have 46% of the vote to Labours 42% and turnout was down 2.4% since 2017. Interestingly here as in other areas, the existence of the Brexit party may have allowed the Conservatives to win, by drawing away Labour voters (4%) who could not bring themselves to vote Conservatives. The Liberal Democrat increase in vote share of 2.2% also may play a role. This highlights again the key 'turning point' this election for the Conservative majority, not being Boris Johnson or the Conservatives new-found popularity, but division over Brexit (and antagonism to Labours position), and doubts about Jeremy Corbyn as leader.

The Conservatives:

Even if it is built on a shaky foundation, this does not detract from the scale of the Conservative win - their biggest in 40 years! They took seats that had not been Labour since 1935 (such as Sedgefield, Tony' Blairs former constituency and a seat historically deemed an ultra-safe Labour stronghold). The Conservatives have five years now to convince their new working class Northern voters that they are a better fit for them. Failure to do so will risk losing the means to get a majority in 2024. The Conservatives have already started this process. Johnson in his victory speech directly spoke to these 'new' and possibly temporary Conservative voters when he said;

"I, and we, will never take your support for granted. I will make it my mission to work night and day, to work flat-out to prove you right in voting for me this time, and to earn your support in the future"

They've gone left!?... economically

The 'meat' of this of course is unknown. The Conservative manifesto was purposefully light on detail, but what it does detail speaks to a shift away from the Conservatives economically liberal credentials ( Something that Conservative commentators themselves had previously predicted under Johnson ), Johnson has promised a 'Peoples Government' with new protectionist state-aid laws for British businesses , 'buy British' requirements for Government contracts and the cancellation of corporation tax cuts. This is for the Conservatives a huge move from their traditional economic platform. Johnson indeed in his speech above cited that leaving the EU will allow the British Government to intervene in the economy far more than it is currently allowed to do so under EU rules. The promise is clear, the Conservatives are going interventionist, using a 'big state' to aid ailing aspects of the British economy or give a competitive advantage to British-based companies, this is anathema to traditional Conservative economic values, Thatcher would be rolling in her grave.

On top of this he has also made promises to put an extra levy on foreign home buyers to attempt to arrest high house prices for British citizens and has promised massive spending, £100 billion for infrastructure investment and untold billions for public services. £4.2 billion alone for trains, buses and trams and the Conservatives are promising a government led national strategy for buses , this for them is a major scale-up in state intervention. Johnson's Conservatives essentially have fought, and are fighting Labour on its own economic turf.

This is no surprise really given that Boris Johnson's master strategist Dominic Cummings posted this on his personal blog where he hoped to :

'...change our economy for the better, making it more productive and fairer.'

Through using the state to boost productivity, 'science, technology and helping the regions' . Cumming's imprint on Johnson's Conservative vision is everywhere on the little the Conservatives have promised.

So, with all this in mind Boris Johnson's Conservatives truly have accelerated their shift from an economically and socially liberal party into an economically interventionist and culturally conservative one as the Economist has complained. While traditional Conservative voters may not like this, Labour's offering was to be even more state interventionist and promise even higher levels of spending . Thus they had no choice really but to stick with the Conservatives, and shut up. They will see tax-cuts in the future and a few token policies, but the attention of the Conservatives will be to prove to the British working class 'Up North' that they are the party for them. It's a familiar pitch of course, for those who remember Theresa May's commitments (in rhetoric at least, before Brexit consumed everything) to help the JAM's (Just About Managing) and working classes through 'One Nation' Conservative policies of intervention. This time the Conservatives have found the right tone and policy mix to make themselves tolerable to many Northern Labour voters, while also offering clarity on Brexit which has allowed the North to make the switch it did not fully do in 2017.

The other key point is that after the 2008 financial crash and decade of austerity, it appears that the British public generally have started to shun the Thatcherite reforms and neoliberal policies of the recent-past. 80% of people support minimum wage increases, 74% support the state capping private rents , 64% of people want rail nationalization, only 19% oppose it . These are policies that Corbyn directly offered, indeed taking away Corbyn and Brexit most of Labour's policy platform was very popular among voters . The Conservatives thus are doing what broad-church parties have always done, shifting with the voters, as a majority requires a party to win over a broad coalition of voters, not simply their core supporters.

What this does mean is that the 'Britannia Unchained' hopefuls, like Dominic Raab and the Conservative Free Enterprise Group, who were hoping for a return and revamping of Thatcherism that turned Britian into a low-tax, low-regulation, low working rights and welfare state have lost their influence and the ability to carry out this plan, for now at least. Johnson's big-state drive of protectionism, state intervention, state borrowing and state-led investment places them again on the periphery of the Conservative party.

Brexit means...?

So, the Conservatives overall appear to now be a party of economic intervention and social conservatism (A similar shift has happened in the USA to the Republican party). But what about the factor that dominated this election and provided the vehicle for the Tories to ride into Labour's heartlands, Brexit? ( A point supported by the fact that for all those who voted Conservative, the number one reason given was Brexit ).

Well, with a majority of 80, the largest since 1987 for the Conservatives, Boris Johnson can essentially do as he pleases. Brexit will now certainly be 'done'. While it is true that this election saw 52% of the public vote for 'Remain' parties, compared to 47.3% who voted for 'Brexit' parties , this is an overall vote share that is geographically only concentrated in a few predominantly urban areas such as London, the rest of these people will be diffused throughout the country. Britain's First Past the Post system means they will lack the numbers to really have any influence over how their constituency vote changes. Hence Boris has for the first time, the political clout to shape Brexit as he pleases. It is likely that the leaders of the European Union will be happy for the stability this provides to British politics , as now any agreement Johnson makes, will almost certainly have the backing of Parliament and can quickly pass through the house.

In the longer term, it means that Brexit is still a hugely polarizing topic for British people, this election has essentially done nothing to resolve these divides, indeed as I point out in my Brexit Unpacked Seminar (book via my PR), it is unlikely the division will be healed anytime soon - it may take more than a decade. During this time, British politics, as we've indeed seen at the latest election, will continue to be highly volatile, with the issue being divisive enough for their to potentially be vote share in it for parties in the near-future, particularly as Brexit is a long process that will take years to achieve and then decades for Britain to actually realign itself economically and on the world stage. Debates over trade deals, the nature of Britain, its future economic model are all still to be fought, and the hard-remain and hard-brexit groups are still there, both with their particular visions for Britain's future. Remember the Euroskeptics did not disappear after the 1975 referendum came back that Britain supported joining the then EEC, instead they waited in the wings biding their political time until the circumstances were right to affect change to the entire direction of British politics. There is no indication that Europhiles will be different.

Going soft... on Brexit?

This divide though can be papered over, both as we've seen currently by FPTP overriding the polarization, but also by a government that pursues a Brexit line, and wins a successive number of times until the divisions while not diminishing, are replaced by other concerns. The Conservatives are well on their way to doing this arguably with this win, a win in 2024 may see the matter negated somewhat. It is also helped by the fact that it is fairly likely Boris Johnson will, with his very large majority, simply now ignore the harder-brexiteers in his party , such as the ERG, who already were somewhat dubious of his Withdrawal Agreement, but backed it lest they lose Brexit altogether . Boris Johnson on the other hand is not a 'natural' hard-brexiter. Its well known that in the run-up to the 2016 referendum he wrote two articles, one in support of the EU and the other in support of Brexit . He is a pragmatist who will do what is necessary to keep his position and get his policies over the line.

We've already seen signs of the ERG's lessening influence over the Conservative party as Boris's manifesto shifts to the economic left, offering greater levels of state investment and intervention, which runs directly counter to the ERG's anti-statist platform . Add to this that to retain the Conservatives new working class voters, they'll need to make sure that Brexit, which in all scenarios Whitehall has said will affect the North and Midlands far harder than elsewhere must go smoothly with as minimal disruption to these new voters as possible. This means taking a softer Brexit approach, with a more comprehensive EU agreement, which means closer alignment and avoiding a WTO-terms exit ( With Britain's trading schedule still regardless being blocked by around 20 countries including the USA, China and New Zealand ).

Likewise in larger terms the sustainability of the Brexit project is reliant on its results being in the short-term not economically disastrous and in the longer term offering greater prosperity and opportunity for Britain. This also explains the Conservatives shift to the left economically, with the Government making a big deal out of the fact leaving the EU means they can now promise to bail out businesses effected by Brexit or economic downturns and give favorable trading conditions to British based companies (Again a position directly at odds with the ERG and right-wing of the Conservative party).

The country remains divided by Brexit and will continue to be so, in political terms the pathway is clear, and its likely with the Conservative majority being so large will mean Johnson is able to sideline the more 'hard-line' elements of remain and Brexit in Parliament, both in his party and out, and do a Brexit deal that is more pragmatic to his political circumstances, softer in nature and less disruptive.

Boris's Babies

No, not a new scandal, but the term being used to dub the new 109 Tory MP's coming to parliament. An interesting point to note, and one that adds evidence both to the point that the Conservatives are going economically left, but also that Brexit will be 'softer' (and certainly that the ERG and right-wing Tory economic groups are consigned again to the fringes of the party) is the fact that many of the new Conservatives are very different in age, outlook and class to the parties more traditional members.

There are social workers, teachers, doctors, those with Tattoo's (as the Sun drolly remarked) and above all some fairly young people. The new Conservative MP Sara Britcliffe who took the former Labour heartland seat of Hyndburn is only 24 years old, the youngest MP in parliament currently. These candidates were of course chosen by their local associations (with input from Conservative HQ) to both appeal to their northern voters, but also to directly 'detoxify' the image the Conservative party has built for itself since 2016, that of being pro-austerity, anti-teacher, anti-NHS and against the public sector. These new faces both support Boris Johnson's new 'big state' energy for the Conservative party, but will also be there to enforce it, it is in their interests that Johnson's platform comes to fruition, lest they lose their seats in 2024.

The fact many candidates are far younger, is also an attempt for the Conservatives to tackle a perennial problem since 2015- that being the party is consistently struggling to attract younger voters, despite Labour loss it dominated among the under-45 s, it lacks activists on the ground , particularly when compared to Labour and has a dwindling party membership , indeed the Liberal Democrats and SNP, two far smaller parties, almost have the same number of members. It is thus hoped that this 'new face' of the Conservative party may provide the bridge to start cutting through to both northern voters, and younger people.

With a Conservative party that is more left-leaning economically, that is state-interventionist, likely to be 'softer' on Brexit and is concentrating on 'winning' the captured Northern votes, we are in for an interesting five years and potentially a historic shift for the Conservatives (providing they do as they've said, it might be all merely rhetoric at the end of the day - if it is, we'll be talking about a major Conservative collapse come 2024). Note it isn't necessarily a new and 'radical' Conservative platform, it is a rejection of continuing Thatcherism, the death of British neoliberalism and a return to the 'One Nation' conservatism of the pre-Thatcher era, a term that is currently all the rage among Conservative MP's.

The Brexit Party

With this shift in the Conservative position then, is there room for Nigel Farage's potential 'Reform' party going forward? Certainly there are disgruntled traditional Conservative voters who are pro-small state feeling somewhat politically homeless in this new more populist British political context with all the major parties going along with the majorities desire for greater levels of state intervention in the economy to improve inequality and increase opportunity as well as to provide broader, better public services. Likewise Farage is already worried that Johnson is going towards a far softer Brexit (or Brexit in name only- BRINO) now that he can sideline the ERG . However, only a small section of the brexit voting public ( around 10-18% ) actually agree with Farage and want a 'harder' Brexit, though this is still a significant minority who could cause upset in the future.

A true 'Frenemy'

It is unlikely though that any future Farage party will do any better than his current Brexit party did in terms of winning seats. However, the Brexit party this election did have a rather significant impact on the vote share in the key battleground seats - they essentially split the vote, allowing Labour to hold onto seats such as Sunderland Central . Here Labour were down -13.4% in vote share, getting only 18,336 votes, meanwhile the Conservatives received 15,372 up 2% and the Brexit party received 5,047, 11.6% of the vote. It is highly likely that the Brexit Party prevented the Conservatives taking the seat, this is a story that repeats elsewhere too such as the Labour hold of Alyn and Deeside where Labour received 18,271, the Conservatives got 18,058 and the Brexit party gained 2,678 vote- more than enough to have seen Labour lose its now tiny majority of 213. The Brexit party here thus acted as a conduit for Labour leave voters who had an option other than the Tories to express their preference, allowing Labour to fend off the Conservatives. Another example of this is Hartlepool , where the Conservatives lost -5.3% of their vote taking only 11,869 votes, while Labour received 15,464 votes down -14.8%, with Brexit being such a clear priority for this area which voted leave in 70% leave , the fact that the Brexit party scored a huge 25.8% of the vote, taking 10,603 votes makes it clear that without their presence, the Conservatives could have taken the seat or certainly made it a new marginal.

On the flip-side in traditional Labour seats such as Delyn , the Brexit party split the Labour vote enough for the Conservatives to win by 'default'. Here Labour received 41.4% of the vote share (15,891 votes), if this is added to the Brexit parties 5.1% (1,971 votes) then even with some voting Tory instead, its likely Labour would have retained the seat as the Conservatives only scored 43.7% of the vote (16,756). This story plays out in other Conservative wins such as Bury North where the Conservatives won by a tiny 105 votes, the Brexit party here took 1,240 votes- more than enough to have seen Labour keep the seat if Farage's party had not stood here.

Farage's Brexit Party is a true frenemy for the Conservatives and Labour, both preventing them from taking more seats, but also allowing them into others by default through splitting the vote. This perception is added to in that Farge choosing to stand down his party in the Conservatives existing 317 seats more than likely prevented the Conservatives suffering losses in the South. For instance, in Winchester , who voted 41% to 59% remain in 2016 the Conservatives saw a drop in their vote of -3.7% fended off the Liberal Democrats by a mere 985 votes, if the Brexit Party had stood here the Conservatives would have lost the seat. A similar story plays out in Hastings and Rye where the Brexit party could have facilitated a Labour win if they had stood.

However, this is not to say that Farage was integral to the Conservative win, in traditional Labour seats like Bolsover even if we combine the entirety of the Labour vote with the Brexit party, they still fall-short of beating the Conservatives. The Conservatives were more than capable of breaking into Labour's heartlands without the Brexit party, its just likely it would not have been on the same scale with Johnson getting a far smaller majority.

A PR Snapshot

Farage claims he 'hurt' the Labour party . This is true. But he also put a stopper to some Conservative gains as well. An interesting point that has been raised by Brexit party voters, Greens and Liberal Democrats is that the electoral landscape would look very different if Britain adopted a proportional representation (PR) electoral system. It is more democratic than Britain's current first past the post (FPTP) as it makes every vote count, and gets rid of 'safe seats'. However by being more representative of the electorate, it also tends to result in coalition government, which critics will point out tends to be far less stable than a 'winner takes all' approach and forces compromise. Indeed this point is made clear by the Electoral Reform groups calculations of what our parliament would look like under PR currently - the Conservatives far from winning a large majority would actually be short of the 326 needed to gain only 288 seats. The Brexit party instead would be on 10 seats, instead of their current 0, while the Liberal Democrats would receive 70, Labour 216, Green 12 and the SNP 28. A coalition would thus be the order of the day. Watch out for my true pros and cons article in 2020 on PR vs FPTP, a subject with a lot of complexity behind it.

The Labour position

Labour can pat itself on the back for shifting the UK's political debate away from 'Should the state ever intervene in the economy?' towards 'How much should the state intervene?', that is small consolation to the horrific loss they have suffered against a Conservative party who has fully embraced this shift in the electorates direction. Labour lost seats like Sedgefield which has been Labour since 1935. They lost Northern mining towns that blamed the Conservatives for their decline under Thatcher. Their heartland strongholds were blown wide open. Even where they've retained seats, their majorities have come right down to the wire, such as in Ashton-under-Lyne where Shadow Education Minister Angela Rayner saw a drop of -12.3% of her vote share while the Conservatives grew by 5.3%.

This is not though a startling 'shock' process. An inkling of this was detected in the 2017 General Election, where the Conservatives vote-share grew in the North , despite not winning seats there. For instance in northern areas like Bishop Auckland which Labour has held since 2005 has seen consistent Conservative growth, in 2015 the Tories vote share grew by 6.2% to 32.5%, then then rocketed up 14.4% in 2017 to 46.9% and now in 2019 has become a Conservative 'win' on 53.7% of the vote. It could thus be argued that this is part of a longer-term trend in British politics, the much discussed 're-alignment' as economic distinctions of left and right become less important (or as we've seen in 2019 they essentially merge to be a similar outlook) and instead a nationalist vs globalist divide takes hold. I would argue though this is a topic that needs its own investigation, and we'll also need to wait for the 2024 election result to be able to discuss it with any certainty. Currently the Conservatives, as they freely admit have a long way to go to ensure they 'bank' these new northern voters.

Loved the policies, but oh. Jeremy Corbyn?

The electorates economic shift to a left-wing outlook has held. Labour on its policy platform is at its core popular among voters of all parties (Note though 'core', this is important for a later point), hence why the Conservatives have moved into this space too. Polling after 2019's result found that only 12% of British voters didn't vote Labour because of Labour's policies . Again this feeds into the fact that Britain generally has moved to the 'left' economically, and why Johnson's Conservatives have also followed suit. The issue then is not the core idea behind Labour's policies indeed canvassers have found that outside London, voters liked Labour's policies, but they did not like Jeremy Corbyn's leadership . The shine of 2017 having worn off among the electorate. This proved to be the killer point, as while both Corbyn and Johnson are unpopular, Corbyn is more so . Indeed according to Yougovs polling there, Corbyn and Johnson are both as equally on only 19% of the electorate trusting them to keep their prices, though Johnson actually comes off worse with 54% to Corbyn's 45% believing they would break their promises actively- despite this 36% of voters believe that Johnson would be a 'good leader' (A very low number) compared to Corbyn's 16%. Corbyn might be trusted more, but people did not feel he was leadership material in a race where it was essentially voters choosing the lesser of two evils.

To add further clarity specifically on what it was that was putting people off Corbyn, we can turn to the Guardian, who interviewed former Labour voters in the former Labour stronghold of Sedgefield . Here it was found here that many either hadn’t voted or had switched to supporting the Conservatives out of sheer frustration. While Brexit naturally played a role, far bigger credence by these former Labour voters was given to a personal dislike of Jeremy Corbyn. This dislike was based upon a feeling that he ‘didn’t understand them’. One life-long Labour voter who regretfully had abstained this election said t was because Corbyn was ‘weak’. Here we thus begin to see the crux of the matter.

The north-east is equally left-wing historically, but also patriotic. Indeed, it was noted that the many families had a history of serving in the armed forces or knew someone who did personally. Corbyn’s well known pacifism, and the perception of him being ‘unpatriotic’, by not supporting the armed forces, by engaging in dialogue with those who are perceived to wish harm upon Britain, and no doubt supported by several smear stories of Corbyn being a communist spy or terrorist sympathizer, all worked to Labour’s detriment. Corbyn as a leader is seen in the heartlands and no doubt by many voters across the country as being either unpatriotic or ‘soft’ on security.

A Prime Minister's first role is to facilitate the defense of their nation. The Conservatives have a groundswell of tradition to draw upon being the party of ‘law and order’ and while in reality, have made cuts to defense just as much (and arguably even more so) than Labour has historically, the perception of them being pro-armed forces is strong among all elements of the electorate . Their patriotism also is unquestionable politically.

For Labour though, they tend to be perceived by voters as being significantly weaker in this area , thus when they are successful it is with leaders who double down on domestic and foreign security, as with Attlee whose wartime record and credentials as a veteran were clear, or Blair- who set out publicly to have a strong foreign policy and coined the phrase ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’. Labour essentially have to work twice as hard to convince voters that national security is safe in their hands due to stereotyping essentially. Corbyn though with his pacifistic leanings (highly admirable, but not vote winning), his opposition to Britain’s nuclear deterrent and his more academic approach to security (for instance in response to the recent London Bridge terror attack, the Conservatives immediately promised no more early release for those convicted of terrorism, while Corbyn argued for this to be done only on a ‘case by case’ basis- a very considered response, but not a vote winning one for a party that has to try twice as hard to compete with the Conservatives as being trusted with domestic and foreign national security).

Add to this mix the consistent criticism of Corbyn’s handling of antisemitism in the party, his failure to really crack down quickly on this, and be seen to be doing so, feeding into the narrative that he is a ‘weak’ leader, and its very apparent why Labour lost their core vote. Policy = fine, Corbyn’s leadership = distrusted. Now what I’ve said here is not that Corbyn actually is a bad person, anyone whose seen his personal record knows that he is moral, and upstanding and a genuine person, but he was not the leadership that the Labour party needed to beat a revitalized Conservative party that is taking the fight to them on their home-ground.

While indeed the media portrayal around Corbyn was incredibly negative with a heavy bias, as the University of Longbourgh has proven . Their findings highlight that the media was specifically negative to Corbyn, far more than it ever was with the Conservatives, Labour scoring a -70% for coverage (i.e. the vast majority was negative), while the Conservatives received +30% positive, a huge difference.

But this negativity was to be expected given the past three years had pretty much followed the same course as the University of Longbourgh had shown in 2017 . The reality of this environment meant that firstly Labour would need one hell of a media strategy to combat this- in this latest election it turns out they clearly failed in this area, and secondly in this environment a leader like Corbyn, with his pacifism and particular past seeking dialouge with groups hostile to Britain has a clear handicap. Thus, Corbyn as leader was the main problem for Labour. Again going back to the Guardians findings in Sedgefield, a seat where they still hang the banners in their locals that the miners marched under against Thatcher, and yet which voted Conservative for the first time since 1935; out of every five doors knocked on, two were concerned with Brexit while three with Corbyn.

The second issue, was of course Brexit. Labour lost its leave voters who were integral to its northern heartlands which had overwhelmingly voted to leave during the 2016 referendum , while the Conservatives managed to hold onto their own leave voters (partly informed by the distaste for Corbyn). This double whammy of Corbyn and Brexit acted in tandem to see Labour's northern strongholds collapse, while gains against the Conservatives were limited around the country. The exception to this of course being Remain-voting urban centers like London, where Labour gained Putney from the Conservatives , an affluent suburb where Labour's offer of a second referendum, combined with its popular policy platform appealed. It might also be of interest to those looking into the realignment of British politics to note that Labour's vote share in Putney has consistently been increasing since 2015, from 30% in 2015, to 40% in 2017 and now 45% in 2019 mirrored by a drop in Conservative support.

A final though smaller aspect of why Labour lost is in the sheer amount of policy offerings that came out of nowhere. Take the promise of widespread and free broadband across the UK. The original pledge was a surprise, it had not been on the public radar prior to that in the same way debates about rent caps, train, energy and water nationalization have been. With little time to be properly digested, 62% of voters really liked the idea of free internet access to all homes and businesses, only 1/3rd were in favour of the partial nationalization of Open Reach this entailed , this was a half-way there policy. There is a valid economic discussion to be had about how access to 'free' broadband directly to homes and businesses can benefit an economy undergoing the fourth industrial revolution . Voters responded on gut at the surprise offering and were only partly convinced, with much to be desired.

Labour's 'core' policy offerings as evidenced previously are popular with the public. 2019 saw a swathe of dramatic increases in the amount Labour was offering. This clearly had some detrimental impact, as while the Conservatives also threw out policies of state-intervention and spending pledges, that the IFS blasted , Labour who had done this to a far greater degree, gained larger negative interest when the IFS blasted them , resulting in more media exposure as the Conservatives slipped under the radar, with their huge spending pledges, by being comparatively less than Labours surprise extras. This was helped by the Conservatives traditional reputation of fiscal responsibility and the implementation of a decade of austerity which meant that Conservative spending might possibly (My own opinion here) be received less sceptically by the electorate, while Labour who are expected to make radical (for the UK at least) offerings are more in danger of appearing to 'bribe' the electorate if they go 'too far' as arguably they may have done this time, compared with their more modest 2017 (which was still for the UK at least radical) platform for change. The danger then when the Conservatives adopt a similar approach as they have in 2019 is that they will come across looking potentially far more 'Government worthy'- which polling confirms as the Conservatives despite a very vague manifesto and the IFS criticism were still far more trusted with the economy than Labour .

The Un-Civil War

In the wake of Labour's defeat, Corbyn has said that he will not lead the party into the next election, but he also stated he will continue to lead the party during a 'period of reflection' and stated,

"I will discuss with our party to ensure there is a process now of reflection on this result and on the policies that the party will take going forward...And I will lead the party during that period to ensure that discussion takes place and we move on into the future.”

For some it seems like a sensible thing to do to ensure a smooth transition, particularly as Labour currently has no Deputy Leader since Tom Watson stepped down , however there are already Labour MP's calling for Corbyn's immediate resignation because a serious civil in-party war is looming.

Corbyn staying on for the interim while Labour discusses new policies, analyzes its defeat and talks about a new leader can also be seen to be a play from the parties Social Democratic wing to ensure they maintain control of Labours 'broad church' party, which in it contains various factions from the 'far-left' to the center (This faction is also dubbed the Blairites). By staying on Corbyn and his supporters hope to make sure that Labour do not radically deviate or alter from their current socialist/social-democratic policy platform (which again to a certain degree as we've seen is fairly popular among the British electorate). More than this though, it is to ensure that the next leader has a greater chance of being elected from this wing of the party, and not say from the Blairites or those who support Milliband's version of social democracy. A key force behind this of course is Momentum, and there have already been skirmishes between the Parliamentary Labour party factions and them, epitomized by Labour veteran and former Home Secretary Alan Johnson (who served under Blair) and Ed balls attacking both Corbyn's leadership, but also Momentum's role as a 'party within a party' that had sought to capture the Labour party and drag it consistently further left. Alistair Campbell had a fiery exchange with Momentum's leader Jon Lansman as the results came in, as he blamed them and Corbyn directly for this defeat.

Trade Unionists have blamed the defeat partly on Corbyn's bombardment of the electorate with too many policies on spending and state intervention that dwarfed his 2017 offering , which was popular and stretched the belief that these were not simply expensive bribes too far (Non-disclosure- A criticism I agree with personally),

Momentum meanwhile have dug in, they have stated they are not going anywhere and are getting to work pointing out that Corbyn's policies are popular among the public in polling (They mostly are... please note I used 'mostly') and that it was Brexit and Brexit alone that saw Labour so heavily defeated. This is a narrative peddled by the Labour leadership directly and one in a leaked secret document its told its loyalists to also follow . Momentum and Corbyn supporters are also advocating this line .

Post-election statistics have shown that Labour's support collapsed by 6 points in Remain areas and 10 points in leave areas . So while Brexit does have a huge bearing, there appears to be more to the picture than simply Labour being too 'remain', too 'leave' or too 'on the fence'.

Critics of Corbyn offer the argument much as they did on the night that essentially Corbyn himself was vastly unpopular. Nick Cohen argues using polling statistics that;

'A vast poll of 12,000 voters, released tonight, showed Jeremy Corbyn was by far the single biggest reason voters gave for deserting Labour. Of those who voted Labour in 2017 but were less than 50 per cent less likely to vote Labour now, Deltapoll found the overwhelming reason people gave was they ‘don’t like Jeremy Corbyn’ with 46 per cent agreeing with that blunt statement.'

There clearly is a Corbyn problem. However, currently Labour Blairites, or former Labour Blairites like Alastair Campbell are using such an argument to ignore the Brexit factor. Campbell argues that Corbyn's unpopularity was more to blame , and his refusal to take a firm stance on Brexit. While again there could be some truth to this, adopting a pro-remain position as Campbell advocates would still have seen Labour's leave voting heartlands go towards the Conservatives. The fact is that on Brexit Labour had a very difficult position, straddling as it did both remain cities in the south and leave towns in the north. In this context though, the appeal of Corbyn himself indeed did no favours though.

The debate about why Labour lost is only just beginning, and the coming civil war in Labour over the issue is starting to heat up. I am currently writing a deep dive article on the Labour party, its factions and how it functions, so watch out for that one! Broadly there are three factions in play:

Social Democratic Corbyn supporters- Momentum, McDonnell, Abbot and co- these are people who are blaming just Brexit for Labour's loss, that they were in an impossible position, they hope to engineer it so that the next labour leader will be a social democrat of their ilk.

Social Democratic Traditional Labour- These are people like Trade Union leader Len McCluskey who have blamed Corbyn for being too 'London-centric' and 'out of touch' with traditional working class North of England Labour voters. They also blame the Labour leadership for not supporting Brexit. They also thought blast any attempt by 'New Labour' to use this as a way to put one of their own candidates on the Labour throne.

New Labour- The remnants of the Blairites and the social democrats of Ed Milliband I would place in this category. These are openly arguing that Labour has only been successful in the recent passed when it was running on a center-left platform as Tony Blair did (Essentially neoliberal policies and a socially, but not economically to the left), they also tend to be Remain-leaning and thus place more emphasis on the failure of Corbyn's leadership and policy offering than they do on Brexit as seen by former MP's like Anna Turley who argued both for a second referendum on Brexit and has said of Labour's defeat that:

'For me, when you’re getting four doors in a row of lifelong Labour voters saying ‘I’m sorry Anna, I’m a lifelong Labour voter, I like what you’ve done, but I just can’t vote for that man to be Prime Minister’, I’m afraid that’s a fundamental barrier that we just couldn’t get across'

It goes without saying that the 'New Labour' faction also refuse to support any 'new' Corbyn-esque candidate .

The three broad factions (with many differences internally simplified for the sake of the article and my own sanity) all of which compete with one another and who represent three different traditional Labour electorates, Corbyn's group represents the young, New Labour are the centrist and center left voters who feel that Corbyn is a disaster and has gone 'too far', and the Traditional Social Democrats advocate a traditional working class vote, older and Brexit supporting. There is thus no easy way for these groups to compromise as they share very different values, indeed currently it seems like all three positions are simply digging in as these comments highlight , but if Labour is to ever make a resurgence they will need to somehow instead of destroying or removing the other factions, work out a way where they can be in coalition together- the 'broad church' that is needed by any British political party to actually win and gain a majority. With Corbyn gone, and Brexit at least perceived to be done (its not properly yet of course, that will take years) there might be the chance to retake their lost heartlands in 2024... this is providing the oncoming internal struggle isn't too bloody and polarizing and that the Conservatives are not wildly successful in convincing Northern voters through their new left-wing economic position of 'big state' Conservatism that they are now the 'real' party of the working classes.

Cue outro and the tantalizing promise of a Part 2

Here endeth then Part 1 on the tale of the 2019 General Election and its consequences. I hope you've enjoyed reading and that you'll join me for Part 2 which will come out sometime next week (Early Christmas present for you!). Part 2 will go into detail about the 'rise of the Celts' and the expected issues this may cause the United Kingdom as well as pay a visit to the funeral that was the Liberal Democrats election dreams as well as the macro effects it may have on our politics.

I'll hope you'll join me then, until then- stay warm, drink tea and make merry.

FactCheckUK + CCHQ = hot water!

Sun, 28 Jun 2020 21:10:45 GMT

The role of the 'boomer-meme' strategy in politics (Originally published 20 November 2019)

So, the decline of British politics continued apace yesterday. The Conservative Party misleadingly re-branded their main Twitter account (CCHQ) as 'FactcheckUK' for the duration of the leader's debate last night. It has been rectified now, but whether this was due to their rightfully getting into hot water over this, or simply because it was 'mission accomplished' is debatable. In this article I hope to shed light on the more Machiavellian aspect to the Conservatives online media strategy that currently opposition MP's and media outlets are missing, and indeed playing right into the hands of...

CCHQ's re-brand entailed removing every single 'Conservative' symbol or identification (apart from the tiny @CCHQ handle) and replacing it with branding / design to mimic the presentation of legitimate fact-checkers such as Channel 4's Factcheck and Fullfact. While masquerading thus as an impartial service, CCHQ proceeded to spout-forth party political statements, supporting everything Boris Johnson said on the stand, while disparaging Corbyn. This was happening with Boris Johnson at the stand unabashedly stated that trust and truth in politics did matter (That this statement was met with derisive laughter from the audience alas shows how far British politics has fallen)

Sowing confusion

In their new skin, CCHQ acted as a 'shield' for Johnson against the actual impartial Fact Checkers that were active during the debate busily checking up on the statements made by both leaders. It did this by muddying the waters with its party-political messaging under the guise of an impartial service, which it hoped will have misled and confused voters. This morning James Cleverly (Conservative Party Chairman) defended his party by saying that essentially the 'branding' of the Conservatives Twitter page did not matter, people knew it was CCHQ by the tiny @CCHQ handle that remained, however if this branding had not mattered, then why change it in the first place to look like a Fact Checking service?

Twitter is a fast-flowing service with 5,787 tweets a second . In this context it is very easy to trick viewers through such re-branding who merely view data from their feeds. Very few users will actually click on the post to see its source or the conversation surrounding it. Even if they did, again the re-branding would help mask the truth from a cursory glance. Thus the Conservatives 'shield strategy' is a viable, if disgraceful one.

This fast-flowing nature of Twitter (and social media in general) is also integral to the second aspect of CCHQ's strategy- courting controversy. The (rightful) ruckus this has caused plays right into their hands.

The Conservatives have historically suffered when it comes to the social media front of electoral strategy. Quite simply, they aren't popular online. They lack the organic army of activists and sympathizers that parties like Labour have , who are willing to 'share' for free the parties various messages and attack lines. This is an issue not merely because the Conservatives find it difficult online to fight elections, but also because social media should ideally be the Conservative's saving grace to compensate for a smaller and less active canvassing force . Indeed in trying to make use of social media more effectively, they spent £2.3 million on Facebook adverts in 2017 , compared to Labour's mere £500,000. Labour of course relied on its huge 'free-share' base instead and most commentators agree that they had the better of the Tories in this area, despite the funding difference.

Boomer Meme Strategy

So this time the Conservatives have changed tack, asymmetrical online warfare is the order of the day, and the 'Boomer Meme's strategy' is being employed to potentially great effect. This oddly named concept, was pioneered by Sean Topham and Ben Guerin during the 2019 Australian election, were as digital media strategists their particular use of controversial or poor quality 'memes' was said to have contributed greatly to the success of the right-wing coalition government coming to power.

The strategy had entailed the employment of short political statements and pop-culture references that were engineered to be 'bad', mocked and derided. In this way the opposition and media would share them (To criticize or comment on their poor quality or simplistic message) thus increasing the 'reach' of the message and the views it would get for free. Essentially leeching onto their opponents reactions to propel the message forward.

Both men have now been employed by Boris Johnson to help craft the Conservatives media strategy. Earlier this year, the Guardian reported that we began to see Conservative online posts simply stating 'Get Brexit done', written in Comic Sans, the most controversial of all fonts , with nothing more to them. Recently though it seems the strategy has evolved. The courting of ridicule and controversy has increased - The Conservatives firstly took a poor quality jab at Corbyn , with a photo-shopped picture of the leader of the opposition dressed as a Chicken and a jibe at KFC that they had 'found a bigger chicken than you', while mimicking the KFC logo. This was ridiculed by commentators and KFC, but created views from this controversy. Then there were posts such as the doctored footage of Labour's Keir Starmer . The Conservatives created an edited clip that made it look like Keir Starmer had failed to answer a question on Labour's Brexit policy. He in fact had, and the interviewer Piers Morgan was quick to attack the Conservatives for the dishonest edit.

The Conservatives appeared hamfisted, dishonest silly, and were called out each time, generating controversy. While this could be seen as merely a confirmation that the Conservatives are still very bad at media strategy, the flip-side is that they've taken the lessons of the Boomer Meme strategy (essentially a hypersonic conception that all publicity is good publicity) and run full pelt with it- indeed even now, the Keir Starmer doctored footage is well believed by some voters I know, it is effective, and during a decade of hung parliaments and unstable majorities, even small advantage begins to count.

Controversy pays

Thus, the controversy created by CCHQ masquerading as an impartial Fact Checker might actually be something either sought, or at least taken advantage of by the Conservatives. Immediately on seeing the change, commentators attacked CCHQ in their Twitter threads, shared the CCHQ statements and homepage to display their outrage, or simply make others aware of the dishonesty. Opposition candidates like Labour's David Lammy were quick to attack it for the purposeful misleading that it was, while the BBC today are likely to run with this story all day.

Surely though this will have a negative effect upon Conservative party polling, it must be politically damaging? Well, not in our current context. The British public's general (and understandable) apathy and lack of trust in Britain's political class, an issue far before and deeper than just Brexit or the MP expense scandals plays right into Conservative hands. Indeed a Hansaard survey found that 54% of the British public were supportive of a leader who was willing to break the rules . When so little is expected of the political class, and when in fact a significant proportion of the country would support subversive actions from a 'strong man' to 'get things done' the actual electoral fallout and political consequences of being caught doing something like this will probably be very minimal. At best it'll be a 'there the liars go again, oh well', or at worst there will actually be a groundswell of support for the daring ingenuity of pulling such a dishonest trick.

Thus for the Conservatives there will likely be no real political consequences and moreover they have made up for their lack of an organic online presence and large body of willing followers to share their message, by using their opponents to do it for them, and roping the media into playing along. Alongside the criticism of those sharing this story, viewers will also see the Conservatives political posts, people will search for CCHQ to look for themselves, traffic will increase, which will help the Conservatives appear more often on Twitter feeds and other search engines like Google helped by the algorithms used which do not always take into account if the increased engagement with the site is positive or negative.

Twitter has condemned the move, calling it misleading and has stated it will take 'decisive corrective action' if anyone did this again. However, the damage is done, Twitter took no action when the flurry of reports came in during the debate and no sanctions are being applied now. The Electoral Commission has also said that this is essentially beyond its remit. UK electoral law regarding the misuse of online data and strategy has not changed since 2015 , there is no code of ethics or conduct for this. We are wholly unprepared to deal with a party that is willing, and indeed has made it, its strategy to go against typical political convention and actively be dishonest online.

The Conservatives this morning speaking through Dominic Raab , have defended this by saying they do not recognize Twitter's summation that they were dishonest, by brushing off criticism levelled at them by the actual independent Fact Checkers by ridiculing them as simply 'not liking competition' before finishing up by saying that voters on the doorstep do 'not give a toss' about social media use. This is no mere defensive rearguard action from a Conservative party caught red-handed at purposefully being misleading, but statements designed to both brush off the controversy, aimed at their traditional voters, and also purposefully inflame the controversy among the opposition and media- thus getting more air-time to the story and views online for the Tories core messages and attack lines. Moreover they are right, it is unlikely they will be punished by the wider-electorate for such subversive tactics due to the public's already low expectations of our political class, and are more likely to (as in Australia) get a net positive from their presence now being far greater than before, at least for a while, and then when the traffic dips- another digital controversy can also be created.

The Conservatives have essentially overcome their deficit in online presence by intelligently creating controversy and leeching onto the oppositions criticism of their manufactured 'problem' to expand their online reach to heights they could only dream of before...all it has cost them is the integrity of Britain's politics. If the Conservative Party had done this in 'reality', say through a leaflet or letter through the door, they would rightfully get slammed for it and legal action would no doubt swiftly happen.

Online however, currently the only effective arbiter is Twitter, a private company. While Twitter in this case has condemned the Conservatives, it chose to take no actual action either at the time or now. Add to this Facebook's controversial stance in deciding not to interfere/vet with its fact checking service (choose depending upon political bias) political adverts on its site and there are real questions over how we resolve this. It is debatable if state-led legislation can really help the matter, regulating the internet and its platforms is a true minefield- indeed the Conservatives have had t o drop their own plans to mandate an age-verification checker for online porn due to it being far too complicated and essentially unrealistic currently. When something as non-controversial (for most) as preventing children from accessing pornographic content cannot be delivered, how is something as party-politically sensitive as legislating to prevent dishonest politicking of data and online platforming supposed to succeed?

Until it somehow does though, democracy and truth in politics will continue to suffer at an ever faster pace, particularly if political parties have outright embraced (as opposed to tacitly flirting) with misleading, misinforming and lying to voters as viable tactics to employ in a democratic society.

Claiming the Conservatives are 'plotting' to sell the NHS is unfair. It implies an agency that Boris Johnson's Britain could not afford.

sammercury@hotmail.co.uk (Samuel Jardine) — Sun, 28 Jun 2020 19:06:30 GMT

There is opportunity in Brexit for the UK, but promoters of Brexit need to start being upfront about not merely a credible post-Brexit vision for Britain but also the trials and tribulations Britain will face in a multi-polar world (Published originally on my LinkedIn on November 28, 2019)

The furor over the revealing of a leaked Government document by Britain's Labour party which highlights that discussions between the US and British governments over the NHS (or aspects of it) being included in a post-Brexit Free Trade Agreement is one of those moments that has the potential to change an election… or back-fire spectacularly.

Both sides have had their pundits and spin doctors hard at work to maximize or minimize the damage these revelations cause. However, a fair and balanced assessment is difficult to make as the rather ‘simplistic’ messaging a General Election requires prevents the more detailed (and alas winding and wordy!) analysis needed. For starters to apply some broader context it's not exactly as if the NHS has not been steadily outsourcing contracts or parts of its service without the help of the USA. Privatization has been creeping steadily in under Governments of all banners.

The 'TL/DR' Summary:

To summarize the oncoming winding and wordy analysis- Labour have not been fair with their current attack upon the Conservatives. There is no foreseeable way the NHS could be 'taken off the table' if the USA desires it to be up for discussion, it is not necessarily that the Conservative's master-plan of finally privatizing the entirety of that dastardly socialist NHS has been exposed. That the USA is able to demand and get the NHS 'on the table' however is entirely due to the Conservatives own self-created weaknesses in Britain's global position.

Simply put, Britain cannot walk away from a US trade deal if Boris Johnson sticks to his arbitrary promise that there will be no extension for EU trade talks, we will leave in 11 months with or without a deal. A position that has already come under fire as it means Britain is putting itself into a place where it will only get poor quality trade deals due to being rushed on its own self-imposed timetable . It is entirely unrealistic to expect a fully-fledged trade deal in 11 months, the quickest take several years, unless Britain is prepared to simply give into everything the EU wants. This means we're likely heading for ‘no-deal’, in which case, Britain politically and economically just cannot afford to walk away as the Conservative Government has said they would, from the US. Indeed, the success of a comprehensive FTA with the USA becomes integral to, and will reflect directly on the political stability of the Brexit project and the presiding Government.

For their part the USA already runs a large surplus with the UK already in both goods and services- there is no economic incentive for them to need an FTA with Britain. Their aims in real terms is to simply rearrange British domestic circumstances to suit particular US lobby groups.

This is on top of the 'natural' power imbalance- trade negotiations are almost always political, and the US always throws its incredible weight around and almost always gets it way. If the US wants the NHS or elements of the NHS to be on the table, there is very little Britain can do to keep it off the table, particularly if there is no comprehensive EU agreement in place to prop up Britain's position, something that is impossible with Johnson's 11 month timetable, at best the EU has said it will only offer a 'bare-bones' agreement . This is where the Conservatives have been truly misleading.

To the winding and wordy analysis:

Firstly, The Conservatives indeed have been misleading- They have consistently maintained the NHS is not 'on the table' and their Manifesto plants a brittle flag (Manifesto's rarely survive contact with reality) committing the NHS, its drug pricing and its other components to all ‘not be on the table’ during any FTA discussions. Yet 'Channel 4 Dispatches' found d rug pricing had been extensively discussed already and it is clear from the further leaked text that drug pricing among other areas too is further developed than the Government has been letting on, while of course the UK has not agreed to anything yet, this is far from it being 'off the table' as talks are happening directly on these subjects. The fact that early in the campaign Conservative candidates were specifically t old not to make any pledges for supporting legislation that protect the NHS from privatization in trade deals compounds this further.

But this does not mean the Conservatives are actively ‘plotting’ to sell off the NHS (to use Labour’s accusation), it more likely means that the USA wants the NHS to be on the table, as they have openly stated in the form of their 'Summary of Specific Negotiating Objectives' , and thus it is. The US after all are operating from an assumption that ‘everything’ is on the table in negotiations and leaving it up to the UK to try and get areas excluded- a tactic which favours the US position entirely as the UK is not and will not really be in any position to get the comprehensive exclusions that it might need to protect its economy and services. It is not then Conservative plotting, but the weakness of Britain’s negotiating position exacerbated by Johnson's arbitrary no extensions to EU trade talks policy that means the NHS is 'on the table', by if not by plunging Britain into a recession as the IFS has predicted , at least then weakening Britain's economy to make us more dependent upon a comprehensive and fast-track USA FTA.

Trade as Politics

Trade deals between states are not just about ‘business’ as I suspect most people believe, they are inherently political as domestic sovereignty is at stake. Dependency theory indeed argues convincingly the point that a trade agreement between two unequal powers results in the larger state having undue influence over the domestic affairs of the smaller state with no equivalent reciprocation (whether they choose to exert this influence or not is a different matter, the point being if they did, there is not a lot the smaller state can do to prevent it).

An example can be seen in the China-Canada FTA discussions which began officially in 2016 (Still not signed- FTA’s take a long time, not the under a year as the Conservatives have promised, unless essentially they just sign up to a blank cheque agreement), in these discussions, China enforced a treaty clause that secret tribunals would be created that could review and potentially change Canadian law if Chinese businesses found existing or new regulations negatively affected their interests . Thus, Chinese officials would have a say in how Canada domestically passes laws, the worst part, there was no reciprocation of this at all for Canadian businesses in China.

The Canada-China FTA has only come into real hot water recently though due to a clause the other big power, the USA enforced on it during its USMCA trade agreement that allows the US to inspect any other FTA’s that Canada signs with other countries not part of the USMCA area - essentially the US can dictate who Canada can and cannot do business with and on what terms. It’s not too far to say that Canada essentially has to choose between which master to serve at this rate, and as you can imagine, this does not bode well for Britain.

The USA has 'Big Trade' energy

Indeed, the USA acts just as China does globally, it throws its weight around to interfere with the domestic agenda of its smaller trading partners whenever it suits its own interests. A case in point is with Ecuador. In 2018 the USA demanded that Ecuador cease promoting natural breastmilk to its own citizens, as it was threatening the market-share of US powdered milk companies, for whom Ecuador is apparently a large market. The US even went so far as to threaten the imposition of trade sanctions and withdrawal of aid if Ecuador did not comply . Forget ‘Big Oil’ and ‘Big Pharma’ being the evil Washington lobbyists playing the strings of power…US powdered milk is now getting in on the game too. But the point is, that the US is prepared to be very aggressive to get its own way, even over such a globally insignificant issue as breastmilk.

Take also the US-UK treaty relationship in its historical context. The USA during the 1961 ATS negotiations forced the UK to the negotiating table, and then proceeded to destroy the British negotiating demands through threats and then imposed unilaterally on a humbled Britain its own vision of how the Antarctic should work. This by-the-by is during the high point of the ‘special relationship’. This is eerily similar to the negotiations in 1947 and 1949 over the Sterling Crisis where the US not merely manipulated British weakness, but actively caused damage first to Britain's economy to get its own way.

When you add to the USA’s aggressive stance to trade and getting its own way (even without Trump’s ‘America First) with the context of Britain’s own position and its easy to become rather alarmed. We’ve already had reports during 2017 that in preliminary talks when the British delegation refused the US something, US negotiators wold just literally walk away until the Brits backed down.

This is because the US runs a trade surplus with Britain in both goods (A surplus of $5.5. billion in 2018, massively increased for its 2017 $2.2 billion) and services (A surplus of $13 billion in 2018) . Thus, the US there is no economic incentive for the USA to do an FTA with the UK, they are doing very well already with a positive trend to boot, and theoretically any FTA may actually see Britain advocate for measures to balance things out a bit from their perspective to protect Britain's own domestic industry and services which might harm the USA’s trade surplus (A very important statistic in Trump’s administration)… that is if Britain was an equal power to the USA of course. The USA is approaching this FTA in real terms to simply rearrange Britain’s domestic circumstances to better suit particular lobby groups.

Post-Brexit Britain's 'Small Trade' energy

Britain on the other hand needs an FTA with the USA. It needs it economically to account for the loss of trade with the EU, particularly if Johnson sticks to his promise of seeking no extension and thus crashing out of the EU on no-deal while still not having negotiated a trade agreement with them.

While an FTA with the US will nowhere near make up for the lost trade in the short or mid-term, it will at least alleviate the issue slightly and may present new opportunities for British businesses. To put this in context though, in 2018 from the British Governments own figures , the EU made up 45% of UK exports and 53% of its imports. By comparison the US was ‘just under a fifth of UK exports’ and 10% of imports.

So, economically Britain (particularly one that seems as now headed on course for a no-deal brexit) will desperately need this FTA with the USA. There are no other large-scale markets (beyond the EU) that are wealthy and populous and that has the need or want, or is able to purchase large volumes of British goods and services, that can be tapped into quickly (i.e. not having to negotiate individually- remember another constraint is how long it takes to sign FTA’s and also that Britain lacks the diplomatic infrastructure to tackle negotiating multiple agreements at the same time currently ). A China FTA while also fitting this bill should be deemed a terrifying prospect for a weak (again however temporarily) post-Brexit UK as it, unlike the USA, is actively building a neo-hegemony through unequal trade partnerships , not to mention the UK has directly competing interests with China- Hong Kong being an obvious one alongside the South China Sea crisis, where Britain recently deployed warships . Indeed China has said that Britain due to its geopolitical rivalry may now not expect a very good post-Brexit trade deal . So Britain cannot simply walk away from an FTA with the US, and thus the ability for the Government to protect the NHS from being ‘on the table’ is simply not there.

This is exacerbated by Britain’s political dimension too. The real test of Brexit as a sustainable project will come after Britain has left the EU. The economic impact must be bearable or at least very short, otherwise public support (already polarized) will disintegrate, along with the political capital of the Government presiding over it. Brexit must also be shown to be a great ‘success’, by opening new trading opportunities. As I keep drumming in, trade negotiations take years, unless one party is prepared to simply give in to all the demands of the other. During this time, Britain will be stuck in a mire- Even on the much vaunted (and misunderstood) WTO terms, Britain’s trade will suffer, and moreover several WTO members, including Russia, and yes, the USA are actually opposing Britain’s establishment of its own WTO schedules , preventing it from swiftly moving to trading on secure WTO terms. There are a variety of complaints at Britain's proposed schedules, but essentially it boils down to these states being able to take advantage of Britain's need to get its schedules in order (And quickly) to leverage concessions, be it monetary or more substantial 'special treatment' on a sectorial basis. Britain will have to thus give potentially significant concessions , undermining its domestic industry, until these states relent and withdraw their objection. In the meantime this could have a profound impact upon Britain’s businesses and services as we are forced to operate in the short, or potentially even mid-term under generic tariffs that will catch businesses unprepared and alter the scale and scope of our markets. The CBI already warns that even if we get securely on WTO terms, the British economy will be radically altered, with sectors shrinking and some manufacturing areas disappearing entirely .

So again, with the need for a ‘comprehensive’ FTA with the USA being integral to the political stability of the Brexit project, as well as Britain’s economic health (which ties into the political sustainability of Brexit) it is hard to see how the UK can afford to provide a rebuttal to US demands, substantial political capital will have to be spent, and even after that remember the US has placed the emphasis on the UK having to defend areas of its economy for exclusion from its demands, If the British Government digs down on the NHS, what else will they instead have to sacrifice? and there is nothing to prevent a USA who already enjoys a substantial and growing trade surplus from simply walking away.

Moreover, there is the small point of a post-Brexit Britain, in a multi-polar world that is fast going into a protectionist phase will be uniquely at risk, with Britain being forced to latch onto the coat tails of one of the big powers. That however is a geopolitical article for another time.

Rounding up

Overall though, in this context with the factors described it is not within the power of the British Government, Conservative or otherwise to realistically ‘walk away’ from the prospect of a US FTA, particularly as it needs a comprehensive one to ensure the viability of Brexit, as well as the UK’s own position as a global actor. Indeed it is likely that any USA FTA will not come close to making up for the economic loss anyway , but even then Britain will need at least some salve economically and politically.

So, if the USA wants the NHS on the table, there is very little that can be done to ‘keep it off’. This is where the Conservatives are being misleading, by presenting to the public that somehow Britain can ‘walk away’ in a post-Brexit context, the only way it could do that would be to sign a comprehensive deal with the EU- either going into the customs union and single market (and indeed becoming an economic vassal of sorts- taking EU rules with no say in how they are made), or doing a comprehensive FTA with the EU… which will take far more than 11 months.

So what we should be blaming the Conservatives for is offering a false narrative on Britain’s ability to a ‘walk away’ in its immediate post-Brexit aftermath, as well as at best being utterly simplistic, or at worst concealing the truth from the public about the challenges facing a post-Brexit Britain, challenges made worse and in some cases caused by the self-imposed ‘no extensions’ policy by Johnson which will force Britain into the context noted above. A context where Britain has little choice but to bow to US pressure, which will be huge, or risk Brexit unravelling. However, this isn’t as catchy or concise as the ‘Conservatives plotting’ line reeled out rather unfairly. The act of ‘plotting’ requires more agency than Britain is likely going to have on our current course.

There is opportunity in Brexit for the UK, but promoters of Brexit need to start being upfront about not merely a credible post-Brexit vision for Britain (The current 'Global Britain' mantra is sorely lacking a basis in reality), but also the trials and tribulations Britain will face in a multi-polar world, heading into a protectionist phase, to get there. If they continue to spin a yarn of fabled Brexit uplands, they'll have no-one but themselves to blame when Brexit becomes undermined and unravelled at its moment of final achievement.